On troubles. (About the twenty-two things that cause trouble to monks) .
The four requisites (for the attainment of beatitude) . .
. Impurity. (Carefulness required for obtaining the end). . .
. Death against (and with) one’s will . The false ascetic. (Wrong conduct leads to perdition, right conduct to salvation)
. The parable of the ram, &c. (illustrative of the folly of the sinner who misses his chance of reaching a more exalted state of existence) . .
. Kapila’s verses (in praise of good conduct) . The Pravragy4 of king Nami. (A dialogue between him and Indra who advised him to retain the royalty) . .
The leaf of the tree. (A sermon by Mahavira on the punishment of the sinner and the reward of the righteous) .
The very learned (monk; his virtues and his superiority) . .
Harikésa, (a Kandala, turned monk ; “his victory over a Brahman, whom he converts)
13. Xitra and Sambhfita. (A dialogue on the vanity of worldly pleasures)
14, Ishukara. (A _ legend, illustrating the excellence of a monastic life)
Cad
Vi 4/5 °
PAGE xiii
p. 15
18 20
p. 24
27 31
p. 35
41 46 50 56
p. 61
viii
CONTENTS.
Lecture 15.
» 16. » 17. ~ 18.
. 4 » 25.
26.
» 29.
The true monk; (how he should conduct himself) . . .
The ten conditions of perfect chastity
The bad Sramaza; (what a monk should avoid)
Safigaya. (King S. turned monk ; he preaches that the state of a monk is preferable to that ofa king; illustrations from Gaina history) .
. The son of Mrig&. (On the punishment in the hells)
. The great duty of the Nirgranthas. (A dialogue between king Sré#ika and a monk on the happiness obtained by righteousness. The bad monk is lost) .
. Samudrapfla, (tumed monk. On the duties of a monk)
. Rathanémi. (The renunciation of Arish/anémi;
his wife Ragimatt exhorts Rathanémi)
. Kési and Gautama. (The followers of Parsva
are brought over to the church of Mahfvira) . The Samitis (and the Guptis)
The bad monk is lost) .
. Samudrapfla, (tumed monk. On the duties of a monk)
. Rathanémi. (The renunciation of Arish/anémi;
his wife Ragimatt exhorts Rathanémi)
. Kési and Gautama. (The followers of Parsva
are brought over to the church of Mahfvira) . The Samitis (and the Guptis)
The true sacrifice. (Gayaghdésha, the monk, converts Vigayaghésha, the Brahman) The correct behaviour (of monks during the
several parts of day and night)
. The bad bullocks (compared to bad pupils by Garga)
. The road to final deliverance. (On the fundamental principles of Gainism)
The exertion in righteousness. (On the seventy-three articles necessary for reaching perfection)
. The road of penance. (On external and internal austerities) .
. Mode of life. (A list of articles of the Gaina faith according to the number of their subdivisions)
. The causes of carelessness; (what excites the passions and produces Karman)
PAGE
69 73
Pid
a
p. 80
p. 88
100 108 112 11g 129 136 142 149
p. 152
p. 158
p. 174
p. 180
CONTENTS.
ix
Lecture 33. The nature of Karman, (and the subdivisions of it)
” 34. On Lésy4 .
” 35. The houseless monk. (The chief duties of a monk)
» 36. On living beings and things without life. (The contents of this Lecture are detailed in note 2, pp. 206, 207) .
SUTRAKA/TANGA. FIRST BOOK.
PAGE
192 196
p. 203
p. 206
Lecture 1. The doctrine. (On some heretical doctrines) 235-248
Chapter 1. (Materialists, v.8; Ved4ntins, v.9; other materialists, vv. 11, 12; Akriy4vadins, v. 13; forerunners of the Vaiséshikas, v. 15;
PAGE Lecture 3. Chapter 4. (Several objections nemoved) 268 ” 4. Knowledge of women . . . 271-278 Chapter 1. (How women tempt a , monk) 241 Chapter 2. (How they treat him afterwards). 275 ” 5. Description of the hells . . . . 279-286 Chapter 1. . . . . . . 279 Chapter 2 . 283 ” 6. Praise of Mahavira : 287
” 7. Description of the wicked. (No living beings should be destroyed; no merit in ablutions and tending the sacrificial fire. A monk should not be selfish) 292
’ 8. On exertion. (Exertion not leading to works recommended) . . 297
» 10. Carefulness. (Some more injunctions and prohibitions) . . . 306
» 11. The Path. (The same subject continued and concluded) 310
» 12. The creed. (On the four heresies : Agnosticism, v. 2; Vinayavada, v. 3 ; Akriyavada, wy. 4-10; KriyAvada, v. 11 ff.) . 315
» 13. The real truth. (Some duties of a pious monk). . v1)
» 14. The Nirgrantha. (The same subject continued) . . . . 324
» 15. The Yamakas. (Miscellaneous topies treated in artificial verses) . - 329 » 16. The song. (On the virtues of a true monk) . 333
SECOND BOOK.
Lecture 1. The Lotus. (The parable of the Lotus. The
Materialists, § 14 ff. Another school of
Materialists and the forerunners of the
Vaiséshikas, § 20 ff. The Véd4ntins, § 25 ff.
The fatalists, § 30 ff. Exhortation to follow the true Law, § 35 ff). 335
CONTENTS.
xi
Lecture 2. On activity. (The twelve kinds of committing sin, and sinless actions. Some wicked practices described, § 25 ff. Some more wicked practices, § 60 ff. Right conduct of monks, § 69 ff.; of laymen, § 75 ff. Refutation of the 363 heretical philosophical schools, § 79 ff. Conclusion) .
” 3. Knowledge of food. (On the generation of living beings) . . . . .
» 4. Renunciation of activity. (An action is sinful though it be done unconsciously) .
5. Freedom from error; (what should be maintained and what not).
” 6. Ardraka; (his dispute with Géedla, a " Buddhist, a Védic priest, a Védantin, and a Hastitapasa) . .
” 7. Nalanda. (Udaka, a follower of Parsva, is is converted by Gautama) .
Inpex or Names anp SusyjEcTs . InpEx oF SANSKRIT AND PrAxrit Worps . .
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East
PAGR
p. 355
388 398
p. 405
409 419
437 443
p. 453
INTRODUCTION
(Udaka, a follower of Parsva, is is converted by Gautama) .
Inpex or Names anp SusyjEcTs . InpEx oF SANSKRIT AND PrAxrit Worps . .
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the Sacred Books of the East
PAGR
p. 355
388 398
p. 405
409 419
437 443
p. 453
INTRODUCTION
TEN years have elapsed since the first part of my translation of Gaina Sfitras appeared. During that decennium many and very important additions to our knowledge of Gainism and its history have been made by a small number of excellent scholars. The text of the canonical books, together with good commentaries in Sanskrit and Guzerati, has been made accessible in fair editions published by native scholars in India. Critical editions of two of them have been published by Professors Leumann? and Hoernle?; and the latter scholar has added a careful translation and ample illustrations to his edition of the text. A general survey of the whole Gaina literature has been given by Professor Weber in his catalogue of the Berlin Manuscripts? and in his learned treatise* on the sacred literature of the Gainas. The development of Gaina learning and science has been studied by Professor Leumann, and some Gaina legends and their relations to those of the Brahmans and Buddhists have been investigated by the same scholar®. An important document for our knowledge of the old history of the Svétambara sect has been edited
1 Das Aupapatika Sitra, in the Abhandlungen fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. viii; and Dasavaikalika Stra und Niryukti, in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. xlvi.
? The Uvasaga Das&o: (in the Bibliotheca Indica), vol. i. Text and Commentary, Calcutta, 1890 ; vol. ii. Translation, 1888.
> Berlin, 1888 and 1892.
* In the Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 211 ff., and xvii, p. 1 ff.; translated in the Indian Antiquary and edited separately, Bombay, 1893.
5 In the Actes du VI Congrés International des Orientalistes, section Arienne, p. 469 ff., in the 5th and 6th vols. of the Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, and in the 48th vol. of the Journal of the German Oriental Society.
xiv GAINA SOTRAS.
5 In the Actes du VI Congrés International des Orientalistes, section Arienne, p. 469 ff., in the 5th and 6th vols. of the Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, and in the 48th vol. of the Journal of the German Oriental Society.
xiv GAINA SOTRAS.
by myself}, and the history of some of their Gakkhas has been made known from their lists of teachers by Hoernle and Klatt. The last-named scholar, whom we have all but lost by this time, has prepared a biographical dictionary of all Gaina writers and historical persons, and he has issued specimens of this great Onomasticon, while Hofrat Biihler has written a detailed biography of the famous encyclopaedist Hémazandra*. The same scholar has deciphered the ancient inscriptions, and discussed the sculptures excavated by Dr. Fiihrer at Mathur4%, and the important inscriptions at Sravaza Beégo/a have been edited by Mr. Lewis Rice*; M. A. Barth has reviewed our knowledge of Gainism °, and likewise Biihler in a short paper °. Lastly Bhandarkar has given a most valuable sketch of the whole of Gainism™. All these additions to our knowledge of Gainism (and I have but mentioned the most remarkable ones) have shed so much clear light on the whole subject that little room is left now for mere guesswork, and the true historical and philological method can be applied to all its parts. Still some of the principal problems require elucidation, while the proffered solution of others is not accepted by all scholars. I, therefore, gladly avail myself of this opportunity to discuss some of the disputed points, for the settling of wliich the works translated in this volume offer valuable materials.
It is now admitted by all that Nataputta (G#4trzputra), who is commonly called Mahavira or Vardhamdna, was a contemporary of Buddha; and that the Nigazthas®
! The Parisish¢aparvan by Hémakandra, Bibliotheca Indica.
3 Denkschriften der philos.-histor. Classe der kaiserl. Akademie der Wissen schaften, vol. xxxvii, p. 171 ff.
5 Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vols. ii and iii. Epigraphia Indica, vols. i and ii.
* Bangalore, 1889.
5 The Religions of India. Bulletin des Religions de l’Inde, 1889-94.
® Nigan¢ha is apparently the original form of the word, since it is thus spelled in the Aséka inscription, in Pali, and occasionally by the Gainas, though the phonetic laws of all three idioms would have given preference to the form niggantha, the more frequent spelling in Gaina works.
INTRODUCTION. XV
INTRODUCTION. XV
(Nirgranthas), now better known under the name of Gainas or Arhatas, already existed as an important sect at the time when the Buddhist church was being founded. But it is still open to doubt whether the religion of the early Nirgranthas was essentially the same as that taught in the canonical and other books of the present Gainas, or underwent a great change up to the time of the composition of the Siddh4nta. In order to come nearer the solution of this question, it may be desirable to collect from the published Buddhist works, as the oldest witnesses we can summon, all available information about the Nigazéhas, their doctrines and religious practices.
In the Anguttara Nikaya, III, 74, a learned prince of the Likkhavis of Vaisali, Abhaya', gives the following account of some Nigaztha doctrines: ‘The Nigaztha NA&taputta, sir, who knows and sees all things, who claims perfect knowledge and faith (in the following terms): “walking and standing, sleeping or waking, I am always possessed of perfect knowledge and faith ;” teaches the annihilation by austerities of the old Karman, and the prevention by inactivity of new Karman. When Karman ceases, misery ceases; when misery ceases, perception ceases; when perception ceases, every misery will come to anend. In this way a man is saved by pure annihilation of sin (niggara) which is really effective.’
The Gaina counterpart to these tenets can be collected from the Uttaradhyayana XXIX. ‘By austerities he cuts off Karman,’ § 27. ‘By renouncing activity he obtains inactivity; by ceasing to act he acquires no new Karman, and destroys the Karman he had acquired before,’ § 37. The last stages in this process are fully described in §§ 71,
1 There are apparently two persons of this name. The other Abhaya, a son of king Srézika, was a patron of the Gainas, and is frequently mentioned in their legends and in the canonical books. In the Magghima Nikaya 58 (Abhayakuméra Sutta) it is related that the Nigaz/ka Nataputta made him engage in a disputation with Buddha. The question was so adroitly framed that whether the answer was Yes or No, it involved Buddha in self-contradiction. But the plan did not succeed, and Abhaya was converted by Buddha. There is nothing in this account to elucidate the doctrines of Nataputta.
Xvi GAINA SOTRAS.
72. And again, in XXXII, v. 7, we read: ‘ Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery.’ The nearly identical verses 34, 47, 60, 73, 86, 99 may be thus condensed: ‘But a man who is indifferent to the object of the senses, and to the feelings of the mind [this comes nearest to the Buddhist védan 4. perception], is free from sorrows; though still in the Saszsdra, he is not afflicted by that long succession of pains. just as the leaf of the Lotus (is not moistened) by water.’
perception], is free from sorrows; though still in the Saszsdra, he is not afflicted by that long succession of pains. just as the leaf of the Lotus (is not moistened) by water.’
The above assertion that Nataputta claimed the possession of perfect knowledge and faith, requires no further proof; for it is one of the fundamental dogmas of the Gainas.
Another piece of information about Nigaz¢ka doctrines may be gathered from the Mahdvagga VI, 31 (S. B. E., vol. xvii, p. 108 ff.) There a story is told of Siha 1, the general of the Li#ksavis, who was a lay disciple of Nataputta. He wanted to pay the Buddha a visit, but Nataputta tried to dissuade him from it, because the Nigan¢has held the Kriy4vada, while the Buddha taught the Akriyavada. Siha, however, setting his master’s prohibition at nought, went to the Buddha on his own account, and was, of course, converted by him. Now the statement that the Nigaztias embraced the Kriyavada is borne out by our texts ; for in the Strakritanga I, 12, 21, below, p. 319, it is said that a perfect ascetic ‘is entitled to expound the Kriydvada ;’ and this doctrine is thus expressed in the Afaranga Stra I, 1, 1, 4 (part i, p. 2): ‘He believes in soul, believes in the world, believes in reward, believes in action (believed to be our own doing in such judgments as these): “I did it;” “I shall cause another to do it ;” “T shall allow another to do it.’
Another lay disciple of Mahavira, converted by the Buddha, was Upéli. As narrated in the Magghima Nikaya 56, he ventured upon a dispute with him whether the sins of the mind are heaviest, as the Buddha teaches, or the
' The name Stha occurs in the Bhayavatf (Calcutta edition, p. 1267, see Hoernle, Uvasaga Dasfo Appendix, p. 10) as that of a disciple of Mahavira; but as he was a monk, he cannot be identified with his namesake in the Mahavagga.
INTRODUCTION. xvii
sins of the body, as the Nigaz¢ka Nataputta contends. In the beginning of the discourse Upali states that his master uses the term dazda, punishment, for what is commonly called kamma, deed, act. This is true, though not quite to the letter; for the word kamma occurs also in the Gaina Sitras in that sense. The term dada, however, is at least as frequently used. Thus, in the Sdtrakyzt4nga II, 2, p. 357 ff., the thirteen kinds of ‘committing sins’ are treated of, and in the first five cases the word which I have translated ‘committing sins’ is in the original daz dasamad4ze, and in the remaining cases kiriyA4¢h4ne, i.e. kriyAsth4na.
The Nigawtha Up4li goes on to explain that there are three dazdas, the dazda of body, that of speech, and that of mind. This agrees with the Gaina doctrine expressed in nearly the same words in the Sthan4nga Sdtra, 3rd uddésaka (see Indian Antiquary, IX, p. 159).
kriyAsth4na.
The Nigawtha Up4li goes on to explain that there are three dazdas, the dazda of body, that of speech, and that of mind. This agrees with the Gaina doctrine expressed in nearly the same words in the Sthan4nga Sdtra, 3rd uddésaka (see Indian Antiquary, IX, p. 159).
The second statement of UpAli, that the Nigaz¢kas consider sins of the body more important than sins of the mind, is in perfect harmony with Gaina views. For in the Satrakritanga II, 4, p. 398 ff., the question is discussed whether sins may be committed unconsciously, and it is boldly answered in the affirmative (compare note 6, p. 399) ; and in the Sixth Lecture of the same book (p. 414) the Buddhists are severely ridiculed for maintaining that it depends on the intention of the man whether a deed of his be a sin or not.
In the Anguttara Nikaya III, 70, 3, some practices of Nigaztha laymen are discussed. I translate the passage thus: ‘O Visékha, there is a class of Samavzas who are called Nigazthas. They exhort a SAvaka thus: “ Well, sir, you must desist from doing injury to beings in the East beyond a yégana from here, or to those in the West, North, South, always beyond a yégana from here.” In this way they enjoin tenderness by making him spare some living beings ; in this way they enjoin cruelty by making him not spare other living beings.’ It is not difficult to recognise under these words the Digvirati vow of the Gainas, which
(45) b ”
Xviii GAINA SUTRAS.
consists in laying down the limits beyond which one shall not travel nor do business in the different directions. A man who keeps this vow cannot, of course, do any harm to beings beyond the limits within which he is obliged to keep. This is so distorted by the hostile sect as to lay the rule under discussion open to blame. We cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their opponents; it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections to be raised against them all the better applicable. The Gainas were not a whit better in this respect than the Bauddhas, and they have retorted upon them in the same way; witness their misrepresentation of the Buddhist idea that a deed becomes a sin only through the sinful intention of the doer, in a passage in the present volume, p. 414, v. 26 ff., where the sound principle of the Buddhists is ridiculed by applying it to a fictitious and almost absurd case.
414, v. 26 ff., where the sound principle of the Buddhists is ridiculed by applying it to a fictitious and almost absurd case.
The passage in the Anguttara Nikaéya, which we have just discussed, goes on as follows: ‘On the Upésatha day they exhort a Savaka thus: “ Well, sir, take off all your clothes and declare: I belong to nobody, and nobody belongs to.me.” Now his parents know him to be their son, and he knows them to be his parents. His son or wife know him to be their father or husband, and he knows them to be his son or wife. His slaves and servants know him to be their master, and he knows them to be his slaves and servants. Therefore (the Nigaz¢has) make him use lying speech at the time when he makes the above declarations. On this account I charge him with lying speech. After the lapse of that night he enjoys pleasures (by means of things) that were not freely given. On this account I charge him with taking of what is not freely given.’
According to this statement, the duties of a Niganztha layman became, during the Upésatha days, equal to those of a monk ; it was on common days only that the difference between layman and monk was realised. This description, however, does not quite agree with the Pésaha rules of the Gainas. Bhandarkar gives the following definition of Pésaha
INTRODUCTION. xix
according to the Tattv4rthasdradipika, which agrees with what we know about it from other sources: ‘ Pésaha, i.e. to observe a fast or eat once only or one dish only on the two holy days (the eighth and the fourteenth of each fortnight), after having given up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours, incense, lights, &c., and assumed renunciation as an ornament.’ Though the Pésaha observances of the present Gainas are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall short of the above description of the Nigawtka rules; for a Gaina layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the Pésaha days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist account contains some mistake or a gross misstatement, it would appear that the Gainas have abated somewhat in their rigidity with regard to the duties of laymen.
Buddhaghésa, in his commentary on the Brahmagdala Sutta, Digha Nikdya I, 2, 381, mentions the Nigaz¢has as holding the opinion, discussed in the text, that the soul has no colour, in contradistinction to the Agivikas, who divide mankind into six classes according to the colour of the Atman; both Nigazthas and Agivikas, however, agree in maintaining that the soul continues to exist after death and is free from ailments (ar6g6). Whatever may be the exact meaning of the last expression, it is clear that the above description squares with the opinions of the Gainas about the nature of the soul, as described below, p. 172 f.
Whatever may be the exact meaning of the last expression, it is clear that the above description squares with the opinions of the Gainas about the nature of the soul, as described below, p. 172 f.
- In another passage (I.c. p. 168) Buddhaghésa says that Nigantha Nataputta considers cold water to be possessed of life (so kira sit6daké sattasa##i héti), for which reason he does not use it. This doctrine of the Gainas is so generally known that I need not bring forward any quotation from the Sdtras in support of its genuineness.
This is nearly all the information on the doctrines of the
1 Sumaagala Vilasinf, p. 119 of the Pali Text Society edition. be xXx GAINA SOTRAS.
ancient Nigaz¢has which I have been able to gather from the Pali texts. Though it is less than we desire, its value is not to be underrated. For with one exception all the doctrines and usages of the ancient Nigazthas mentioned agree with those of the present Gainas, and they comprise some of the fundamental ideas of Gainism. It is therefore not probable that the doctrines of the Gainas have undergone a great change in the interval between the quoted Buddhist records and the composition of the Gaina canon.
I have purposely deferred the discussion of the classical passage on the doctrines of Nigaz¢za Nataputta, because it leads us to a new line of inquiry. The passage in question occurs in the SAma##aphala Sutta of the Digha Nikéya1. I translate it in accordance with Buddhaghdésa’s comment in the Sumangala Vildsini. ‘Here, great king, a Nigaztha is protected by restraint in four directions (#4t uyamasamvarasamvut6). How,great king, is a Nigantha protected by restraint in four directions? Here, great king, a Nigaz¢ka abstains from all (cold) water, he abstains from all bad deeds, by abstinence from all bad deeds he is free from sins, he realises abstinence from all bad deeds. In this way, great king, a Nigaz¢ha is protected by restraint in four directions. And, great king, because he is thus protected, the Nigam‘a NAtaputta’s soul is exalted, is restrained, is well settled ?.’—This is, certainly, not an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Gaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it, and successfully imitates the language of the Gaina Sftras. As I have already explained elsewhere’, I think the term #4tuy4masamvarasamvut6 has been misunderstood not only by the commentator, but also by the author of the text. For
1 Page 57 of the edition in the Pali Text Society.
* The translations of Gogerly and of Burnouf in Grimblot, Sept Suttas Palis, were made without the help of a commentary, and may, therefore, be passed by. It is, however, open to doubt whether Buddhaghésa has drawn his information from genuine tradition, or had to rely on conjectures of his own.
5 See my paper, ‘On Mahfvfra and his Predecessors,’ in the Indian Antiquary, IX, 158 ff., where some of the above problems have been treated.
INTRODUCTION. Xxi
5 See my paper, ‘On Mahfvfra and his Predecessors,’ in the Indian Antiquary, IX, 158 ff., where some of the above problems have been treated.
INTRODUCTION. Xxi
the Pali ZAtuy4ma is equivalent to the Prakrit katuggama, a well-known Gaina term which denotes the four vows of PArsva in contradistinction to the five vows (pa#ka mahavvaya) of Mahavira. Here, then, the Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nataputta Mahdvira a doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Parsva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Nigaz¢ka creed unless they had heard it from followers of PArsva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mah4vira had already been generally adopted by the Nigazthas at the time of the Buddha. _I, therefore, look on this blunder of the Buddhists as a proof for the correctness of the Gaina tradition, that followers of Parsva actually existed at the time of Mahavira.
Before following up this line of inquiry, I have to call attention to another significant blunder of the Buddhists: they call Nataputta an Aggivésana, i.e. Agnivaisy4yana ; according to the Gainas, however, he was a Kasyapa, and we may credit them in such particulars about their own Tirthakara. But Sudharman, his chief disciple, who in the SOtras is made the expounder of his creed, was an Agnivaisy4yana, and as he played a prominent part in the propagation of the Gaina religion, the disciple may often have been confounded by outsiders with the master, so that the Gétra of the former was erroneously assigned to the latter. Thus by a double blunder the Buddhists attest the existence of Mahavira’s predecessor Parsva and of his chief disciple Sudharman.
That P4rsva was a historical person, is now admitted by all as very probable ; indeed, his followers, especially Kési?, who seems to have been the leader of the sect at the time of Mahavira, are frequently mentioned in Gaina Sdtras in such a matter-of-fact way, as to give us no reason for doubting the authenticity of those records. The legend in
' In the Ragaprasnt Parsva has a discussion with king Paési and converts him, see Actes du VI Congrés International des Orientalistes, vol. iii,
P- 490 ff.
XXii GAINA SOTRAS.
The legend in
' In the Ragaprasnt Parsva has a discussion with king Paési and converts him, see Actes du VI Congrés International des Orientalistes, vol. iii,
P- 490 ff.
XXii GAINA SOTRAS.
the Uttaradhyayana, Lecture XXIII, how the union of the old and the new church was effected, is of much interest in this respect. Kési and Gautama, .the representatives and leaders of the two branches of the Gaina church, both at the head of their pupils, meet in a park near Sravastt; the differences in their creed concerning the number of great vows, and the use or disuse of clothes are explained away without further discussion, and full harmony with regard to the fundamental ethical ideas is satisfactorily established by the readiness with which allegorical expressions of the one speaker are understood and explained by the other. There seems to have been some estrangement, but no hostility between the two branches of the church; and though the members of the older branch invariably are made to adopt the Law of Mahavira, ‘ which enjoins five vows,’ it may be imagined that they continued in some of their old practices, especially with regard to the use of clothes, which Mahavira had abandoned. On this assumption we can account for the division of the church in Svétambaras and Digambaras, about the origin of which both sects have contradictory legends!. There was apparently no sudden rupture ; but an original diversity (such as e.g. subsists now between the several Gahkhas of the Svétambaras) ripened into division, and in the end brought about the great schism.
The records in the Buddhist Canon are not repugnant to eur views about the existence of the Nigaz¢has before Nataputta; for the Nigaz¢kas must have been an important sect at the time when Buddhism took its rise. This may be inferred from the fact that they are so frequently mentioned in the Pitakas as opponents or converts of Buddha and his disciples ; and as it is nowhere said or even merely implied that the Nigazthas were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddha. This conclusion is supported by another fact. Makkhali Gés4la, a contemporary
1 See my paper on the origin of the Svétambara and Digambara sects in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. xxxviii, p.1 ff.
INTRODUCTION. XXili
This conclusion is supported by another fact. Makkhali Gés4la, a contemporary
1 See my paper on the origin of the Svétambara and Digambara sects in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. xxxviii, p.1 ff.
INTRODUCTION. XXili
of Buddha and Mahavira, divided mankind into six classes}. Of these, according to Buddhaghésa *, the third class contains the Nigazthas. Gésala probably would not have ranked them as a separate, i.e. fundamental subdivision of mankind, if they had only recently come into existence. He must have looked upon them as a very important, and at the same time, an old sect, in the same way in which, in my opinion, the early Buddhists looked upon them. As a last argument in favour of my theory I may mention that in the Magghima Nik4ya 35, a disputation between the Buddha and Sakaka, the son of a Nigavf¢ha, is narrated. Sakkaka is not a Nigantha himself, as he boasts of having vanquished NAataputta in disputation’, and, moreover, the tenets he defends are not those of the Gainas. Now when a famous controversialist, whose father was a Nigaztha, was a contemporary of the Buddha, the Nigaz¢has can scarcely have been a sect founded during Buddha’s life.
Let us now confront the records of the Gainas about the philosophical doctrines of heretics, which they had to combat, with such as the Buddhists describe. In the Sitrakvztanga Ii, 1, 15 (p. 339 f.) and 21 f. (p. 343) two materialistic theories which have much in common are spoken of. The first passage treats of the opinion of those who contend that the body and the soul are one and the same thing ; the second passage is concerned with the doctrine that the five elements are eternal and constitute everything. The adherents of either philosophy maintain that it is no sin to kill living beings. Similar opinions are, in the Sama#faphala Sutta, ascribed to Pirava Kassapa and Agita Késakambali. The former denies that there is such a thing as sin or merit. Agita Késakambali holds that nothing real
1 SAmafAaphala Sutta, Digha Nikaya IT, 20.
2 Sumangala Vildsint, p. 162. Buddhaghdsa expressly states that Gésdla reckoned the Niga¢has lower than his own lay disciples, who form the fourth class—As Buddhaghésa does not take umbrage at Gésfila’s reckoning the Bhikkhus still lower, it is clear that he did not identify the Bhikkhus with the Buddhist monks.
> See p. 250 of the Pali Text Society edition.
XxiV GAINA SOTRAS.
> See p. 250 of the Pali Text Society edition.
XxiV GAINA SOTRAS.
corresponds to the current transcendental ideas. He moreover maintains: ‘Man (purisé) consists of the four elements; when he dies, earth returns to earth, water to water, fire to fire, wind to wind, and the organs of sense merge into air (or space)’. Four bearers with the hearse carry the corpse to the place of cremation (or, while it is burned) they make lamentations ; the dove-coloured bones remain, the offerings are reduced to ashes.’ The last passage recurs with few alterations in the Sdtrakritanga, p- 340: ‘Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village*.’
In connection with the second materialistic system (p. 343, § 22, and p. 237f., vv. 15, 16) a variety of it is mentioned, which adds the permanent Atman or soul as a sixth to the five permanent elements. This seems to have been a primitive or a popular form of the philosophy which we now know under the name of Vaiséshika. To this school of philosophy we must perhaps assign Pakudha Kaksayana of Buddhist record. He maintained * that there are seven eternal, unchangeable, mutually independent things: the four elements, pleasure, pain, and the soul. As they have no influence upon one another, it is impossible to do any real harm to anybody. I confess that to maintain the eternal existence of pleasure and pain (sukha and dukkha) and to deny their influence on the soul, seems to me absurd ; but the Buddhists have perhaps misstated the original tenets. At any rate,theviews of Pakudha Kakdayana
1 Akasa; it is not reckoned as a fifth element in the Buddhist account, but it is so in that of the Gainas, see below, p. 343, and p. 237, verse 15. This is a verbal, rather than a material difference.
3 put here the original texts side by side so that their likeness may be more obvious :
come under the denomination of Akriyavada; and in this they differ from the Vaiséshika proper, which is a Kriy4vada system. As these two terms are frequently used both by Buddhists and Gainas, it will not be amiss to define them more accurately. Kriy4vada is the doctrine which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. Under this head comes Gainism, and of Brahmanica! philosophies Vaiséshika and Ny4ya (which, however, are not expressly quoted in the canonical books of either Buddhists or Gainas), and apparently a great many systems of which the names have not been preserved, but the existence of which is implied in our texts. Akriyavada is the doctrine which teaches either that a soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by acts. Under this subdivision fall the different schools of materialists; of Brahmanical philosophies the Védanta, Sankhya, and Yéga; and the Buddhists. Of the latter the doctrines of the Kshazikavadins and the Sfinyavadins are alluded to in Sitrakrtanga I, 14, verses 4 and 7. It may be mentioned here that the Véd4ntists or their opinions are frequently mentioned in the Siddhanta; in the Satrakritanga the Védanta is the third heresy described in the First Lecture of the Second Book, p. 344; it is also adverted to in the Sixth Lecture, p. 417. But as no professor of it was among the six heretical teachers (titthiya) of the Buddhists, we may pass them over here !.
The fourth heresy discussed in the First Lecture of the Second Book of the Sitrakv#ténga? is Fatalism. In the Sama##aphala Sutta this system is expounded by Makkhali Gésala in the following words *: ‘Great king, there is no cause, nor any previously existing principle productive of the pollution of sentient beings; their defilement is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. There is no cause nor any previously existing principle
‘ It is worthy of remark that the Védantists play no conspicuous part, if any, among Buddha’s opponents. As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed.
3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170.
XXvi GAINA SOTRAS.
As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed.
3 Page 345 f., see also p. 239. 3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas P&lis, p. 170.
XXvi GAINA SOTRAS.
productive of the purity of sentient beings: their purity is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. For their production there is nothing that results from the conduct of the individuals, nothing from the actions of others, nothing from human effort: they result neither from power nor effort, neither from manly fortitude nor manly energy. Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable}, is destitute of intrinsic force, power, or energy, but, being held by the necessity of its nature, experiences happiness or misery in the six forms of existence, &c.’ The explanation of these doctrines in the Sdtrakrztanga (l.c.), though less wordy, comes to the same; it does not, however, expressly ascribe them to Gésdla, the son of Makkhali.
The Gainas enumerate four principal schools of philosophy?: Kriyavada, Akriyavada, Ag#anavada, and Vainayikavada. The views of the Ag#Anikas, or Agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies which I have given in note 2, p. 83, is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what Agnosticism was like. It is, according to the Sama##aphala Sutta, the doctrine of Sa#gaya Béla¢¢kiputta, and is there stated in the following way®: ‘If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer: If I experience a future state of existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If they inquire, Is it after this manner? that is
‘In the original: sabbé satté sabbé p44, sabbé bhfita, sabbé giva. Thesame enumeration frequently occurs in Gaina Sitras, and has, in my translation, been abbreviated in ‘all classes of living beings.’ Buddhaghésa’s explanation has been thus rendered by Hoernle, Uvasaga Dasdo, Appendix II, p. 16: ‘In the term a// deings (sabbé satta) he comprises camels, oxen, asses, and other animals without exception. The term all sensive beings (sabbé p4m4) he uses to denote those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth. The term al/ generated beings (sabbé bhiit&) he uses with Teference to those that are generated or produced from an egg or from the womb. The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’
2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174.
INTRODUCTION. XXVii
The term ad! living beings (sabbé giva) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.’
2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385. 3 Grimblot, 1. c., p. 174.
INTRODUCTION. XXVii
not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern, Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine.’ In the same way he e.g. refuses a definite answer to the questions whether the Tathagata is after death, or is not; is and is not at the same time, is not nor isnot at thesametime. It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or nonexistence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression.
The records of the Buddhists and Gainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahavira, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between some of those ‘heretical’ doctrines on the one side, and Gaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahavira, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sa%gaya, Mahavira has established the SyAdv4da. For as the Ag#dnavada declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syadv4da declares that ‘you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (sy4d asti), deny it from another (sy4d n4sti) ; and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (sy4d asti nAsti). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (sy4d avaktavyaz). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible
XXviil GAINA SOTRAS.
(syad asti avaktavya); of non-existence (sy4n nAsti avaktavyah); and also of both (sy4d asti nAsti avaktavyah)}.’
Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible
XXviil GAINA SOTRAS.
(syad asti avaktavya); of non-existence (sy4n nAsti avaktavyah); and also of both (sy4d asti nAsti avaktavyah)}.’
This is the famous Saptabhanginaya of the Gainas. Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents ? The subtle discussions of the Agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the Syadvada must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the Ag#anavada. It was the weapon with which the Agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahdvira’s creed convinced by the truth of the Saptabhanginaya !
We can trace, I imagine, the influence of Agnosticism also in the doctrine of the Buddha about the NirvAma, as it is stated in P4li books. Professor Oldenberg was the first to draw attention to the decisive passages which prove beyond the possibility of doubt that the Buddha declined answering the question whether the Tathagata (i.e. the liberated soul, or rather principle of individuality) is after death or not. If the public of his time had not been accustomed to be told that some things, and those of the greatest interest, were beyond the ken of the human mind, and had not acquiesced in such answers, it certainly would not have lent a willing ear to a religious reformer who declined to speak out on what in Brahmanical philosophy is considered the end and goal of all speculations. As it is, Agnosticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of the Nirvaza*, It is worthy of note
1 Bhandarkar, Report for 1883-4, p. 95 f.
2 The reticence of Buddha on the nature of the Nirvasza may have been wise at his time; but it was fraught with very important results for the development of the church. For his followers, having to hold their own against such split-hair dialecticians as the Brahmanical philosophers, were almost driven to enunciate more explicit ideas about the great problem which the founder of the church had left unsolved. The tendency to supply the crowning stone to an edifice which appeared to have been left unfinished by the hand of the master, led to the division of the community into numerous
INTRODUCTION. XXIX
that in a dialogue between king Pasénadi and the nun Khémé, told in the Samyutta Nikaya, and translated by Oldenberg, the king puts his questions about the existence or non-existence of the Tathagata after death in the same formulas which Sa#gaya is made to use in the passage translated above from the Sama##aphala Sutta.
In support of my assumption that the Buddha was influenced by contemporary Agnosticism, I may adduce a tradition incorporated in the Mahavagga I, 23 and 24. There we are told that the most distinguished pair of his disciples, Sariputta and Moggalana, had, previously to their conversion, been adherents of Saw#igaya, and had brought over to Buddha 250 disciples of their former teacher. This happened not long after Buddha’s reaching Bédhi, i.e. at the very beginning of the new sect, when its founder must have been willing, in order to win pupils, to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration.
The greatest influence on the development of Mahavira’s doctrines must, I believe, be ascribed to Gés4la, the son of Makkhali. <A history of his life, contained in the Bhagavati XV, 1, has been briefly translated by Hoernle in the Appendix to his translation of the Uvasaga Dasdo. It is there recorded that Gésala lived six years together with Mahiviraas his disciple, practising asceticism, but afterwards separated from him, started a Law of his own, and set up as a Gina, the leader of the Agivikas. The Buddhist records, however, speak of him as the successor of Nanda Vakkha and Kisa Samkikfa, and of his sect, the a#élaka paribb4gakas, as a long-established order of monks. We have no reason to doubt the statement of the Gainas, that Mahavira and Géséla for some time practised austerities together; but the relation between them probably was different from what the Gainas would have us believe. I suppose, and shall now bring forward some arguments in favour of my opinion, that Mahavira and Gésdla assosects soon after the Nirvaza of Buddha. We need not wonder therefore that in Ceylon, which is at such a distance from the centre of Brahmanical learning, Buddhists could retain the doctrine of the Nirvaza in its original form.
XXX GAINA SOTRAS.
We need not wonder therefore that in Ceylon, which is at such a distance from the centre of Brahmanical learning, Buddhists could retain the doctrine of the Nirvaza in its original form.
XXX GAINA SOTRAS.
ciated with the intention of combining their sects and fusing them into one. The fact that these two teachers lived together for a long period, presupposes, it would appear, some similarity between their opinions. I have already pointed out above, in the note on p. xxvi, that the expression sabbé satt4 sabbé p44 sabbé bhiat4 sabbé giva is common to both Gésala and the Gainas, and from the commentary we learn that the division of animals into ékéndriyas,dvindriyas, &c., which is so common in Gaina texts, was also used by Gésdla. The curious and almost paradoxical Gaina doctrine of the six Lésy4s closely resembles, as Professor Leumann was the first to perceive, Gés4la’s division of mankind into six classes ; but in this particular I am inclined to believe that the Gainas borrowed the idea from the Agivikas and altered it so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of their own doctrines. With regard to the rules of conduct the collective evidence obtainable is such as to amount nearly to proof that Mahavira borrowed the more rigid rules from Gésala. For as stated in the Uttaradhyayana XXIII, 13, p. 121, the Law of Parsva allowed monks to wear an under and upper garment, but the Law of Vardham4na forbade clothes. A term? for naked friar, frequently met with in the Gaina Sitras, is akélaka, literally ‘unclothed.’ Now the Buddhists distinguish between Adélakas and Nigazéhas ; e.g. in Buddhaghésa’s commentary on the Dhammapadam’? it is said of some Bhikkhus that they gave the preference to the Nigaz¢has before the A#élakas, because the latter are stark naked (sabbas6é apatikkfann§4), while the Nigan¢has use some sort of cover’ ‘for the sake of decency,’ as was wrongly assumed by those Bhikkhus. The Buddhists de-
1 Another term is Ginakalpika, which may be rendered: adopting the standard of the Ginas. The Svét&mbaras say that the Ginakalpa was early replaced by the Sthavirakalpa, which allows the use of clothes.
2 Fausboll’s edition, p. 398.
3 The words sésakam purimasamappit4 va pafisshadenti are not quite clear, but the contrast leaves no doubt about what is meant. Sésaka is, I believe, the Pali for sisnaka. If this is right, the ahove words may be translated : ‘they cover the pudenda wearing (a cloth) about the forepart (of their body).’
INTRODUCTION. XXxXI
Sésaka is, I believe, the Pali for sisnaka. If this is right, the ahove words may be translated : ‘they cover the pudenda wearing (a cloth) about the forepart (of their body).’
INTRODUCTION. XXxXI
note by A#élaka the followers of Makkhali Gés4la and his two predecessors Kisa Samkikka and Nanda Vakkha, and have preserved an account of their religious practices in the Magghima Nikfya 36. There Sakkaka, the son of a Nigaz¢ha, whom we are already acquainted with, explains the meaning of kayabh4van4, bodily purity, by referring to the conduct of the A#élakas. Some details of Sakkaka’s account are unintelligible in the absence of a commentary, but many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well-known Gaina usages. Thus the Aéélakas, like the Gaina monks, may not accept an invitation for dinner; they are forbidden food that is abhiha¢a or uddissakafa, which terms are, in all likelihood, identical with adhyéhrita and auddésika of the Gainas (see p. 132, note); they are not allowed to eat meat or to drink liquor. ‘Some beg only in one house and accept but one morsel of food, some in more up to seven; some live upon one donation of food, some on more up to seven.’ Similar to these are some practices of Gaina monks described in the Kalpa Sftra, ‘Rules for Yatis,’ § 26, part i, p. 300, and below, p. 176f., verses 15 and 19. The following practice of the A#élakas is identically the same as that observed by the Gainas: ‘some eat but one meal every day, or every second day1, &c., up to every half month.’ All the rules of the A#élakas are either identical with those of the Gainas or extremely like them, and dictated, so to say, by the same spirit. And still Sagéaka does not quote the Niga¢has as a standard of ‘bodily purity,’ though he was the son of a Nigaz¢ha, and therefore must have known their religious practices. This curious fact may most easily be accounted for by our assuming that the original Nigas¢has, of whom the Buddhist records usually speak, were not the section of the church, which submitted to the more rigid rules of Mahavira, but those followers of P&rsva, who,
without forming a hostile party, yet continued, I imagine, to retain within the united church some particular usages of the old one!. As those rigid rules formed no part of the ancient creed, and Mahavira, therefore, must have introduced them, it is probable that he borrowed them from the A#élakas or Agivikas, the followers of Gésdla, with whom he is said to have lived in close companionship for six years practising austerities. We may regard Mahavira’s adoption of some religious ideas and practices of the Agivikas as concessions made to them in order to win over Gésdla and his disciples. This plan seems to have succeeded for some time ; but at last the allied teachers quarrelled, it may be supposed, on the question who was to be the leader of the united sects. Mahavira’s position apparently was strengthened by his temporary association with Gésdla, but the latter seems to have lost by it, if we are to believe the account of the Gainas, and his tragic end must have been a severe blow to the prospects of his sect.
Mahavira probably borrowed much more from other sects than we shall ever be able to prove. It must have been easy to add new doctrines to the Gaina creed, as it scarcely forms a system in the true sense of the word. Each sect, or fraction of a sect, which was united with the Gaina church by the successful policy of Mahavira ?, may have brought with it some of its favourite speculations, and most probably its favourite saints too, who were recognised as Kakravartins or Tirthakaras. This is, of course, a mere conjecture of mine; but it would account for the strange hagiology of the Gainas, and in the absence of any trace of direct evidence we are driven to rely upon guesses, and those deserve the preference which are the most
? As I have said above and in note 2, p. 119, this difference has probably given rise to the division of the church into Svétambaras and Digambaras, But these two branches have not directly grown out of the party of Parsva and that of Mahavira ; for both recognise Mahavira as a Tiithakara.
* Mah4vfra must have been a great man in his way, and an eminent leader among his contemporaries; he owed the position of a Tirthakara probably not so much to the sanctity of his life, as to his success in propagating his creed,
INTRODUCTION. XXXill
* Mah4vfra must have been a great man in his way, and an eminent leader among his contemporaries; he owed the position of a Tirthakara probably not so much to the sanctity of his life, as to his success in propagating his creed,
INTRODUCTION. XXXill
plausible. For the rest, however, of the hypotheses which I have tried to establish in the preceding pages, I claim a higher degree of probability. For on the one hand I do no violence to the tradition of the Gainas, which in the absence of documents deserves most careful attention, and on the other, I assume but what under the given circumstances would have been most likely to happen. The cardinal feature in my construction of the early history of the Gaina church consists in my turning to account the alleged existence of followers of Parsva in the time of MahAvira, a tradition which seems to be almost unanimously accepted by modern scholars.
If Gainism dates from an early period, and is older than Buddha and Mahavira, we may expect to find marks of its antiquity in the character of Gaina philosophy. Such a mark is the animistic belief that nearly everything is possessed of a soul; not only have plants their own souls, but particles of earth, cold water, fire, and wind also. Now ethnology teaches us that the animistic theory forms the basis of many beliefs that have been called the philosophy of savages; that it is more and more relinquished or changed into purer anthropomorphism as civilisation advances. If, therefore, Gaina ethics are for their greater part based on primitive animism, it must have extensively existed in large classes of Indian society when Gainism was first originated. This must have happened at a very early time, when higher forms of religious beliefs and cults had not yet, more generally, taken hold of the Indian mind.
Another mark of antiquity Gainism has in common with the oldest Brahmanical philosophies, Védanta and Sankhya. For at this early epoch in the development of metaphysics, the Category of Quality is not yet clearly and distinctly conceived, but it is just evolving, as it were, out of the Category of Substance: things which we recognise as qualities are constantly mistaken for and mixed up with substances. Thus in the Védanta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and
[45] c
XXXIV GAINA SOTRAS.
Thus in the Védanta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and
[45] c
XXXIV GAINA SOTRAS.
joy itself. In the Sankhya the nature of purusha or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three guzas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these guzas are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Gaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, parydyas; and when they mention guzas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sdtras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Ny4ya-Vaiséshika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of pary4ya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category ‘quality,’ since pary4ya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the Gainas applying the category ‘substance’ to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of ‘quality,’ is seen in their treating merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact}; for they are regarded as coextensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vaiséshikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaiséshika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance), Gainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded.
‘ That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f.