reternatural pleasures, and certain vehement appetites pees forth, and which impel their possessors into profundities and precipices. For now desires have compelled some not to abstain either from their mothers or their daughters, and violating law, their country, city, and king, with their hands as it were bound behind them, they are violently dragged along like slaves to extreme destruction. But from avarice germinate rapine, robbery, parricide, sacrilege, sorcery, and such other evils as are the sisters of these. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to purify the woods in which these passions have fixed their abode, with fire and sword, and all the machines of disciplines; and having liberated the reasoning power from such mighty evils, we may then implant in and deliver to it something useful and good.” So great and so neces- sary was the attention which, according to Pythagoras, ought to be paid to disciplines prior to philosophy. He likewise ordained that a singular honor, and the most accurate investigation, should be given to the teaching and participation of his dogmas, as he judiciously examined the conceptions of those that came to him, by various documents, and ten thousand forms of scientific theory.
CHAP. XVIII.
AFTER this we must narrate how, when he had
admitted certain persons to be his disciples, he dis-
tributed them into different classes acconding to their
respective merits. For it was not fit that all of them
should equally participate of the same things, as they
were naturally dissimilar; nor was it indeed right that
some should participate of all the most honorable
auditions, but others of none, or should not at all
partake of them. For this would be uncommunicative
and unjust. While therefore he imparted a convenient
portion of his discourses to each, he benefited as much
as possible all of them, and preserved the proportion
of justice, by making each a partaker of the auditions
according to his desert. Hence, in conformity to this
method, he called some of them Pythagoreans, but
others Pythagorists; just as we denominate some men
Attics, but others Atticists. Having therefore thus
aptly divided their names, some of them he considered
to be genuine, but he ordained that others should show
themselves to be the emulators of these. He ordered
therefore that with the Pythagoreans possessions should
be shared in common, and that they should always live
together; but that each of the others should possess his
own property apart from the rest, and that assembling
together in the same place, they should mutually be at
leisure for the same pursuits. And thus each of these
modes was derived from Pythagoras, and transmitted
to his successors. Again, there were also with the
Pythagoreans two forms of philosophy; for there were
likewise two genera of those that pursued it, the Acus-
matici, and the Mathematici. Of these however the
Mathematici are acknowledged to be Pythagoreans by
the rest ; but the Mathematici do not admit that the
Acusmatici are so, or that they derived their instruction
from Pythagoras, but from Hippasus. And with respect
to Hippasus, some say that he was a Crotonian, but
others a Metapontine. But the philosophy of the
Acusmatici consists in auditions unaccompanied with
demonstrations and a reasoning process; because it
merely orders a thing to be done in a certain way, and
that they should endeavour to preserve such other
things as were said by him, as so many divine dogmas.
They however profess that they will not speak of them,
and that they are not to be spoken of; but they con-
ceive those of their sect to be the best furnished with
wisdom, who retained what they had heard more than
others. But all these auditions are divided into three
species. For some of them indeed signify what a thing
is; others what it especially is; but others, what ought,
or what ought not, to be done. The auditions there-
fore which signify what a thing is, are such as, What
are the islands of the blessed? The sun and moon.
What is the oracle at Delphi? The tetractys. What
is harmony? ‘That in which the Syrens subsist. But
the auditions which signify what a thing i saaee) is,
are such as, What is the most just thing? To sacrifice.
What is the wisest thing? Number.* But the next
to this in wisdom, is that which gives names to things.
What is the wisest of the things that are with us,
[i.e. which pertain to human concerns]? Medicine.
What is the most beautiful? Harmony. What is the
most powerful? Mental decision. What is the most
1 Kuster, one of the editors of this Life of Pythagoras, not perceiving that these auditions are both questions and answers, has made them to be questions only, and in consequence of this was completely at a loss to conceive the meaning of ézep éotiv % dppovia, év 4 al Leippves. Hence, he thinks it should be, re éoriv 7 dppovia y zSov ai LepHves ; but is not satisfied with this reading after all. Something I have no doubt is wanting; but the sense of the passage is, I conceive, that which is given in the above translation.
2 << Pythagoras,” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Cratylum,) “ being asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number ; and being asked what was the next in wisdom, said, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms : for there that which is the first, and properly number, subsists after the superessential one.} This likewise supplies the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which is of itself, and which is con- verted to and perfects itself, subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence, are the same, so there also number and
1i.e. Number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number according to hyparxis or essence, subsists at the summit of the order which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 3d book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
excellent? Felicity. What is that which is most truly
asserted? That men are depraved. Hence they say
that Pythagoras praised the Salaminian poet Hippo-
domas, because he sings:
Tell, O ye Gods! the source from whence you came, Say whence, O men! thus evil you became?
These therefore, and such as these, are the auditions
of this kind. For each of these shows what a thing
especially is. ‘This however is the same with what is
called the wisdom of the seven wise men. For they
investigated, not what is simply good, but what is
especially so; nor what is difficult, but what is most
dificult; viz. for a man to know himself. Nor did
they investigate what is easy, but what is most easy;
viz. to do what you are accustomed to do. For it
seems that such auditions as the above, are conform-
able but posterior in time to such wisdom as that of the
seven wise men; since they were prior to Pythagoras.
The auditions likewise, respecting what should or should
not be done, were such as, That it is necessary to beget
children. For it is necessary to leave those that may
worship the Gods after us. That it is requisite to put
the shoe on the right foot first. That it is not proper
to walk in the public ways, nor to dip in a sprinkling
vessel, nor to be washed in a bath. For in all these it
is immanifest, whether those who use them are pure.
Others also of this kind are the following: Do not
assist a man in laying a burden down; for it is not
proper to be the cause of not laboring; but assist him
wisdom are the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesses the images and essential transitive reasons of them as statues of beings. Being, there- fore, is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with wisdom ; but that they are denominated is from soul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things.”
in taking it up. Do not draw near to a woman for the sake of begetting children, if she has gold. Speak not about Pythagoric ? concerns without light. Perform libations to the Gods from the handle of the cup, for the sake of an auspicious omen, and in order that you may not drink from the same part [from which you poured out the liquor]. Wear not the image of God in a ring, in order that it may not be defiled. For it is a resemblance which ought to be placed in the house. It is not right to use a woman ill; for she is a suppliant. On this account also we bring her from the Vestal hearth, and take her by the right hand. Nor is it proper to sacrifice a white cock; for this also is a sup- pliant, and is sacred to the moon. Hence likewise it announces the hours. To him who asks for counsel, give no other advice than that which 1s the best: for counsel is a sacred thing. Labors are good; but pleasures are in every respect bad. For as we came into the present life for the purpose of punishment, it | is necessary that we should be punished. It is proper to sacrifice, and to enter temples unshod. In going to a temple, it is not proper to turn out of the way ; for divinity should not be worshipped in a careless manner. It is good to sustain, and to have wounds in the breast; but it is bad to have them behind. The soul of man alone does not enter into those animals, which it is lawful to kill. Hence it is proper to eat those animals alone which it is fit to slay, but no other animal what- ever. And such were the auditions of this kind.
The most extended however were those concerning
sacrifices, how they ought to be performed at all other
times, and likewise when migrating from the present
life; and concerning sepulture, and in what manner it
is proper to be buried. Of some of these therefore the
reason is to be assigned why they are ordered; such
for instance as, it is necessary to beget children, for the
1The words wrépt 7iQaydpewv are omitted in the original, but from the Protrept. of Iamblichus evidently ought to be inserted.
sake of leaving another that may worship the Gods instead of yourself. But of others no reason is to be assigned. And of some indeed, the reasons are assumed proximately; but of others, remotely; such as, that bread is not to be broken, because it contributes to the judgment in Hades. The probable reasons however, which are added about things of this kind, are not Pythagoric, but were devised by some who philo- sophized differently from the Pythagoreans, and who endeavoured to adapt probability to what was said. Thus for instance, with respect to what has been just now mentioned, why bread is not to be broken, some say that it is not proper to dissolve that which con- gregates. For formerly all those that were friends, assembled in a barbaric manner to one piece of bread. But others say, that it is not proper, in the beginning of an undertaking, to produce an omen of this kind by breaking and diminishing. Moreover, all such precepts as define what is to be done, or what is not to ‘e done, refer to divinity as their end; and every life is co- arranged so as to follow God. ‘This also is the principle and the doctrine of philosophy. For men act ridicu- lously in searching for good any where else than from the Gods. And when they do so, it is just as if some one, in a country governed by a king, should reverence one of the citizens who is a magistrate, and neglect him who is the ruler of all of them. For the Pytha- goreans thought that such men as we have just men- tioned, performed a thing of this kind. For since God is, and is the lord of all things, it is universally acknow- ledged that good is to be requested of him. For all men impart good to those whom they love, and to those with whom they are delighted; but they give the contrary to good to those to whom they are contrarily disposed. And such indeed is the wisdom of these precepts.
There was, however, a certain person named Hippo-
medon, an Aigean, a Pythagorean and one of the
Acusmatici, who asserted that Pythagoras gave the