P.146. But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the whole.
For whole co-subverts, but is not co-subverted by
part: since if whole is taken away, part also is taken
away; but the contrary does not follow.
P. 167. Such therefore as have the intellective and
gnostic part of virtue, are denominated skilful and
intelligent: but such as have the ethical and pre-
elective part of it, are denominated useful and
equitable.
The following account of the virtues is extracted
from the Notes to my Translation of the Phedo of
Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which
are common to brutes, being mingled with the tempera-
ments, and for the most part contrary to each other;
or rather pertaining tothe animal. Or it may be said
that they are illuminations from reason, when not
impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they
are the result of energies in a former life. Of these
Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. ‘The ethical
virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by
custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues
of children when well educated. These virtues also
are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise
transcend the temperaments, and on this account are
not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato
delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the
same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In
the third rank above these are the political virtues,
which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific.
But they are the virtues of reason adorning the
irrational part as its instrument; through prudence
adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible,
and through temperance the epithymetic power, (or
the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning
all the parts of the irrational nature through justice.
And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic.
These virtues too follow each other. Above these are
the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone,
withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside
the instruments of sense as vain, repressing ae the
energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phedo. Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theztetus.
According to Plotinus, there is also another grada- tion of the virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes, as it were, solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize para- digmatically. And as when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible
natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical
virtues; justice to the political, on account of com-
pacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging
to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe
too, that Plato in the Phedo calls the physical virtues
servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but
he calls the ethical cxtoypapia adumbrations, because
their possessors only know that the energies of such
virtues are right, but do not know why they areso. It
is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato
calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which
are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in
another way, viz. that the political are not telestic, i.e.
do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the
cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympio-
dorus adds, the cathartic virtues are denominated from
the purification which is used in the mysteries; but
the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this
account he accords with the Orphic verses, that
The soul that uninitiated dies, Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.
For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the
virtues. Olympiodorus also further observes, that by
the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize
according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses
those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are
bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility
of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as
Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the
time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian
of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertain-
ing to the Bacchic sacred rites.
All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters,
these being every where common, but subsisting appro-
priately in each. For the characteristic property of
fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate;
of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature;
of justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues appear? Shall wesay inthe psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldzan oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrange- ment to that which is disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabied to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the Timeus? And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn, who is a pure intellect.
As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at
present no less novel than sy oleate the following
discussion of them from the ’Agopua wrpos ta vera,
or Auxitiartes TO INTELLIGIBLES, of Porphyry, is added
for the sake of the genuinely philosophic reader:
“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the
political character, and another to the man who tends
tocontemplation, and on this account is called theoretic,
and is nowa beholder. And there are also other virtues
pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and
separate from soul. The virtues indeed of the political
character, and which consist in the moderation of the
passions, are characterised by following and being
obedient to the reasoning about that which is becom- ing in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious con- verse with neighbours, they are denominated, from the ageregation of fellowship, political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned: by these, should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in con- junction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, gives sub- sistence to prudence; which derives its perféction through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temp- erance. Not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part,] justice is produced. The disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, 1s surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy; } the end of which is a similitude to God.
“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in
1 This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.
purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification 1s to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with _ which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, how- ever, which remains after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boni- form. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. ‘The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising from an associa- tion with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are honorable. But the cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case unless conversion precedes.
“There is therefore another genus of virtues after
the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues
of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed,
wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of
those things which intellect possesses. But justice con-
sists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity
to, and energizing according to intellect. Temperance
is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And
fortitude is apathy; according to a similitude of
that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally
impassive. ‘These virtues, also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.