All of them, however, may be assumed in numbers, in masses, and Jn powers, And how, indeed, they may be assumed in numbers is evident; for it has been shown by us. But they may also be assumed in masses. For three equal mag- nitudes being proposed, you may be able, by using the before-mentioned three methods, to devise other magnitudes, at one tine producing an arithmetic, at another a geometric, and at another an harmonic middle. Jn powers likewise after the same manner. For let there be three equal powers, as for instance, three highest Aupateé (vraras) sounds, all of them homotonous, or of the same tone. You will produce therefore from these, the arithmetical middle, if you place the first sound, that is Aypate, equal to the first; but the second, to the first and second, as for instance, another sound emitting a sound the double of the first. And letit be nefe or the last sound, which has a double ratio to Aypate. But the third sound must be placed equal to the first, second, and third. Por it will be a sound which wall have a triple ratio to Aypate, surpassing ucte by as much as γος surpasses Aypate. And these three sounds, Aypate, nete, trite-hyper- holéon, Will avithinetically differ from cach other. But you will make the geometri- eal middle, if the Aypate being posited, you make the first equal to the first, but the second equal to the first and second hypate. And let this sound be mese : for this is capable of emitting a sound the double of kypate. But if you make the third sound equal to the first Aypate, and to twice the second, and the third, you will have a certain chord which will sound wete-huperbolaon, For this will be ca- pable of producing a sound the double of mese, and the triple of Aypate. These three sounds Likewise will form the geometric middle. ALL the middles, therefore, are seen to exist in numbers, im masses, and in powers. Number, however, is more adapted τὸ the arithmetical, bulk to the geometrical, and power to the har- monic middle. And hence Plato uses these three, viz. numbers, masses, and powers.
It is well, likewise, that assigning certain common ratios, he commences from the middle. For it is this through which all analogy consists, collecting the
Book 111. Timasus of Plato. 405
extremes according to ratio, from one power to the other. For analogy is that Which is principally and) properly a bond. Butitis a bond as that ¢hrough wehich, and the unddle. Por through the middle analogy binds the extremes. From this, therefore, he commences as most allied to the nature of analogy, and because habitude receives its completion through it. Hence, also, they are called middles, and because sameness is the end of all this analogy. | For since they proceed from equality, but equality is sameness, it converts all things to sameness. Sameness, however, may be properly and principally asserted of the geometric middle, for there is the same ratio; but equality of the arithmetic ; and similitude of the harmonic middle. And in the third place, the ascent is through sameness tounion, For analogy indeed is suspended from = equality,” being a πα ingenerated in the boundaries of equality. But equality is suspended from same- ness, and sameness from union.
It is necessary, however, after the mathematical resumption of these words, to direct our attention to the physical theory, For itis not fit that those who apply themselves to this discussion, should dwell on mathematical speculations ; for the dialogue is physical; nor that they should neglect such speculations, investi- gating only what relates to sense 3 but it is requisite to conjoin both, and always connect physics with mathematics ; just as the things themselves are connected, are homogeneous, and of a kindred nature, according to the progression from intellect. For, in short, if the Pythagoreans arranged the mathematical essence as a medium between intelhgibles and sensibles, as being more evolved than intelligibles, but more universal than sensibles,* why is it requisite, omitting mathematics, to pay attention to physiology aloue? For how is the sensible nature adorned, according to what reasons is it arranged, or from what reasons does it proceed, exceptitrom those that are mathematical? These reasons there- fore for productive powers], are primarily in souls, descending into them from intellect; and afterwards they are in bodies, proceeding into them from souls. Hence it is necessary not to remain in mathematical speculations as some do; for this produces false opinions in the auditors, and induces them to think that physical figures and numbers are mathematical. It is also in another respect absurd. lor the reaxons of nature do not receive the accuracy and firm-
* Tnstead of εξηρτηται yap ἡ μεν ex rns ἀναλογίαν, it is requisite to read in this place, εξηρτηται yap ἢ) μὲν ἀναλογία εκ τὴς ἰσότητος,
* For των νοητῶν here, it is obviously necessary to read τῶν αἰσθητῶν. |
406 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 111.
ness of the mathematical reasons. To which may be added, that in so doing we shall not follow the demonstrative canons, in which it is said that) things pertaining to one genus must not be transferred to another, Neither therefore is it possible to survey physical objects arithmetically.
Let us, therefore, if you think fit, discuss the theory of the proposed words - physically. ‘The first analogy then, according to which nature inserts harmony in her works, and according to which the Demiurgus adorns and arranges the universe, is one certain life, and one reason, proceeding through all things ; which first, indeed, connects itself, but afterwards the natures in’ which it exists 5 and according to whieh sympathy is ingenerated ἴῃ ἈΠ mundane essences, as existing in one animal, and governed by one nature, This life, theretore, which is the bond of wholes, total nature for nature which ranks as a whole] and the one soul of the world constitute, The one intellect ihewise generates it; and always more excellent beings, insert in mundane matures, a greater and more perfect union. Lat it be said, therefore, that the habit which predominates in material subjects, that material form, and the powers of the muddle elements, are bonds. All these however, have the relation of things without which the primary bond 15 not participated, and are analogous to the middle in mathematical entities, through which habitude subsists in the extremes. But the lite of which we are speaking, which collects and unites all things, and is suspended indeed from its proper causes, but binds the things in whieh at is inherent, Is fru/y analogy, and preserves both its own union and the union Of its participants, Again, therefore, a bond is threefold, For the common powers of the elements are one bond 5 the one cause of bodies is anothers; anda third is that which as the middle of both the others, which proceeds indeed from the cause of bodies, but employs the powers that are divided about body. And this is the strong bond, as the theolo- wist says, which is catended through all things, and is connected by the yolden
chain. For Jupiter after this, constitutes the golden chain,’ according to the
admonitions of Night.
But when your pow’r around the whole has spread A strong cocrcive bond, a golden chain
Suspend from ather,
' This golden chain may be said to be the series of unities proceeding from the one, or the ineffable principle of things, and extending ay far as to matter itself, And of this chain, the light immediately
proceeding from the sun is au image.
Book αι} Tim.Eus of Plato. 407
Physical analogy then being a thing of this kind, let us survey in what things, and through what, it is naturally adapted to be established. As Plato therefore says, It subsists in nambers, masses, and powers. — Physical mambers, however, are material forms divided about the subject i.e. about body}. But masses are the extensions of these forms, and the separations or intervals of them about matter. And powers are the things which connect, and give form [or specific distinction) to bodies. For form is one thing, and the power proceeding from it is another. For form indeed is impartible and essential, but becoming extended, and dilated into bulk, it emits, as if it were a blast from itself} material powers, which are certain qualities, "Thus, for instance, in fire, the formand essence of it is impartible,’ and is truly the image of the cause of fire. For in partible natures there is that which isimpartible. But from the form in fire which is impartible, a separation and extension of it take place about matter, from which the powers of fire are exerted, such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something else of the like kind. And these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of fire. For essences are not from qualities, nor are essence and power the same ; but every Where the essential precedes power; and from that being one, a multitude of powers proceeds, and that whieh is divided, trom that which is indivisible; just as from one power many enerzies proceed. For by how much more each thing proceeds, by so much more is it multiplied ἀπ divided, conformably to {the characteristic of] its principle and cause, which is impartible and indivisible, As in every body, therefore, there is this triad,’ T mean number, bulk, and power, analogy and the physical bond, occupy from on high the numbers, masses, and powers of bodies, and likewise congregate their partible’ essences, and unite them for the purpose of producing the one completion of the world. They also insert communion in forms, symmetry in masses, and harmony in powers. And thus all things are rendered eflable and consentaneous to each other. But this analogy proceeds from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle ; from the first also to the middle, and from this to the last; and again, from the last to the middle, and from this to the first. Beeause, likewise, a bond of this kind imparts progression and conversion to bodies, it begins indeed from the
‘Instead of ro μὲν εἰδὸς αὐτὸν καὶ oumna, ἀμέρους ἐστε καὶ orros ἄγαλμα τῆς αἰτίας τὸν Rupes, It TS requisite to read, τὸ μὲν εἰδὸς αὐτὸν κας οὐσία «μέρες ἐστι, και οντῶς AYAAPaTHS αἰτίας τὸν RYPOS.
δ For τὸν rpirov rovrov in this place, it is requisite to read τὸν rptagou rovroy.
? Instead of apepers here, itis necessary to read μέρισταν.
408 ᾿ PROCLUS ON THE {Book 111.
middle, in consequence of being connective, and the cause of union, and is * defined according to this peculiarity. But it proceeds from the first through the middle, to the last, as extending and unfolding itself, as faras to the last of things. And it recurs from the last to the first, as converting all things through harmony to the intelligible cause, from which the division of nature, and the separation and interval of bodies were produced. For by converting them to this cause, according to one circle, one order, and one series, secondary being suspended from primary natures, it causes the world to be one, and most similar to. the intelligible [paradigm]. For as there all things are truly united to each other, 50 here all things are adapted to each other. And as intelligibles proceeding trom the good, are again converted to it, through the goodness which is in them," and through the intelhyible monads ; thus also sensibles: proceeding from the Demi- urgus, are again converted to him, through this bond, whieh is distributed and pervades through all of them, and binds all things together, For in this respect it imitates the intelligible, But it) subsists intellectually in intellect, totally in wholes, and partially in partial natures,
After the same manner, therefore, as the intelligible, the sensible world has all things, according to all its parts. Por fire, so far as it is tangible, participates of earth, and earth, so far as itis visible, participates of fire, and each participates of moisture. For earth indeed is conglutinated and connected through moisture, and its dissipated nature is united through it; but tire is nourished and increased by it. So that the extremes are the middle, in order that what is said may become physically manifest in things that are Known by us. The extremes, there- fore, are ina certain respect the middle, as preserving through it their proper idea, and remaining such as they are. And moisture itself, so far as itis coloured, participates of fire, and so far as itis re-Invigorated through heat. But again, so far as it is tangible, 10 participates of earth. So that each of the extremes gives perfection to moisture. These things, however, will shortly after become more known to us,