If therefore the universe is generated, itis necessary that it should be sensible. But if sensible, itis visible and tangible, And itso, it consists of fire and earth, But if this be admitted, it also consists of the middle clements. | For tire and earth areas much disjoined from cach other as the sight and the touch, and require the other clements as connecting media. Tfhowever, the world is visible, itis neces- sary there should be fire; and if tangible, 1Ὸ is necessary there should be earth, Bor that which is solid is tangible, and is also able to resist the touch; since that which is friable, and cannot sustain the touch, is by no means κι]. Tence Pythagoras calls the earth the sustainer, as being solid, and resisting the touch, and as moved with dituculty, and participating of stable power. If therefore, as we have said, fire is requisite in order that the world may be visible, but earth, that itimay be tangible, divinity beginning from fire and earth, made the universe, Not that he first made these ; for we have already reyected the generation which is according to time; but since every physiology commences from contraries, on this account Plato says that the composition of the universe orianated from fire and earth, in order that it might become visible through fire, and tangible through the solidity of earth, which with great accuracy he calls ὦ certain solid. Por ἃ physical solid is one thing, bata mathematical solid another, And the datter ts intangible, but the other, which the discussion now requires, is tangible, Por that solid is tangible, which as physical Pence those are absurd who doubt why earth alone ix solid: for, say they, water and air are also solids, Por it may be said, in answerto them, that resistance expecially pertains to earth; since tt is the support and foundation of the other elements. For earth supports water, and
* The words ex’ evOecas, are omitted in the original
Book 111.} τιν ῦ5 of Plato. 297
both earth and water support air. Earth therefore, is the first tangible, and the first resisting substance, and on this account is the first solid. We shall omit how- ever to notice those who say that Plato here calls the three elements after fire, earth, For if this were admitted, it would not be possible to assign what is the medium of earth and fire.
“ΤῸ is impossible however, for two things alone to cohere in a beautiful manner, without the intervention of a certain third ; fora certain collec- tive bond is necessary in the middle of the two. But that is the most beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound, to be one.”
In what is here said, a bond is assumed as affording an image of divine union, and the communion of powers, according to which the intellectual causes of wholes effect their generations. But beauty appears to be assumed, as having an uniting and binding essence and power. For the words, “ to cohere ina beautiful manner, and the most beautiful of bonds,” appear to me_ to be significant of this. Beginning therefore from the duad, as allied to generation, progression and difference, Plato introduces union to the participants of it, and an harmonious communion through a bond, imparting to the world this as the second gift from the Demiurgus. We shall however here avoid the introduction of such doubts as are adduced by those who do not rightly understand what is said by Plato. For neither do those who say that semicircles require no bond in order ἴο the generation of a circle, speak rightly; fora circle does not consist of semicircles, Lut on the contrary, the circle now existing, and not subsisting from these, the diameter being drawn makes the semicircles. And this is evident from the name affording a generation to these from the circle, but not vice versa. Nor do those speak rightly who assume the monad and the duad, which in a certain respect are opposites, and have no medium. For Plato does not absolutely say, that there is something between all things, in whatever manner they may exist, which gives perfection to the hypostasis of one composite. For he says, that two things alone cannot beautifully cohere without a third. But the monad and the duad are not contraries, since the duad consists of monads. Nor again, is there any rectitude in the assertions of those who introduce things that are corrupted together, as for instance, wine mingled with honey. For these no longer exist
498 PROCLUS ON THE (BooK τι,
when the mixture takes place. We however, do not investigate how things are corrupted ; for this is not wonderful ; but how remaining what they are, they are co-harmonized with each other. For this bond‘ is the cause of safety to the things that are bound, but not of their common corruption and abolition. Nor do those speak rightly who adduce as a witness the communion of man and woman, which requires no third thing to its subsistence. For through ignorance they do not perceive the greatest bond, that of love, which excites to communion, in one way indeed, to a communion of the psychical life, and in another to that of the physical life. For the bond through animation is the medium in these. Nor are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver. For of these there is the same essence; since both are water. ΑἸ these theretore, wander trom the conception of Plato.
We however, again say, conformably to what has been before observed, that it is necessary these two things should be assumed, in the first place, in order to the g, and in the next place, in order that their coalition may not be corrupted. For they would no longer be bound, but would cease to exist, In the third place, also, it is necessary that they should truly be the clements of
composition of one thin
that which consists of them. For having these conditions, they will entirely be in want of a certain third thing to their colligation, For what, since they are separate, divided, and most distant from each other, will collect them into one ? Por if nothing accedes to them, they will remain divided, and will subsist after the same manner as before. But if something accedes to them besides what they already are, this thing which accedes will become their bond. For it was this which collected them mto the composition of one thing. A bond, however, is said to be so ina threefold respect. For one bond is that which pre-exists in the cause of the things that coalesce. But another is that which is inherentin the things themselves that are bound, and which is co-ordinate to, and connascent with them. Anda third is that which exists in the middle of these, proceeding indeed from the cause, but presenting itself to the view* in the things that are mutually bound. Ifyou are willing also, one bond of an animal, and of the parts in it, is the one reason which is pre-established in the cause itself of the ammal. But the nerves and the fibres are another bond, connecting the parts of the animal, And another bond is the physical reason or productive and forming power, which
* For ov yap δέσμος ουτος, It is necessary to read 0 yap de opios ovros.
* For evgau operos in this place, it is obviously necessary to read eppawoperos,
Book 411] TIM ALUS OF PLATO, 399
proceeds from the cause of the animal, and employs the nerves, and all the inate- rial organic bonds tor the colligation of the animal. For this bond is neither exempt from the things that are bound, nor yet ranking among things which are withont eflective power, is it destitute of the true cause. You must not therefore, understand the bond which is now mentioned by Plato, according to the first mode; for this is not attended with cause ; but cause is entirely exempt from the things which proceed from it, so far as itis cause. But Plato says, that the bond isin the middle of the things that are bound. That, however, which is in the middle of certain things, is not separated from them. Nor does this bond subsist according to the organic and Jast kind of bond. For the bond which is confor- mable to this, is not the lord of itself nor of its own proper union. Plato how- ever adds, that the bond of which he is sneaking, makes both itself and the things which are bound to be one. Forit is possible for this to be arranged in the middle, But it possesses such a power as this through analogy, whichis the most beantiful bond, and which imparts to it a power that causes all things to have sameness and union. This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound, but has a subsistence in them. The demiurgic will likewise, is a bond, but is exempt from the things that it binds; “ 1/y τοῦ, says the Demiurgus, being a greater and more principal bond than those with which you were bound at the commence- ment of your generation.” 11 remains therefore, that we must understand the bond here mentioned, according to the middle mode, and as having a middle form, so us to be neither ellective nor organic.
Whence then is the conception of such a bond derived, and of what is it the symbol? Jt proceeds indeed from the one cause of wholes. For the power of imparting union is present to all things, from that fountain of all union, through which also intellect is conjoined to the intelligible, and which produces the light of truth, or the first of bonds, through which all things are connected with each — other, and become perfectly one thing through similitade. It is through this like- wise, that things which have proceeded from their proper principles are converted to them. But this bond also proceeds from the one being, which is the first of beings, and which unitedly comprehends the causes of all things, according to the bond and divine union contained in it. It likewise proceeds from all-perfect animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to itself, than a sensible’ animal; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade
* For ἡ το νοητὸν here, it is evidently necessary to read ἥ ro αἰσθητον.
400 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 115.
through each other prior’ to analogy; which analogy imitating, makes all things to be in all, and imparts the same powers to different things. It also proceeds from the connectedly-containing cause. For analogy inserts connexion, causing the natures which are bound by it, as Plato says, to be indissoluble by every thing except by him who binds them. Hence this bond proceeding from these causes, is connective, is the cause of the communion, and one union of separated natures, and is the supplier of harmony, and of the conspiration hastening to unity of dif- ferent things; in order that it may be similar to the causes from which it was derived.