But the words, ‘“cehich was not in a state of rest but moved,” show that the 7 hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of) order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,! where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, “ he led it’ from disorder into order,” signify the participation of intellect, and an intel- lectual life. But the word conceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the ἡ expression “ being willing,” and power in the expression “ as much as possible,” in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, “ conceiving.” For in the Laws, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, vis. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, “ that was in every respect better than this,” signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. “ that he led ' it from disorder into order.” "The word this also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received ; buat the word that represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. Tle places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is firstin the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being ali things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any
" For nxev here, itis requisite to read ηγεν.
328 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 11,
alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, alwurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither js nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primanly. But external natures are the images of his allness, (ravroryros) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. Tor the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and prescrye its Own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.
It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to. the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order, They however speak theologi- cally. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato philosophically transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.
In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent: soul, and is borne along in a con- fused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order, ‘Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without genera-
tion from acause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something eise, and
not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will
| * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2
a AWA A,
t } ! " vberwnct
Book 11. Timaus of Plato. 329
not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be pre- servative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbe- gotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But ifsomething else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it snould be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten,' that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles ; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause. :
Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good. Por that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. Vor why is the one more suflicient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these princi- ples being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to.each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. . Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-
! It is necessary here to supply ἀγένητον των; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, aire αγενητων ὑντων, We Must read, cire ayernroy των ayeyntwY OVTwY.
* For αταξιαν here, it is necessary to read αξιαν.
Tim. Plat. Voi. L ; oy
330 ΤΠ PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι.
ciple of all principles). But if this be the case, there will not be more [indepen- dent) principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing,
than things posterior tu it when the principle is subverted... But this will be the
+ ‘ease, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating.
“If however this be true, itis not possible for the principle to exist, the world not”
‘lexisting, | But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, — that God exists without fabricating. ‘They assert this however, not* knowing
‘that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nu-
| tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrament [the body], For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation 5 “but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. ) Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, Is adscititious, ΠΟ therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power ; but if he does not, lis power will be adscititious. Hlow there- fore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?
The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. ‘This is hkewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since what- ever you may assume will be derived from thence. “This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he ciearly says, that all things are from bound and
“ Instead of καὶ order μαλλὸν arnpnpern τῆς ἀρχὴν, ἐκ πκοδων ra per αὐτήν, ἐκ τοντων μὴ οντω), αναιρειται ἡ ἀρχῇ, Ll read, καὶ ονδεν μαλλον ανὴηρημενὴς τὴς ἀρχὴν, €« ποδων τα μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ εκ τύντων, κ. Me
Ὁ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.
ΟΟΚ it.J ΤΌΘ OF PLATO. 331
infinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles ; but these are per- fected by the one principle. Prom what is said also in the Philebus this is evi- dent, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he de- Monstrates, that itis neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself, :