If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these itmust be said, thatthe progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, Is itnecessary that there should not be every self-motive hfe? But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it: is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should) be selfmotive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts Ἦ And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes ond selfmotive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are selfmotive indeed, but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the selfmotive power, are ata certain time liberated fron habitude, [tis necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary? to each other. Evil, however, is noton this account natural to the soul ; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an
essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease
* MoyAnpas is omitted in the original, * For the proper parts of d self-motive whole, are also self-motive,
> For aw’ αἰτίαν here, itis necessary to read amerarriws,
Wook 11.} τιν of Plato. 419
is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is ood to. the wholeness of bodies, Por it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As, therefore, to. the nature which isin us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus alse to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated irom wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For acontinued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail, But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or Mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Tlence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.
Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner frém the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, consi- dered as imparting being to all things. Forevery thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause, But he was not "willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good, And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced cssenti- ally indeed (roma partial soul, but accidentally from divinity, so far as it is evil, ifit is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. Por so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him Who sullers it, and rescmbles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable Ὁ of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be puri- fied. Por base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that perform them with repentance. And when, indecd, they are the subjects of medi- tation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the
* For ro μεν vrapevow in this place, itis uecersary to read, ro μὴ Suvapevor.
410 “PROCLUS ON UTIL [wooK 11.
most disgraceful parturition, And some, indeed, exlubit this punisliment accord. ing to the whole of their life; but others according to purtial energies, For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination,
In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature, It remains, therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither js it in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from divi- nity ; nor in their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it re- mains, thatit must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, itis neither in such as are rational; for all these aspire after good ; nor in such as are irra- tional; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry ' of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in forin; for it wishes to rule over matter; norin matter, for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form. Butit consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a parypostasis, or resemblance of subsistence, and that at the same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsis- tence, since It is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, itis evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which ts not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, “ as much as possible, written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.
“Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved ina confused and disorderly manner, be led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former.”
‘ For ovpperpig here, it is uccessary to read, ασυμμετρίῳ. μμετριᾳ 7 ?
Book 11.] Timaus of Plato, 321
Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is
here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world froma certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was froma disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a benefi- cent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the com- position of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Tamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of > impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his benefi- cent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the nume- rous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously sur- veys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribu- tion of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal- formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication ; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.
We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,’ but the other decora-
tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that //
* For Lwxparcns here, it is necessary to read cwparins.
Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s
322 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK It.
every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet partici- pating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if itis moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whule of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed 5 the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorner, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct sub- sistence ; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe, And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and = dis- orderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, itis evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus), and that he alone produced its orderly distribution, For he first: constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is trae. But with re- spect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms. Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbe- gotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. Vor Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it ts unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether itis unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God ; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the