he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces all things, and this ‘Timzus denominates the most proper and powerful principle, because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves indeed that which is generated, but is moved from thence [i. 6. from the first principle]. And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but is moved by goodness ; because the good indeed, ts prior to intelligibles, but the paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectual, About the good also, all intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of intellectuals © subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the paradigmatic is more principal, and the final is most principal. Por it is that for the sake of which all things subsist, from which other things are suspended, and which is truly the end of fabrication, Hence the world is perfected indeed, on be- coming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as 10 partici- pates of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. Foras the good is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first dignity in each, On these accounts therefore, he calls the tinal cause the most principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of mos¢ principal, he indicates that which is truly * cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of generated natures τ but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the effects themselves. It must be said however, that generation and tne world, ἐδ τὸς have before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement of things, and the perfection itself of the universe. Since also in dogmas concerning the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in’ discus- sions concerning the good. For intellect subsists on account of the good, and the intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in-us. Ilence Plato thinks it is necessary, that those who assert something concerning the most proper and powerful principle, should be prudent men, and that their auditors should receive what they say with the greatest) rectitude. What then, may not any casual person say something concerning God and the — final cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude assertmmg that God is good? But God spoken of without true virtue is but a name, as Plotinus says ; and
® Lustead of πέρι δὲ τὸ γοερον, ἢ τῶν γοήτων διακοσμησις in this place, itis necessary to road πέρι δε ro vonror, ἢ των voepwr διακοσμησις. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.
> Lor τῆν ovros αἰτίαν here, itis requisite to read τῆν οὕτως αἰτίαν.
Timazus of Plato. 31)
Book 11.)
he ts spoken of by the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance. Do not dwmons also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were | round him; and demiurgie angels, who precede as ina solemn procession the paternal production of things; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the one fabricative cause? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, anzels intellectualiy, damons with undetiled purity, eternally, and ina way allied to the natures prior to thei, but we must be satisfied with having this knowledge pru- dently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media between more divine natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived of intellect. Vor such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and intelligence, but ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak con- cerning the most proper principle, what we assert must be received as uttered by prudent men, Jor prudence isa medium between intellect and opinion ; sothat aright judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, “ he who especially.” For the assertion concerning this principle must be especially received from prudent
men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must
be sought ; and from the multitude, a casual assertion,
“Por the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that
as much as possible nothing should be evil.”
The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartibles to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from things with- out interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the tinal cause apoplithegmatically ; inthe next place, discursively ; and in the third place, it delivers in’ an evolved manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the asser- tion, “he was good,” uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of causes, But the words, “ Jn him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing ; and being entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself,” comprehend this cause discursively ;' because, after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now says represents to us intelligence procecding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third
* The word διεξοδίκως is omitted in the original,
419 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.
assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first division was, “ he was good,” onthis account the second begins from good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. And the third beginning from his twil/, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he was good, he wished to make all things good, But if he wished, he made them to be so, and the universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much con- cerning the order and connexion of the assertions.
Let us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itse ‘lf, therefore, which 1s oft itself exempt from beings, is one, ineffable, and uncircumse ribed, from ¢he one
tself possessing its undetined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requi- site tu survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of the one,
coodness indeed pre cedes, but the sec “ond is will, and the third is providence 3 goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable ; δια τοῦ! exhibiting the super- -plenary, the evtended, and the genera- uve; and providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective of works, and the unide- filed. According however, to this ineffable and united hyparais of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy 3 essence indeed, being firmly established in this triad, and existing selfpe rfect; but power pos- sessing anever-failing and infinite progression; and enerzy be inzallotted perfection and essential production, And again, intellect analogously receives a triple dia- sion, into being, life, and the intellectual. Por the first of these 15. the supplier ofexistence, the second of vitality, and the third) of knowledee. After these, soul likewise is divided) into the object of science, into: science, and’ the scien- tific. For the first of these indeed, is that which is known, the second is know- ledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These triads therefore, being four in number, as goodness is to will, so Is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to sc ience. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that) which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the eonnective, the stable, the umform, and the perfective, pertain τὸ. goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will, Por the selfbegotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will, And energy, intellect, and that which is
scientific, pertain to providence, For the efficacious, and that which proceeds
"οὐκ 41.) Tim.Eus of Plato. 313
through and antecedently comprchends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence, Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so faras he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and provi- Jence ; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, ne is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will. Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If, however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all tnings are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods, therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression’ as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum, For what vacuum can there be when things characterized by itself? have the first subsistence; those that rank as the second proceed from these ; those of the third order proceed from these and
* TIpoogow is omitted in the original. “5 viz. Self-subsistent super-essential natures ; for to these the αὐτο, or tlse//, primarily belongs. The neat to these are intellects, Those in the third rank, are souls, ‘Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies, And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.
Jim. Plat, ἘΠ fe α ᾿ 22k
314 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11,
others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term another ; and those in the fifth rank being others only ; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar!’ Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, selfmotive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. Por all beings derive their com- pletion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from (he one.