In the next place, it must be considered what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings itranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine lamblichus, that which is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that ¢he one is beyond the paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concurs with it, and denominates each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry supposes, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the Demiurgus, but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this inter- preter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving that in each monad of it there 1s a first, middle and last, calls the last’ in each animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to him, intellect is proximately suspended from essential animal. Hence, either the essential Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic causes are not many, or not every Demuurgus effects his proper production according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial soul,
* For ἕκαστον here, it is necessary to read ἐσχατον.
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Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients, some have made the Demiurgus himsclf to possess the paradigms of wholes, as Plotinus ; others, not the Demiurgus, but have asserted that the paradigm is prior to him, as Porphyry ; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to the one, or there are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and the one. For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after the one, it is absurd that all the multitude of intelligibles should be immediately posterior to that which is without multitude. For through numbers proximate to the one, the progression is to the whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there are other orders between the one and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him. For if itis primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible multitude. Lor the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be, intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has those which are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus, whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him? To say, therefore, that it is not seen by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible, whether being converted tv himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the image of being, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to himself, the object of his intellectual perception will be in himself. So that the paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus; intelligibly indeed prior to him, but intellectually in him,
The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, “ Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,” he asserts that
272 PROCLUS ON THE [poox a.
the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself. And again, when he says, ‘ Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fushtoned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part ; but we must admit that ut is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts 7°—in these words also he separates him who constituted the universe from the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, "776 was good ; but in that which is good, envy can never be inherent about any thing whatever: being therefore void of this, he was willing that all things should be as much as possible similar to himself ;” here, the sameness of the Demiargus with the paradigm, appears to be manifest. So that in some places Plato says that the Demnurgus is the same, and in others, that he is differentfrom the paradigm, and very properly makes each of these asser- tions. For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist intelligibly ; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus; aud the whole number of ideas ts one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating these things says, that the intelligible God [Phanes] was absorbed by the Demi- urgus of wholes. And Plato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradigm, indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theolovist, however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our preceptor, the God who ts called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established at the end of intelligibles, is animal itself,’ with Plato. Hence it is eternal, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.*| And the former indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but the latter is the most monadic of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through Night as the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in intellectuals.
Then of Protogonus the mighty strength Was seen; for in his belly he contain’d
* For τῳ αὐτοθωψ here, read τὸ avrozwoy.
* 1. @, Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order,
Book 11. Tim/Eus of Plato. 273
The whole ἡ of things, and mingled where ’twas fit,
The force and powerful vigour of the God.
Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c.
Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Demiurgus looked to the paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly. Ilence also the theologist says:
For in his sacred heart he these conceal’d, And into joyful light again reveal'’d.
That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this pa- radigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intel- lect, is manifest thronch what has been said.
Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible ; for there is not any other generated nature in order that the universe might be fa- bricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning So- crates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have been rea- sonable. But as the inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated? For what other generated nature is there besides the universe?) We may dissolve this doubt however, by recollecting what has been frequently said, that Plato calls soul generated, so far as it participates of time. But the inquiry here is, what is the paradizm of the universe, whether itis soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature. After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may be solved. May it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the
* In the original τῶν xarrwr Se Sepas, the word Seas or body obviously signifying whole. Tn this sense also, the word σώμα, which ts likewise body, is used by Aristotle in Lib. 2, Cap. 2. of his Meteors. For he there says, that the sea is the principle and body of all water, ἀρχὴν εἰναι καὶ σωμα του παντὸς vdaros ηδ᾽ ἐστι. This principle tov, he afterwards calls nOpocoperos oyxos, a collected bulk or mass. So that ὅεμας with Orpheus, and wa with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as odorms οὐ wholeness with the Platonists.
Tim. Plat. Vou. I. . 2M
474 PROCLUS ON THE fecon τὸ
world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbe- gotten? For if nothing was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to inquire whether the world was generated with relation to perpetual being, or to that which is generated. This however, is now investigated. Prior to the world therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither per- petual being, nor place ; for three things (as Plato says] were prior to the gene- ration of the universe, viz. being, place, and generation; it is evident that the so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind, Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved ina confused and dis- orderly manner, Was generated, as we have said, and had a prior subsistence. The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible pre-existing as more excellent, whether was the universe assimilated to the ma- terial nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more divine? For being a medium between the two, it 15 necessarily assimilated to one of the extremes. For it is supposed that the Demiurgus assumed that disorderly nature, and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very properly inquires to which of these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, whether to that which he assumes, orto that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows Is con- formable ; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved ina confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.
Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms, with relation to which of these the universe was generated. And this assertion 15 after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these pa- radigins, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that which is less excellent; bat) we perceiving the natures Which are prior, and also those which are posterior to him, interrogate ourselves, in which of them it is. tit to place the paradigm. But others say that Plato adduces that which is gene- rated, forthe sake of a perfect division, in order that he may not appear to prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm js eternal. For supposing the paradigm to be venerated, he shows that a certain absurdity will fullow. Others again say, that since of sensibles, some are preternatural, but others according to nature ; and of these, some have the images of certain venerated natures, but others are the similitudes of them ;—hence Plato wishing
nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 275