Jeasting and banguet, are words adapted to the Gods, and especially to the mun- dane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet and delicate food, as Socrates says in the Phadrus: and the feasting on the nati- - vity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore, Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutual participa- tions of divine conceptions, And itis not at all wonderful that Timaus should feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and partici- pations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling and being filled by each other, For thus we hear from poets inspired by Phabus, that the Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the works which they effect in the universe.
In golden cups the Gods each other pledge, And while they drink their eyes are fix’d on Troy. *
They also know and intellectually perceive each other. For Gods are to each other not unknown. *
But the intelligible according to the Chaldzan oracle is nutriment to that which is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting, subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating in this respect the Gods, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own proper intellectual conceptions.
“Tim. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.”
The philosopher Porphyry says, that what is apposite is delineated in these words: that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associa- lions, viz, infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of
this kind depends on circumstances and is involuntary. Another thing also is delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present
᾿ liad Iv. 2 seq. " Οὐγ95. Υ, 79.
16 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.
words therefore, comprehend both these, indicating the manners of Timiwus, and the necessity of one being absent; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. But the
divine Tamblichus speaking lottily on. these words, says that those who are exer-
cised in the survey of intelligibles, are unadapted to the discussion of sensibles ; as also Socrates himself says in the Republic, + that those who are nurtured in pure splendor, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavert through the obscurity which is there; Just as it likewise happens to those who ascend from the cavern, through their Inability to look directly τὸ the hieht.” Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as being adapted to another contemplation, that of intelligibles. 1 is also necessary: that this his infirmity, should be a transcendeney of power, aecording to which he surpasses the present theory, Lor as the power of the wicked, is rather impoteney thane power, thus also imbecillity with respect to things of a sccondary mature, Is tran scendency of power. According to famblichus therefore, the person who is wanting, is absent in consequence of betng incommensurate to physical discus- sions; but he would have been willingly present, if intelligibles were to have been considered, And nearly with respect to every thing [in this dialogue} prior te physiology, one of these, i.e. Porphyry, interprets every thing in amore political inanner, referring what is said to the virtues, but the other, Tamblichus, ina more physical way. Por itis necessary, that every thing should accord with the pro- posed scope : but the dialowue is physical, and not ethical, Such therefore, are the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. Por TP omit to men- tion those who labour to evince, that this fourth person was "Thewtetus, because he was known to those who came out of the Eleatic* school, and because we are informed felsewhere} that be was all Pence he is said to have been now absent on necount of iiness, Por this Aristocles: infers, that the absent: person wits Theatetus, who a little before the death of Socrates, beewme hnown to Socrates, and to the Elean stranger, Bat admitting that he had been Leng before known to the latter, What is there in common between Timwus and hin? ‘Phe Platonic Prolomy however, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon: for in the dia- logue which bears hiv name, he is not thought deserving of an answer by Socrates, But Dereyilides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness, * See the beginning of the 7th book of the Republic. > Por eXeyaruov here, it eppears to me to be pecessary to read EXearjauv.
Book 1.] Tim/Eus of Plato. 17
when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit; since it is well observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, like- wise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For to say that it was either Theaxtetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. But to say it was Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day, when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference in the Pirewus; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were with Timeus. Hence Socrates asks Timzus where that fourth person was; and Timezus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was neces- sary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is said by the more ancient interpreters,
What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says, therefo-e, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished. But the discussion in the Timeus becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and arcane. TLence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the Pirwus, the hearers were many, and those who had names were six. But in the second conference, which is narrated by Socrates, those who receive the nar ration are four in number, And in the present conference, the fourth person is wanting; but the auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors con- tracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad.—But at one time, it is accompanied with contention; on which account also, the auditors have the indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which the odd is com- plicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative, yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the auditors are four in number; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness ; but through the nature of the even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time' the discussion
* It is necessary to supply in this place, the words owov δε. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Cc
18 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1.
is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively, and narrafively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number, and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of which are in a state of hostility to each other, and measure the hostility of these parts ; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated from it; and others are entirely separated from it;—thus also ‘of discussions, some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain respect media between both. Some, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tran- quillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul; but others to doxastic ener- gies; and others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects, are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such as are more venerable. Thus also with respeet to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues,
Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should be fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different: measures of auditions? For of those who caine to the homacoion (or common auditory of the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more superticial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity as the cause of the absence of this fourth person? For the imbecility of the soul with respect to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated con- ferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which benefits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But the falling off which not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Timwus says, that this fourth person was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not absent in such a way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in evreater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a
Book 1.) Timeus of Plato. 19
polity. But it is among the number of things impossible, that one who is adapted to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was absent through indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power. And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others fo him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbe-
_cility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend
from the speculation of sensibles, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet he who becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a tran- scendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of physics. It likewise appears to me, that the words “ has befallen him,” sufficiently represent to us the diflerence between him and those that were present, with respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being anony- mous also, scems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscribed by those that were present, but the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato, therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Phado, he does not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He also mentions indetinitely,' the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the discussion of the subjects that were then considered ; and likewise very many others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain* have been present at these discussions; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says something; but Hermocrates is silently present, differing only from him who is absent in a greater aptitude to hear, but being inferior to all the rest, through his inability to speak.
“Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timus, and that of the com- pany present, to fill up the part of this absent person.”