With respect to Harpocration, it would be wonderful, if he were consistent with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus, For this man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God, Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the World. But again changing the order he calls the first God Dia, and the king of the intelligible; but he denominates the second God, the ruler, and the same divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, 1s all these; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all lan- guage, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God even father; but he denominates him father, and offspring, and the offspring of an offspring.
But Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocration, immediately makes the Demiurgus to be the same with the good, though the Demiurgus is called good by Plato, but not the good. He is also denominated by him intellect, but he says that the good
* For efnprnyevoy in this place, itis requisite to read εξηρημενον.
* Instead of παντος here, the sense evideotly requires that we should read ποιητὸν.
* Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards iu the other orders of Gods.
Book 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 257 —
is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic. What then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the Demiurgus, and in this case, there will be something more ancient and honorable than the good; or itis in the Demiurgus, and the first God will be many things ; or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus the good, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and = will intellectually perceive them.
After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold Demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, but the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain respect the Demiurgus of the universe. And Aristotle shows that this is the first God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling every thing between ἐδ one and the world, the intelligible. For there, accord- ing to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things,
Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is tru/y that which itis. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect. But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains ; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how inuch greater the interval is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, there- fore, that there are these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn. And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds, Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad. . For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad ;
Tim. Plat. Vou... I. 2K
458 PROCLUS ON THE [soon 11,
but the monad is prior to the triad. Where, therefore, is the demiurgic monad, in order that the triad may procced from it? How likewise is the world one, unless it was fabricated by one cause? For it is by a much greater priority necessary that the cause itselfshould be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may become only begotten. Let there then be three Demiurgi; but who is the one Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten ? Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad.
After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotinus, calls the super- mundane soul the Demiurgus, but the intellect of it to which it ix, converted, animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm ofthe Demiurgus; whom itis worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the Demiurgus. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually deno- minates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul? ILow also does he call the world a God? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things partake of the demiurgic providence, And divine production, indeed, Is able to generate intellect and Gods, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the psychical order. 1 omit to say that this very thing itself requires much confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable® soul.
In the next place, therefore, the divine Jamblichus has written much against the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian; but delivering his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that from what has been said, it is evident that he asserts the same thing as Plotinus,— He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, ** Thus we call that which is truly cause, and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic God, whom we now investigate, comprehending in one, possesses inhimself.” If, therefore, in what is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-
+ i.e. A soul which is not consubsisteut with body.
Book 11. Tim.Zus of Plato. 259
gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says:
For in Jove’s ample dwelling all things lie, And in Jove’s belly they together flow.
And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods should be the universe, but after a different manner, one demiurgically, another connectively, another immutably, another convertively,' and another in some other way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent between the world and the one, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the subject of doubt; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are the fathers of Jupiter?) Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to the onc? How likewise can we say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demi- urgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is notan eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with other eternal beings. That Iamblichus himself, however, though he here celebrates the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately elsewhere, may be from thence assumed, Tor writing concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timanus, after the intelligible triads, and the three tricds of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual’ Gods, he attributes the third order in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. Tor he says that these three Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the perfection of things of this kind, and that the inost beautiful indications of it are divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives
completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds
* Instead of των δε rpexrws, it is necessary to read τὸν δε excorperrixws.
* It is here necessary to supply καὶ voepwy. For the three triads of the intelligible and at ‘hes same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order.
260 Proclus on the [βοοκ τῷ)
every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions, the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined by forms, all proceeding fabrications, and other things similar to these. It is worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the Tamblichean theology from these things, and to determine what the nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of wholes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole’ of perpetual being, if indeed perpetual being has been already defined by Plato; but he now says that it Is difficult to find the Demiurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men? And how can these things be verified of that which is definitively delivered, and unfolded into light to all those that were present ?
After Lamblichus, therefore, Theodorus, following Atnelius, says that there are three Demiurgi. He arranges them, however, not immediately after the one, but at the extremity > of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and the third, the fountain of souls. He likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars. Again, therefore, the same things must be said to himas were said to the illustrious Amelius ; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Gods, or Gods analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Deminrgi, but that the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power, and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to con- sider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated partially, and not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls, is one of the fountains contamed in this middle [or generative power of the De- miurgus.} For life is not in souls only, norin animated 1tures alone, but there is also a divine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychical life, which is said to proceed diversely from thence, from divided rivers. And such, in short, are the dogmas ? of the ancicnt interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.
Let ux, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor (Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.
* For o\ew here, itis necessary to read odor.
1 ΓῚ
Instead οἵ exe τὰ δε των νοητων τέ καὶ νυέρων θεων, I read ex’ ἐσχατον τῶν γοήτων κ. λ.
2. For δυγματων here, it is becessary to read δυγματα.