But what is said in the Philecbus appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists froma certain cause of the mixture. ‘For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. . This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intel- lect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature, Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence, All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgus to the one, form to bound, matter / to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter: are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the infinite, and that whichis mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former (viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated} are seen in mundane natures only, For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible. Hlenee, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a cer¢ain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evi- dent that the Demiurgus is subordinate to the one, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,’ the formal, and the material, Timzus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demon- stration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material eause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, itis a form participated by matter, and by | the orzanie, formal, and material causes is proximately moved, But Timeus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is ~ generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypo- theses afford him this utility,
“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inva- riable sameness of subsistence, and always employing’ a certain paradigm
* There is an omission here, in the original, of ro οργανίκον. * For xporxoperos in this place, it isnecessary to read xporxpwperos.
222 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.
of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks
to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his work will not be beautiful.”
This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, but the present axioms do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigma- tic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is, whether eternal or generated. For from there being an effective cause, it follows that there is also a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him, For universally, that which makes, being extended to a certain form, makes that which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is neces- sary however to find that which is next in order, viz. whether the mundane para- diem is eternal, or generated. But to this the proposed axioms contribute: and the whole of what is said, will be truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is generated, there is a Demiurgus of it; if thereis a Demiurgus of the universe, there is alsoa paradigm. And ifindeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was gene- rated on account of aneternal paradigm. But if it was not, that whichis generated is not beautiful. So that acontinued syllogism such as the following ts produced, The world was generated. Every thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every thing having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has both a demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms there were two hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which Is generated has a cause, that which has not a cause, is not generated ; thus also in these, there are two common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an ‘atelligible para- digm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is not beautiful.
Each also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intel- ligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he makes the imitation beautiful: for there, that which is primarily beautiful, sub- sists. Butifdissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible: for on the contrary, he falls off from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account
nook 1] TIMAUS OF PLATO. pa as |
of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently does not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who made the [eclebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception of the Jupiter in ILomer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God. And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident that he would have rendered his work still more beautiful. For from the para- digm indeed, beauty or the want of beauty accedes to the image; but from the maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetype is derived. With reference to both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work an eflect of the maker. On this account also Timeus, when he speaks of the paradigm, conjoins with itits image: for he says, “ Thus therefore we must speak concerning the paradigm and its image.” But when he speaks of the Demiurgus, he conjoins with hin his work : for he then says, “ Of whom [am the Demiurgus and father of works.”
Since however paradizms are triple; for there is either an eternal paradigm of an cternal thing, or an eternal paradigm of a generated thing, or a generated pa- γα ταν Of a generated thing ;—hence when there is an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated nature, this falls off from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially generated, should be productive of eternal natares. ‘The former, therefore, par- ticipate froin their paradigms of beauty and order, as being imitations of a stable nature ; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in motion, are not beautiful, and vet are not entirely deformed, but are alone mani- fested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which ac- cedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms." And perhaps on this account also, ‘Timwus does not say that what derives its subsistence according to a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not subsist confonn-
* For ονύμασι here, it scems necessary to read, παραδειγμασι.
a4 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 11. |
ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of things artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that pro- ductive principle which ts in the mind, of the artist.) That these axioms there- fure are true, we may through these observations be reminded.
Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a De miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion ; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is per- fectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripateties grant indeed, that there is some- thing which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that itis a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multtude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a pro- ducing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire ? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendeney, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which ts infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perp πα}, and deriving: its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite: power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad intinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the pro- position which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and
Hook τι} Tim.Eus of Plato. 225
how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is init. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite, This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself, Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hlence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always becoming to be, and never ts.