sisLs incorporeal ly in the inti lligihle causes of all tilings. What else however, can we say that each ol these powers i-, than a corporcal-formed and material 1 life, "hit'll is gnostic ot things that fallen it externally, produces this knowledge through organs, i» not dependant on itself, hut on the things which it uses, is tumbled with material masses, and knows that which it knows accompanied with passion ? l or not < very passion which is produced in the animal, imparts to us a sensation ol itself, hut that which effects much agitation, as Socrates says in the Philehus. For it is necessary that a certain agitation should he produced about the sensoria. For neither are all the motions in the soul distributer! as far as to the body, but there are some, such as the intellectual, which pertain to the soul itselt by its< Sf. Nor do all the motions about the body extend as far as to the soul, but there are some which through their obscurity, are unable to move the soul. Sense therefore is produced, not from all passions, but from thn>c that are violent, which cause much agitation. Anri the mortal-formed sense indeed is partible, is mingled with missions in its decisions, and is material. Hut there is anotla . sense prior to this, in the v * hit lc of the soul, w liioli is, as with reference to this, immaterial and pore, and an impassive knowledge itself subsisting by itself, yet not liberated fro n morplic; because it also is corporeal formed, as being allotted its hypostasis ,i, body. And this sense indeed, lias the same nature with the piiant »sy. For one essence is common to both; yet externally proceeding, it is called sense; hot remaining within, and beholding innrpli;** and figures in the spirit, it is denominated the phantasy. So far likewise, as it is divided about the spirit, it is sense. Farther still, opinion indeed, is the basis of the rational life, but the phantasy is the summit of the second [or irrational] life. And opinion and the phantasy are conjoined to each other, and the irrational is filled with powers from the more excellent life. Hut the middle of the irrational life is unreceptive of supernal forms, hut is alone receptive of such as are externally situated. And at the same time, it is common, and knows that which is sensible passively. Hut the material sense is alone perceptive of things which fall on it externally, and move it, not lieing able to retain the s|M*ctach*s in itself, ia consequence of being partible, and not one. For it is divided about the sensoria. The impassive therefore and common sense is fine thing; the sens** which is common hut passive another; and that which is distributed and passive another. And the first of these indeed, pertains to the first vehicle ; the second, pertains to. the irrational life; and the third, to the animation of the body.
* For litre, it it Decenary to read reeXov.
1 For avroil liere, read avnji.
10H
PROCLUS ON THE
[book V .
After sense, however, Plato arranges desire. 1 But tliis is life indeed, anti corporeal funned, always rew caving the hotly, ami alleviatin';: its wants; about which als<», pleasure and pain are surveyed, por these passions are likewise present with the other parts of the soul. For both in reason, and in anger, you may assume pleasures anti pains. Corporeal pain am! pleasure, however, are gem-rated according to desire. For of the body tin path to that which is preternatural, and the privation of life, produce pain; but the return to that which is conformable to nature, and the adaptation to life, produce pleasure. And that which in these passions is assuaged, or exhilarated,* is the cfiif/n/iiitlu part. Since however, these two passions arc primordial, and the fountains of the other passions, as Plato says in the l'hiUbus, and in the Laws, hence through the mixture of these, he gives a g« iteration to the other pa-shms, and denominates love a mixture ut pleasure and pain. For love p< rtaiiis to all things. And so far indeed as the object of love is in its view, love is accompanied with pleasure; but >o tar as it is not vet present with it m energy, hive i< mingled with pain. Plato a >o < haracterizes the whole life of th sire through love, because this passion is most vehement about it.
In the third place tin re fore, lie eiiuiuerati s anger. But anger is a life, n mov mg every thing which pains anti disturbs the body ; oil which account also the fear of the corruption of the body disturbs it. Lxcess however, anil deticieiicy' are surveyed about it, such as audacity and timidity, ami the attendants on these, ambition, contention, and all such effects as are produced from astonishment* about mortal concerns; the superior soul employing tins life, in order to the motion of the body. And these three geiiesiurgie powers indeed, have the following order. The body, as soon as it is born, according to the progression of generation, participates of sense. I or it would not be an animal, nor would it possess appetite, unless it were generated sensitive. For appetites imh-d, are accompanied with sense, but senses* are not entirely accompanied w ith appetites. Hence, the animal is in a greater degree characterized by the sensitive, than * by the orectic. But after the participation of sense, the hotly apfs ars to
■ Drain Is admirable dciiued t»y the l’y thagorcaiis to be a certain tendency, impulse and appetite of the soul, in order to be idled with somethin", <>r In enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive inerts ; or ol’ the cut nation and absence, anil tnill-ptTCcpliuli of certain things. See ui\ translation of lamlihcliUs* l.ileol Pythagoras, p lib.
1 Instead off uf*y/irioe m this pl.iee, it appears to me to he requisite to read t.(yvfincr.
1 I or irtau* here, it is necessary to read xrcuii.
4 The wools ui ft uorfiijofn are wanting in the ojigiual, but ought evidently to be inserted.
5 Instead of o ry iptiruy in this place, it is necessary to read ij ry cyecTny.
HOOK V.]
TIM/EL'S ()!■ PLATO.
HW
he pleased and pained. Ami it is contracted indeed, l»y the external cold, hut relreslied liy the swaddling hands, and hd to a condition conformable to nature. Hut alter desire, as an increase of years accedes, it exerts the passion of amrer. l or anger is now the power of a more rohust and vigorous nature. Hence also ■ of irrational animals, such as are more material, live according to desire alone and participate of pleasure and pain ; hut such as are more perfect, are allotted a more irascible hie. Prior however to these appetites, as we have said respectin'* - sense, there is a certain summit of them in the pneuma or spirit of the soul. And this summit is a certain impulsive power, which is motive indeed of the spirit, hut guards and connectedly contains the essence of it; at one time being extended, and distributing itself into parts ; but at another, being led to bound and order, and regulated by reason.
“ And that such souls as subdue these would live justly, but such as arc vanquished by them, unjustly."
IIow tl lerefore can souls suhdue these corporeal lives, except by possessing the causes of them ? For through these they render them more concordant [with reason]. For every thing which naturally has dominion over the passions, contains in itsi It the reason [or productive principle] of them ; in order that hy looking to this, it may define the measures of their motions. Thus the anger in the breast was suppressed by l lysses ; for it bad been already disciplined by him. But the soul also adorns ext» rnal anger, in order that its motion may be just. If however, this inward angi r in him had committed itself to passion and material motion, it would have entirely corrupted the other well-ordered disposition of his soul. Hi •nee when souls subdue material passions, and adorn their inward lives, they live justly; lmt vv lien they are subdued by them they imperceptibly fall into injustice. For following the immoderate appetites of the body, their powers liecome inordinate, and unadorned, anil are exti nded about generation, in a greater degree than is lit. lint how do they at one time follow justice, and at another not ? For it was before said of them, “ Of those that arc always willing to follow justice and you'* May it not be said, that they are always indeed willing to follow justice and the Gods, but that they do not always follow them, for the reasons assigned in the Gorgias, which distinguish true will from the opinion which is governed hy appearances? Or may it not be said, that souls follow justice and
■IF
Tim. Plat.
* For litre, read vpr. VOL. II.
p. 410
PROCLUS ON THE
[BOOK V.
the Gods, in consequence of a divine nature presiding in them? For he who wishes that which is good, wishes to follow justice. For this is what was said in the lieforo cited passage, viz. “ that a divine nature has dominion in those that arc alnays a iilnn' toJolloxr justice and the Gods." For the divine part of us naturally follows justice; but the irrational forms of life follow the div me nature which is in us.
“ That he also who lived well during the proper time [of his abode on the earth ' again proceeding to the habitation of his kindred star, should enjov a happy life.'
Again, these tilings arehkewise effected!))'souls themselves. For being self-motive, they arrange themselves in an appropriate place, But they are also ellected by Fate. For this power delim s the appropriate allotments of each soul, and coadapts them to the proper forms ot life. And in the third place, they are < fleeted bv the Gods, who dispose in an orderly manner the parts of the universe. For they distribute to all things that which is according to desert; and on this account it is said, that Justice proceeding to the* universe from the middle sphere of the Sun governs all things according to rectitude. As in wholes, however. Justice following Jupiter, is the avenger of vIiom* that desert the divine law, thus also, the energy ot Justice about souls, adorns those that forget the laws of 1 ate, and exchange for a more excellent, a subordinate life. And thus much m common as to tin se particulars.
But what is the proper time, what the kindred star, and what the happy life ? The proper tunc therefore, is such as that which Plato defines in the 1 lraalrus, to the souls which are circularly led 'ruin hence, alter the first generation, viz. a thousand vears, or some otliei period of this kind, l oras this time pertains to those that choose a philosophic life, so another period more or less extended, is adapted to those that make a dillcri nt choice, this time not subsisting monadicallv, but being defined according to the form of life. But the kindred star , is that about which the distribution of souls and tin ir vehicles is made. So that if there are some souls, w hich from the first, have their allotment about the earth, these after the first life, follow ing Justice, and the Gods, will return to the ethereal vehicle o*‘the whole earth, relinquishing the terrestrial bulk. And in this establishing themselves, ami the organ eonnaseeiit with tln-m, [i. e. their ethereal vehicle,] they will themselves be filled with intellectual hie, but will fill tin ir vehicles with divine light, and demiurgic power. If also, there arc certain souls that proceed about the Sun, these returning to their wholeness, will together with it dispose wholes in an orderly manner, being allotted through a co-ordination nu ok v.]
muxs or plato.
p. 411
«i(li it, a power ot such a kind, as not to depart from the intellection of themselves, in their pro\ idential attention to the universe. And the happy li/e, is that life which is defined according to the peculiarity of the leading powers, For these are in the order of da-mons, Inning partial souls in their possession. an<l elevating them to the intelligible, in the same manner as the leaders of the hi m rated Gods. Hence also, Plato« I.-ew here, calls these souls happy, as being susp( nth d from these leaders w ho are happy (vj'ex.ivi.wmv r lVT mv\ i. c. w ho are beneficent da-mons. For « very where, that which is proximatclv established above the nature which is thought deserting of its providential care, has the order of a beneficent damon w ith respect to it.