The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

energize according to all their powers, it necessarily follows, that they must l»e more familiarized with the life, which is di\isihle about body, ami !>e more remote from an impartible essence, and thus preserve the analogous to each of the ex¬ tremes; just a> the most divine of souls, through a similitude to intellect, are more exempt 1 from partible natures, ami are more united to the impartible essences above them, from which they are oonuasceiitU suspended ; ami also establish an intellectual order in souls. It appears likewise, that the intellect of each da-moil, as In mg a whole and one, is the intellect of the ihemou that proximately partici¬ pates it, but coinprctn mis also, the nuinbt r ot the souls th.it are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them.* Kaeh partial soul therefore, w ill have, as an im¬ partible essence, the proper paradigm ot its» It contained in this mti llect, and not simplv the whole intellect, ill the same manner as the d.eiuou who is essentially the leader ot these souls. \\ e sa\ therefore, that tin impartible of each partial soul w hit !i is abuv i it, may be more accurately di lined to lie, the I or ill of it, w Inch i*i comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the il.emo- niacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. \ud thus both the asser¬ tions are true, that the intelhs t alone ot i*ach is established lit the u itures winch always exist on high, and that each is a medium, between the impaitible above, and the partible nature posterior to it And thus much concerning these parti¬ culars.

Itut after what manner does the Deiniurgus point out to these souls, the nature of the universe ? Is it by conveiting them to the world, and preparing them to survey the reasons contained in nature 1 'This however, is to make them less excellent, and to convert them from separate reasons to such as are inseparable from sensible*. But the Deiniurgus, on the contrary, elevates souls to the intelli¬ gible, converts them to himself, separates them from matter, and tills them with divine powers and demiurgic intellec tions. May it not lie said then-lure, that having the cause of nature in himself, he converts souls to himself? For every one who points out, entirely looks to that which he indicates. But the Deiniurgus alone looks to things prior to himself, and to himself, lie beholds therefore the nature, which he indicates to souls, in himself. For he contains the unical prin¬ ciples of all things, and pre-established in himselt powers effective ol the gene¬ ration both of other Brings, and of nature. And as he antecedently contains bodies incorporeally, thus also, he comprehends nature siiperuaturally. I liese things therefore arc* rightly asserted, it is necessary however to speak after

* tor tiwTtioOai here, tl is necessary to read

1 Instead of avrov til tins place, it is uecessary to lead avrut ,

hook V.]

Tl.M/EUS OF PLATO.

another manner, not only placing idea in the Demiurgiis philosophically, hut likewise, as thcnlngists teach, surveying Nature primarily, pre-existing intellec¬ tually in the vivihe deity. Lor hem" suspended from thence, she governs this visible world, assimilates material to immaterial reasons, am 1 refers corporeal to primordial motions, lint it is necessary, to survey Nature secondarily, accord¬ ing ' to the mundane order of the vivific (ioddess, conformably to what the Drat les say, that immense Xafure is suspended from the back o) the Goddess. From her primary subsistence however, in vivilic dcitv, she proceeds into the demiurgic intellect. It is likew ise requisite that souls should survey the fountains and roots ol Nature in orderthat they may liehold their ow n dignity ami the total series from whence they are suspended, and that adhering to this, they should contemplate the universe. For by directing their view to Nature herself, they co-arrange them¬ selves * with Fate. As therefore, the Demiurgiis himself, by antecedently com¬ prehending the paradigm of Nature, governs tiie universe, thus aI>o he is desirous that souls looking to the first and intellectual cause of Nature, should revolve on high, and conduct the whole world. For this is the highest allotment of souls. The Demiurgiis therefore, points out to souls, that fontal Nature, which pre¬ exists in the whole vivilic Cioddess, conformably to that oracle itself of the (iods, which they delivered to their genuine mystics. Hut since souls have second and third lives, the Demiurgiis also gives to them the reasons, or productive principles of these.

“ lie also announced to them the Laws of Fate.”

That this is the second speech of the Demiurgiis, again proceeding to souls through words adapted to souls, is evident. The former speech however, of the Demiurgiis, is immediately addressed to the junior (iods, as (iods of (iods. Hut the second speech 1 indicates that the Demiurgiis tills also these souls with words or reasons, hut not immediately as he does the junior (iods. And the scope indeed, in the former speech, comprehends a representation* of providential reasons, hut in the latter, of the laws of Fate. Having therefore premised thus much, w e say, 1m taking ourselves to the things which are the subject of conside¬ ration, that Fate must not 1m* said to he a partial nature, as some of the lVripa-

* The word-* frvrrpvt *nrn, arc omitted in this place in the original, but ought to be inserted.

* For ent/rnn In fC, read inorni.

1 The words i} <V ttvrrpa, arc also in this place erroneously omitted.

4 I or here, read t^^xxeiv.

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[book V.

tetics, such as Alexander [Aphrodisiensis] assert it to be. For this nature is imbecile, and not perpetual, lint we antecedently assume from common concep¬ tions, that the power and empire of Fate are very great and stable. Nor is it the order of the mundane periods, as Aristotle says, who calls the increase which deviates from order, preter-fatal, as it this order was constituted by I*ate. And the cause of order indeed, is one thing, but order itselt another, Nor must it be said, that Fate is soul in habitude, as 1 heodurus asserts it to be. 1 or such u form of life is not a principle in wholes. Nor is it simply Nature, as Porphyry says it is. For many tilings which are supernatural, and out ol the dominion of Nature, are produced by Fate, such as nobility, renown, and wealth. Fur where do physical motions bring with them the cause of these ? Nor is it the intellect of the universe, as Aristotle again says in a « ertain work, if the treatise concerning the World was written bv him. For intellect produces at once, all things which it produces, and is not at all in want of a government which proceeds according to a certain jK*riod, and a continued and well-ordered series. 'This however is the popularity of Fate, viz. a series of many causes, order, and ajieriodicul production. But if it he requisite to comprehend eoncisely the whole form o! it, we must say, that it is Nature according to its subject, but is deified, and tilh d with divine, in¬ tellectual, and psychical illuminations. For the oilier of the Cods who ari called AToi/'t [rruv uoi^yiTutv xa/.vjufwiivj and the more excellent genera, terminate in Fate. For these imparl powers from themselves to the one life of it; and the Dt-miurgus of wholes, collects and unites all these gills, and all these plenitudes, and demonstrates them to be one power. For if the visible bodies are tilled with divine* powers, hy a much greater priority is Nature deilied. And if the whole visible world is one, milt b more is the whole t sstiice of Fate one, and lias its com¬ position completely tilled from many causes. F«*r being suspended from the pro- vidt nee of the Cods, and the demiurgic goodness, it is rendered one, and governed according to rectitude hy these; since it is a reason consisting of reasons, one multi¬ form power, a divine life, and the order of things that have an arrangement prior to it.* II ence also the ancients, looking to this variety, and multiform nature ol Fat<, were let! to ditleivnt opinions concerning it. For some called it a Clod, on account of its participation of deity, others, a (hcinon, on account of the ellicacious and at the saini lime multiform nature of its production; others, intellect, because a certain participation of intellect proceeds into it; and others, order, because every thing ' which is arranged, is invisibly comprehended hy it. But Plato alone [truly] /

* The word thu* ii omitted in llns plate id the original, but obviously ought to be inserted.

* Fate therefore i» Nature deified, or Nature considered according to her summit.

TIM.El’S OF PLATO.

surveyed the essence of it; for lie calls it indeed Nature, hut suspended from the Demiurgus. I*or how otherwise could the Demiurgus point out Nature, unless he contained the principle of it m himsell * IIow likewise could he announce the laws ot l ate, altt r pointing out the nature of th** universe, except liv constituting Nature, as the one connected receptacle of these laws ? But in the Politicos, he in a still clearer manner, suspends the secondary life of the universe from Fate, aftt r the separation from the universe of the one da-mou that governs it, and the many du-tunns that are the attendants of that one. Ilence, he removes from the world, their providential inspection of it, and only leaves it the government of Fate, though the world always possesses hoth these, hut the faille separates the latter from the former. For he says, that Fate and connascent desire convolve the world ; just as the Chaldean oracles say, “ lh.it Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, in order that heaven may run an eternal course; and that the other periods of the sun, the moon, the seasons, night, and day, may lie accomplished." Thus therefore, Plato also says, that the second period of the world is convolved by Fate, but not the lirsl and intellectual period; all but clearly asserting, that he eonceivi s this [’ale which proximatelv moves the sensible world, to lie suspended from die invisible providence of the Cods. For establishing prior to this Necessity, the mother of the Fates, he convolves* the world on her knees ; as he says, in the [10th book of the] Kepublic.

And if it be requisite to declare my opinion, Plato places these three causes of order, successive to » aeh oth« r, vi/,. Adraslia, Necessity, and I’ate; the first being intellectual, the second supermundane, and the third mundane. Fur tin. Demiur¬ gus, as Orpin us says, xras nurtured indeed by Adraslia, hut associates xtilth Necessity, and generates Fate. Ami as Adrnstia was comprehensive of the divine institutions (iscrufov*) and collective of all-various laws, thus also Fate is comprehensive of all tin* mundane laws, which the Demiurgus now inscribes in souls, in order that he mav lead them logi ther with wholes, and may definitely assign that which is adapted to them, according to the dillerent elections of lives. For on (Ins account , an erroneous choke Lads the soul to a dark and atheistical life, but a pious choice conducts it to heaven, under the guidance of xchotcs ; because each choice is full of the laws of Fate, and souls, as Plotinus says. In-take themselves to the place announced to them by the law which they contain. For this is the peculiarity of the providence of the Cods, to lead inwardly the subjects of their providential care. And why should this be wonderful, since Nature inserting material anti

1 Instead of rpt<p<i here, it is nccesvarj to read trrex^tt.

* In the original but it is obviously necessary to read Ocr/ivr,

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[book V.