aKo requisite to sav, that souls ascending into their vehicles, taeame citizens ofthe universe, proceeded into, and were arranged in subjection to the whole world ; that souls likewise were divided together with the stars; and that they surveyed Nature and the whole mundane order, being themselves arranged above the nature of the world, but receiving their own proper mundane allotment. For in the first place, they were constituted ; afterwards, they were distributed about the divine governments; and thus, in the third place, they ascended into vehicles, surveyed Nature, and were auditors ofthe laws of Fate; from all which, it is easy to perceive, that according to Plato, souls are superior to Fate, according to their highest lit**. I*or that which the father ot wholes gave to them, is according to nature. Hence, as the [Chaldean] Oracle says, “ By understanding the works of the father, they fly from the shameless ' wing of Fate. Ibit they be in Cod, drawing vigorous torches, descending from the father; from which descending, the soul plucks of empyrean fruits, the soul-nourishing dower.”
M hat tl lerefore is the vehicle ot the soul, and how dot's the Demiurgns cause souls to ascend into it ? It is requisite then to understand, that the great Ianiblielms and his followers, are accustomed to say, that front all ether, which has a prolific power, the composition of the psychical vehicles is generated, divine bodies neither being diminished, nor constituting those vehicles by co-acervation, but proceeding according to divine lives, and giving morphe to partial pneumatic substances. It i> necessary, however, to conceive in addition to this, vvliat is more true, that the i-lahoratiou of these vehicles proceeds from demiurgic causes. For the maker * of every corporeal hypostasis constitutes these, who also prepares seats for thi' Gods in the world. For ho receives souls that are sent from the intelligible into the world, and gives different abodes to different souls. The Demiurgns of the universe likewise, constitutes them, and lie the first of all. II* 'nee also, he now causes them to ascend into vehicles, evidently producing the vehicle. For this was not fashioned in what lias been before said, hut the Dciniurgus himself, having constituted this together with wholes, causes souls to ascend into it, and imparts to them the principle of their proper organs. For In; is the Demiiirgus of animals, and of tin* plenitudes of tin* universe. Hence, lie not only produces souls, hut he produces them together with appropriate vehicles. And on a survey of the conception of Plato, we shall find that it is truly admirable ami arcane,* since lie does not represent the Demiurgns as fashioning these vehicles from wholenesses which previously had an existence, as neither does he rnoeiAJs on tiif.
* For ni<t« lirrc, read arm Ft*.
* i. c. Vulcan.
1 For awop ijr#r also in (hiv place, read a*opp7r*r.
[nooi v.
.103 the vehicles of the planets and the fixed ' stars ; hut he says that the J)einiurt;tis p ulueed these, the junior Gods lending parts, ami from these causing the bodies to coalesce. This therefore, is an evident argument that each of these \ehicles is in a cerium respect self-constituted, mid ru»t fahrieated hy an ahlation of other things, lest it shouUl lie requisite that they should In- a^am refunded into anothi r tiling. For every tiling which subsists hy an abscission ol other things, since the aliscission is accompanied with a diminution of tin* whole, must necessarily he entirely restored to the whole, l or it is necessary that each of the wholes of the universe should always remain a whole; on which account also every vehicle of the soul ot this kind is p.-rpetiinl, and alway s the same vehicle is suspended front the same soul. I or each is thus naturally adapted to subsist, as It was generated by the Ihmiur^us. For how «au we any lonjri r preservo the soul mundane, if we corrupt the \< !ii« lc ? .And how can that beany longer said to be mundane, ot which there is nothing in the univeise ! For it parti d souls were superior to a life in conjuiu lion with veliii les, tin v would also he sii|m nor to divine souls themselves. And if they were interior to such a life, how does the IJciniurttus immediately on tlu ir bcim; venerated, introduce them into these vehicles, as lie is now said to do * How likewise, do souls use vehicles, both in Hades, ami in the heavens, it these bodies are not jmi petually PusjM-nderl from them ? Hi it it is evident that they do list* them, both from what is asserted by Socrates in the IMi.rdo, and in tin l’ha drus. I’or in the former, he says, that .wills ascending into vehicles, prut eed to Acheron; and in the latter, (hut the x i hides of the dints In i //•' i truly managed, prin ted in n/nilihi mm, hut the vehicles of other souls that follow the Cods, primed uith ihj/u uln/, and seurcehf [.obtain the vision if the stipercelestiul place]. This therefore*, may also b«* demonstrated through other arguments ; and these things have Is en lieforo ideally asserted by us, and are now recalled to our recollection.
From this likewise, we may survey the dilletvnre of partial and divine souls. For in the latter, tlie I)emiur^us placed the bodies in the souls, as heinir on all sides compri heiuh it in them; the souls not beitiij converted to tin; subjects of their government, but employing one immutable intellection, lhit in tlie former, he causes the souls to ascend into vehu h-s ; Itecausc they ar»* adapted to be frivqueutly Vatupushed by bodies, and to In* converted to the natures over which they preside, 1 when they become parts ol the universe; in tin* same manner as their vehicles arc subservient to tin* laws of Fate; and no longer purely live under tin divim lijjht of l*rovideiiee. And thus much concerning the vehicle of the soul.
I liolr.iil of rXiiiwf lierr, it i> no,to rend iirVuw*.
* Tor ^itu^Ktu lure, it is ikii mry to rrad hutkuvfom.
BOOK V.]
TLMJEL’S OF PLATO.
3.93
It is worth while however, again to recall to our remembrance, hut with a certain accurate consideration of what has been frequently said, that since the whole of our soul is a medium between an impartible essence, and that essence which is divisible about bodies, we clearly obtain this latter essence from its vehicle. Fora connascent vehicle is suspended from our soul, having an appropriate life, in the same manner as the v chicles of divine and da moniacal souls. And this life is the partial essence, of which the soul antecedently comprehends the paradigm; so that opinion is established in the soul as the paradigm of sense ; but the power of deliberate choice, as the paradigm of the orexis in its proper vehicle, according to which it is moved to this, or to that place, and is impelled to do this thing or that. For these arc proximately the partial natures in the soul, and prior to these, the dillcrence in the soul of the all-various divisions of its essence, according to which ii is distributed into parts, and possesses something which is impartible, and a whole. Since therefore, we assert these things concerning the separation into parts in the soul, it is worth while to inquire, what we should admit the impartible essence above our soul to be, since each of the souls superior to ours has an intellect 1 prior to it. For each of these partial souls has not an essential intellect above it. For if it had, it would alvvavs abide on high, in the same manner as the souls superior to it, in consequence of intellect always detaining it in the intelligible, through always imparting to it its light. We have therefore already said something court ruing this, and more than oner, and vve shall now assert more elearly what we conreive to be the truth on this subject, and vvliat divinity imparts to our intellect. Ib nee, vve have frequently spoken concerning vvliat the impartible is in each partial soul, it being a thing truly dubious, by extending our intellect to deity. For to leave an intellect to car h, and this partial, is a thing by no means to be admitted. May we not s.iv therefore, that each of these partial souls is essentially suspended from a certain d.emon, every d.rmon having a certain demoniacal intellect above its* If ? A partial soul therefore, has the same intellect as the d.emon from which it is suspended, arranged as an impartible essence prior to it. Hence, the da-moniacal soul primarily participates of this intellect, but the partial souls that are under it, secondarily, which also makes them to l»e partial. For each lias a peculiar partible nature, but possesses the impartible, in common with the dannons that are above these souls, and to whom the impartible is peculiar. Hence diemons abide on high, but partial souls sometimes descend, dividing themselves about bodies, as l»eing more adapted to these. I*or if in partial souls, the genus of ditlerence is redundant, which makes them unable always to
* Instead of evr here, it is necessary to read w*r.
VOL. II.
Tim. Pint.
3D
p. 394
PROCLUS ON THE
[book V.
energize according to all their powers, it necessarily follows, that they must l»e more familiarized with the life, which is di\isihle about body, ami !>e more remote from an impartible essence, and thus preserve the analogous to each of the extremes; just a> the most divine of souls, through a similitude to intellect, are more exempt 1 from partible natures, ami are more united to the impartible essences above them, from which they are oonuasceiitU suspended ; ami also establish an intellectual order in souls. It appears likewise, that the intellect of each da-moil, as In mg a whole and one, is the intellect of the ihemou that proximately participates it, but coinprctn mis also, the nuinbt r ot the souls th.it are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them.* Kaeh partial soul therefore, w ill have, as an impartible essence, the proper paradigm ot its» It contained in this mti llect, and not simplv the whole intellect, ill the same manner as the d.eiuou who is essentially the leader ot these souls. \\ e sa\ therefore, that tin impartible of each partial soul w hit !i is abuv i it, may be more accurately di lined to lie, the I or ill of it, w Inch i*i comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the il.emoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. \ud thus both the assertions are true, that the intelhs t alone ot i*ach is established lit the u itures winch always exist on high, and that each is a medium, between the impaitible above, and the partible nature posterior to it And thus much concerning these particulars.
Itut after what manner does the Deiniurgus point out to these souls, the nature of the universe ? Is it by conveiting them to the world, and preparing them to survey the reasons contained in nature 1 'This however, is to make them less excellent, and to convert them from separate reasons to such as are inseparable from sensible*. But the Deiniurgus, on the contrary, elevates souls to the intelligible, converts them to himself, separates them from matter, and tills them with divine powers and demiurgic intellec tions. May it not lie said then-lure, that having the cause of nature in himself, he converts souls to himself? For every one who points out, entirely looks to that which he indicates. But the Deiniurgus alone looks to things prior to himself, and to himself, lie beholds therefore the nature, which he indicates to souls, in himself. For he contains the unical principles of all things, and pre-established in himselt powers effective ol the generation both of other Brings, and of nature. And as he antecedently contains bodies incorporeally, thus also, he comprehends nature siiperuaturally. I liese things therefore arc* rightly asserted, it is necessary however to speak after hook V.]
* tor tiwTtioOai here, tl is necessary to read
1 Instead of avrov til tins place, it is uecessary to lead avrut ,
Tl.M/EUS OF PLATO.
p. 395