The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

For bodies indeed, are hound through analogy ; for this is the most beautiful bond of them. But animals aie bound with animated bonus, as we have l>efore observed. And souls w hich contain something of a partible nature are hound by media, [viz. by geometrical, arithmetical and harmonieal ratios;] for Plato calls these ami all tin* productive principles of which the soul consists, bonds. For impartible natures alone are unimiigent of bonds; but those that arc hound,

’ Hap* tTTpnv is omitted in the original.

i hr v»ords cat Xiri)i>arXwi wp «ai>rov cat Tap’ mpoo, are omittrd m the original.

Tim. Pint Vol. II. *2 X

PHOCLUS ON Til K

{ f IMH V

consist of things that have a separate subsistence; these not being separated according to time, but according to the causal comprehension of simple natures in the Demiurgtis. After this manner therefore, the dissoluble of the mun¬ dane Gods as from another, or rather as in another, subsists. Ifencc thev are in a certain rospe-ct, but by no means simply dissoluble. For if the\ were dissoluble from themselves, but indissoluble according to the will of the father, as Severus, Atticiis, and Plutarch are accustomed to say, against whom many arguments are adduced by many if this were the ease, wlienee did thev derive the being dissoluble from tin inselves ? For if dissolution is natural to them, who imparted to them tins natural power? For it was not any other than the Demiurgtis. If liowe r, In* is the supplier of nature to them, lie also is the cause of their dissolution, lint if tin !» mg dissoluble is preternatural to them, the con¬ trary, the indissoluble, is natural to them. And if it is natural to tln-m, they will possess the indissoluble from themselves ; and the very existence of them will be a thing of this hind ; itv the same manner as self-motion is natural to soul, levity to fin*, and to every thing, lh.it winch necessarily exists in it essentially ; so that the mundane Gods will possess this from themselves. Ibit I say from themselves, because they will possess it lrom their proper colnpositinn, wliieli they are essen¬ tially allotted; for they will not poviss it a> sell-.siihsjstent. It is ridiculous therefore to say, that being dissoluble of theuist Ives, they are alone indissoluble through the will of the father, which these men assert to he the ease, in conse¬ quence of wishing to preserve the axiom, that every tiling generated lias corrup¬ tion, and who also contend that the world was generated, list Tima-us should apjvear to contradict Socrates, whom lie had heard on the preceding dav admit¬ ting that the imbegoilen,* is incorruptible. Hein e, if the genus of the mundane Gods is of itself indissoluble, it is al>o of itself unbegntten, and not alone through the will of the father. For unless we admit this, how c an we accord with Plato, who makes a twofold indissoluble, one according to nature, but another accord¬ ing to the* d< miiirgic will ? And, if we deny this, must we not also speak impiously of the 1>« miiirgiis himself? For it being willing to make* his fabrications indisso¬ luble, lie does not possess the* power of effecting this, we must separate his will from bis power, which would lie* absurd, since* this does not take* place with worthy men. lint if he is both willing anel able te> make* the*se indissoluble, Iceing able*, lie* will make* the in te> be* indissoluble?; su that the* indissoluble- in them is according to nature. 1 e»r each of them was g< ne-iateel indissoluble, but was

* Tor airo toXX< i litre, read uiro iroXXwe.

1 Instead et ye» i tjroy litre, it is «>l>vioi.'!\ neeesearv l«> read nynujTtr.

nook v.]

TI MAX'S. or PLATO

not generated dissoluble, and afterwards was made indissoluble* since the works ol the father are indissoluble through the power which he contains. They are likewise indissoluble from the demiurgic will, since they are of a composite nature, and possess the indissoluble with a bond. But there is likew ise m a cer¬ tain respect a dissolution of tin in, so far as they consist of things of a simple nature, of which the father contains in himself the definite causes. At one and tiie same time therefore, they are indissoluble and dissoluble. They are not however, so indissoluble as the intelligible; for that is indissoluble through tran¬ scendency of simplicity. Hut these are at the same time indissoluble and dissolu¬ ble, as consisting of simple natures, ami as being perpetually bound. Tor all the natures that are hound l»emg dissoluble, such as are perpetual, possessing through the whole of time beauty from the intelligible, divine union and demiurgic har¬ mony, are indissoluble. Hut mortal natures are dissoluble alone, liecause they are connected with the deformity and inaptitude of matter. And the former indeed, are beautifully harmonized through the union inserted in tin m by their harmonizing cause; but this is not the case with the latter, on account of the multitude of causes which no longer insert in them a similar union;' for their union is dissipated through the multitude which is mingled in their composition; so that they are very properly allotted a remits d harmony.

Hence, every thing which is hound is dissoluble. Hut one thing is thus dis¬ soluble and indissoluble, and another is di-soluble only, just as the mt< lligiblc is alone indissoluble. V\ by therefore, is that which is primarily bound, at one anti the same time dissoluble and indissoluble? Because it is beautifully harmonized, and is rcc// composed. Tor from being util composed it obtains union; since goodness is utiific. But from the intelligible it obtains the fn'iiiitifulfi/; for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating power it obtains harmony ; for this is the cause of the Muses, and is the source of hiinnonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence we again have the three causes, the final through the uclf the paradigmatic through the beautifully, and the demiurgic through the h.iniionizt’t/. 1 But it is neressarv that a composition of this kind, harmonized by 1 lie one fabricating power, tilled with divine beauty, and obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the Demiurgus says that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature.

1 l’or f it is necessary In read nunr.

' Kr^npn/Tfir i rjv i* eirom onsly printed for «r}£n\nfT/icr»ji .

1 Alter rtjy wnfirif'dYftaTtKrjr it i« neeeviary to supply llie word* hta rov tcakvt, rrjf frrjfjtovpyttifr, which re wanting in the original.

34ft

I’HOC LI S ON I Hi;

[UOUk V,

Moreover, prior to tins Plato hail haul, that the universe is indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If however it is entirely impossible for the universe to Ik- dissolved by any other, but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for him to etl'eet this. I'm it is the province of an evil nature,— it is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either* lie must dissolve it, or some oilier. But if some other, who is it that is able to oiler violence to the Demi- urgtis 1 For it is impossible that a dissolution of it should !>e elli » tt d < wept hv him that bound it. lint it he dissolves it, how lx ing good, can he dissolve that which is beautifully harmoiii/eil alid well composer! ? For that which is suhvertive of these, is produetive of evil ; just as that which is suhvertive of rvil is allotted a Iicih■ licent nature. Hr nee, there is an eipial neeessilv that the Dcmiurgus should he de| waved, if it lawful so to speak, or that this world should be dissolved [vi/. eaeh of these is equally impossible]. Such therefore is the necessity which Plato assigns to tin mcorniptihility of the univi rse. lienee, that Plato gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane finds, he clearly maiiifr sts, when he orders them to hind mortal natures, not with those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the connective bonds of these finds are indis¬ soluble, tin y themsi Ives must be essentially indissoluble. Here however lit* says that they are not in every respect indissoluble. Il is evident then fore from both these assertions, that they are indissoluble, aiul at the same time dissoluble, 1 and that they are not in every respeet indissoluble in consequence of tln ir being appropriately bound, lint if these things are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them should be very dilli rent from that which we call corrup¬ tion. For that which is dissoluble after such a manner as the corruptible, in consequence of not being indissoluble, is so far from being not in every respect indissoluble, that it is in every respect dissoluble. Hence it is not proper to say that the mundane Gods are of themselves corruptible, blit remain incorruptible through the will of the father; hut we ought to say that they are in their own nature’ incorruptible.

“ Hence so far as you are generated, you are not immortal, nor in every respect indissoluble ; yet you shall never be dissolved, nor become subject to the fatality of death; being allotted my will, which is a much

* For »<r« here, rrad tirt.

1 The words cat Xi m i are omitted in the unginal.

’ For avrov fi ctr, it is iiecet'jrv to read n» puli'.

I’IM.Fl S or PLATO.

greater and more excellent bond than the vital connectives with which vou were bound ;it the commencement of your generation/’

Since all the niituilane Gods to whom these wools are addressed consist of divine souls, and animals .suspended from them, or in other words, since they are participated souls, and since the Demiurgus denominates them indissoluble ami a* the same time dissoluble, because the indissoluble of them is not intelligible, and their dissolubility is not mortal, hut the former is through a composition 1 from simple natures, of which the Demiurgus comprehends the separate causes, and the latter is through the immutable connexion of the bond, which the father inserts in (hem;—this being the case, lie now wishes to collect into one point of view, and into one truth, all that he had said separately about them. For at one and the same time he takes away from them the immortal and the indissoluble, and again confers these on them through a subversion of their opposites. For media are allotted this nature, not receiving the nature of the extremes, and ap¬ pearing to comprehend the whole of both. Just as if some one should call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, as consisting of both, and neither impartible, nor partible, as being different from the extremes. Tor see how a middle of this kind may he surveyed in the mundane Gods. That is principally and primarily called immortal, which supplies it-i If with immortality ; since that also is primarily being which is being from itself; intellect which is intellect from itself; and one which is from itself one. For every where that which primarily possi s<e> any thing is siirli from itself; since if it were not so from itsell hut from another, that other would he primarily, either intellect, or lile, or the one, or some¬ thing eFe ; and either this would he primarily so, or if there is nothing primarily, the ascent will he to infinity. Thus therefore, that is truly immortal which is immor¬ tal from itself, and which imparts to itself iiumort ility. But that which is m ilher vital according to tin whole of itself, nor self-subsistent, nor possesses intmorla- litv from itself, is not primarily immortal. Henri as that which is secondarily Ih‘- ing is not lwing, so that which is secondarily immortal is not immortal, yet it is not mortal; for this is entirely a defection or departure from the immortal/ nei¬ ther possessing a conuascent life, nor infinite power. For these three are in a successive order. That wliich possesses from itself infinite life; that which re¬ ceives infinite life from another; and that which neither from itself nor another

' For wnfirht f Itcrf, I frail trv»Omr. For jirior to ihis, Proelm in < ( 'lii'W ftoiis no, r*

'c rovrnti. nXi'rov a^tn rai Xvtov ftrnr, m a»Xv* ith Or

* For rrw (Jn.arcv here, it is obviously nrerwirs to ri-ad rt¥ aCumrev.

Tso

[book V.