Hut the words, “ in that which is animal itself ,we have before explained, and shown what animal itself is, according to our opinion. And now also we sav, that of the intelligible breadth, one part is the summit, is united, and occult; but another part, is the power of the summit, and proceeds, and at the same time abides; and another part, unfolds itself into light through energy, and exhibits in itself intelligible multitude. Of these likew ise, the first indeed, is intelligible lieing, the second, is intelligible life, and the third, is intelligible intellect. The first lieing itselt however, cannot he animal itself: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas; but through its onlvuess, and iucilahic union, it is denominated «nc by Plato. And in short, animal itself is s.ud to participate of eternity, hut the first
Instead of r-«« it, ri jy atf tnurov ftarptrtr in tins place, ll is ro'pimlc to read row it, rpncnytt ttt cnifm, itatfttmr.
* For r«i« ptlf tnirrvy raltaiy vfiirry/rt rwr Qtw in lliis place, ll i» necessary to read rni fttff «oi tv* f«;«i rwr Otvt,
Proclls on the
[book IV.
25ti
Iteing itself, d,>es not participate of any thins, except some one should sav that it participates of the owe, which in every respect is worthy of consideration. For may not that which is above it, he superior even to this ap|>elhiti»ii [the wit]. Ihit hems; itself is primarily that which it is, and not according to participation. Hence, lreins; itself < aiinot he animal itself for the above-mentioned causes. iNor can intelligible life he animal itself. 1 or animal is secondary to life; and is said to Ik* animal through the participation of life. In short, n animal itself was the second, eleruitv would he hem- itself. This however, is impossible. For the one being is one thin- and eternal l>< in- another; the former hem- the monad of l>em", hut the latter a ditad, bavin- the aluinjs rnmplioati d with U in-. Am the former is the cause of existence to all llm.-s, hut the latter of permanency accord i n} r n> existence. If therefore, neither the one h. m- itself is animal itself, nor that which is i.mncdiatrlv posterior to the one brim;; for this is ctcrmly, who li t* mt.-l- li-ihh; power, infinite life, and wholeness itself, according to which earl, of the divinities is at once a whole; it is necessary that the third, [or int. liable intellectJ. should lie animal itself. For it is necessary that animal itself should he alter a certain manner intellect; since the image of it subsists « nt.rely in conjunction with sense. But sense is the image of intellect; so that iu that wlm !. is primarily ani¬ mal, intellect primarily subsists. Hence, if animal itself is second try to hie, it ncccssar.lv exists according to intelligible int. Ih-ct. For he.n- intelligible, and as Plato savs, an animal, the most hcaul.ful of intclligiblcs, and only brgotlc n, it will have this order. For all thin-s after this form are prodm ed in coujum tion with
other thill—s, and fall short til intelli—ihle .illntss.
Animal .1 self then fore, is intelligible intellect, comprehending in itself tl.e intel¬ lectual orders of the Gods, collet tin-, uniting, and pel lectin-them,' anti ht in- the most Ircautiful boundary of intelli-ihles. It also unfolds into light tt, intellec¬ tual natures, the united ami unknow n cause of intelli-ihl. s, exciting Us, ll to uleas and all-various powers, hut producing all the seeoml ortlt rs of the Go,Is. Hence likewise, Orpheus calls it the God Phones, as unfold,ng into l.ght the intelligible unities; anti gives to it various forms, as exhibiting m *^1 raose ot m.el-
li-ihle animals, lIeal>o inserts in it multiform ideas, as primarily compn 'ending intt lh-.hle ideas, and calls it the key of ...lelleet, because it hounds every intelli¬ gible essence, and connectedly-contains intellectual hie. 1 rom this *>o "it .»t .4 God therefore, the Dcmiurgus of the universe is suspended, being htmseli, as we have before said, intellect, hut intellectual intellect, and in a particular maim, r t .e cause of intellect. Hence also, lie is said to mv animal ilsell: lor >i 3 ht ^ the
1 Fof uvry line, ft* ad ciurwy.
nooK iv.]
'IIMXL'S OF PLATO.
peculiarity of the intellectual Coils. For the theologist rails intelligible intellert eyeless. lie says then-fore, concerning it:
In In* tin n*l fi'ciliujg cycle.*, rapid Love.
For the houmlary of its energy is the intelligible. But the Demiurgus bring intellect, does not rank among participated intellects; in order that he may Ik? the Demiurgus of wholes, and that he may he aide to look to animal itself. Being however imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect* And through simple intelligence indeed, he is united to the intelligible; but through various intellection, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Hence his intelligence is denominated vision, as being non-multitudmous, and as shining with intelligible light. But his second energy is called itianoetic, as proceeding through simple intelligence, and advancing to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that lie looks to animal itself; but Orpheus, that lie leaps to, and absorbs it, through the indication of Night. For through Night, who is intelligible and at the same time intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoin* d to the intelligible. You must not, however, on this account say, that the Demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself; for this is not lawful for him to do; but that Ireing converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas w hich is in himself, he is also conjoined to the monad of the all¬ various orders of forms. For intellect is not without the intelligible, 1 and does not subsist separate from it, according to the Oracle. For if vve say, that our soul looking to ilsi-lf knows all things, and things prior to itself are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect should not in a much greater degree, by intellectually perceiving himself survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also in hint, vet not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. lienee likewise, being himself intellectual, lie is said by tlicologists, ns vve have observed, to absorb that intelligible Ood, in consequence of every intelli¬ gible, the divisions of forms, and tin* intelligible number, being perceived by him. Plato, also, indicating this, denominates the ideas of the Demiurgus, such and so many ; by the former, manifesting the peculiarities of the causes, hut by the latter, the separation of them according to number.
If however these things subsist after this manner, it is not projver to admit, as some do, that there is an infinity of forms in iulelligibles. For the definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite, as Plato also indicates. And first natures are always contracted in quantity, but transcend in power, those that arc pos¬ terior to and proceed from them. Nor must it be said, that those who separate animal itself from the Demiurgus, make the intelligible to be external to intellect.
• Instead of it a i-nijro* in tint place, it I* ucccnary to lead re* rn* alone.
Tim. Plat. Vol. II. ^ K
I*HOCI.US ON T!I!-:
[hook iv.
*2 f >h
For we do not make that which is seen to Ik* posterior to that which sees, in order that it may he external to it, hut we assert that the former is prior to the latter. Hut more divine intelligible* are intellei tually jH-ri-eived by more various natures, as existing in them; since the soul also entering into itself, is said to discover all I icings, and as Socrates savs, 1 (i >d and wisdom. Animal itsi If therefore, is prior to the Dcminrgiis, and is not « \ternal to him. And there indeed, all things, subsist totally, and intelligibly ; hut m the Ibiniurgus, intellei tually, and with division. For hi him the separate causes of the ^iiii and moon pre-exist, and not onh the one idea of the celestial tlods, winch gives subsistence to all the celestial genera. Hence, the [Chaldean] < >nu les say, that the demiurgic « m rgies are borne along like sw arms of lu es, bursting about the bodies of the world. For a div me intellect evolves the total si palatum of them in tin* inti lligible, 1 into all tin* demiurgic multitude. And these observations indeed, arc to be assumed as i moll tries.
Jn the in \t place however, it is worth while to relate such opinions of the more ancient inti rpreters, as introduce a more iiom 1 meaning of the words of the text. Amelins therefore from these words, < speci illy constitutes a triad of demiurgic intellects ; calling the fit st that which is, from “ that which is animal but the second that uhich has, from the words “ in that, for the second is not [ideas,] fu\t they cnli r into it ; and the thud that which sees, from the word “ perceived; though Plato savs, that ideas are nt that which is animal, and does not assert, that animal itsi If is one thing, and that in w liicli the ideas of animals are contain¬ ed, another. Hence that which is, is not different from that which has, if the one is that which is animal, but the other that in which ideas subsist. Ag. in, Nume¬ rous arranges the first [find] according to that which is animal, and says that it intellectually sees lor the use of the second; but he arranges the second alter intellect, and savs that if fabricates for the use of the third ; and the third is arranged by him, according to that which energizes diaiioetically. Hut it is evident that these have certain essential diflcivnci*. Such a division, however, is n,it now made bv Plato, in wInch one thing is an inlelh < t perreiv mg intellectually, hut another an intellect energizing diaiioetically. For Plato does not divide energies coiitraiilv to the energizers; since energies proceed Irom those that « ner ,r ize. Ur rather, in divine essence's, energies concur with essences. Hut to •aiceive ilianucticalh/, and to perceive, are at present assmnul as the boundaries of //,(■ energies (svs^yr^L'trn) of the demiurgic intellect. 1 iy no nn aus therefore, ought
* Tins is asserted l>v Socrates in llic 1 ast Mi iliimles.
* 1 of ti ri.i iti in tliii Jilaic, it o in tis.ary to nail o 'j* ioi;ru.
book iv.]
TIM T PS OF I'LA’I O.
these to be contrarilv div ideal in the Demiurgus, since they concur with his hypos¬ tasis. I hose therefore, the diviuc Iaiuhlichiis has sullieieiitl y confuted, adding, that Plato doc* not make such distinctions of di\ine natures, m the Sophi^ta, Pinlehus, and Parmenides, as they speak of, hut separately discusses each of the divine orders which are there mentioned, and divides the hypotheses from each other; separately indeed discussing' the one, separately whole, and successively in a similar manner, circumscribing each hypothesis, he appropriate definitions. We however, for our design is not to confute the opinions of others, remind ourselves, that the tilings proposed to lie considered are, what the one in¬ telligible paradigm is, who the whole Pemiurgiis is, and what the union is of both. I,et us therefore see, how, in what follows, the multitude of paradigms, and the many fabrications of things, are delivered.
“ lint these ideas are four ; one indeed, being the genus of the celestial Clods; another of winged, and air-wandering animals; the third, being the aquatic species; and the fourth, the pedestrinus and terrene.”
As in the d. miurgie intelligence itself, a monad is the leader of the inti Ih-clual multitude, and as in the paradigm, uiiical form has a subsistence prior to nntnher, thus also discourse, which is the interpreter of divine concerns, adumbrating the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first assumes the whole object of know ledge colli etively, and according to an enthusiastic conception ; hut after¬ wards unfolds that which was conglomerated, and develops the* one intellection, through words. It also divides that which is united, according to this nature of the things, at one lime, explaining their union, but at another, their separation. I ; or it is not naturally adapted, nor is it possible for it, to comprehend both of tlies,* at once. r I he discourse of Plato also, being thus afleeted, first in a divinely inspired manner, unfolds into light the w hole nuinher of intelligible ideas, and alter wards, distr$tinli-s into parts, tin* progressions which this number contains, for there the intelligible multitude shines forth, win re there are the first monads ot ideas. And that this indeed is the custom of Plato, we have before .shown in many instances, as in, “ it uas generated," “ he was good," “ one" and in all the before-mentioned examples.