linage of essential time, through whii h all things are nmnhered bv un iter or less uiiuiIk rs of their life. .So that an o\ lives for this, hut man for tiiat length of time, hut the sun is n stun d to its pristine state in one, and the moon in another period of time, ami other things accomplish their periods according to other measures, rune therefore, is the measure of motions, not as that hy which vve measure ; lor this the eonei pi ion aliout tune rlln (s, and not time itself, hut as proiluelive, and defi¬ nitive ol the < \is|i ner of tin life, and « vi ry other motion of things m tune, and as measuring them and assimilating tlx m aei ordm*^ to paradigms, l’or as it rt fi rs itself to the similitude ol eternity, which comprehends paradiipuatii causes, thus also it refers the things wliirli are perfected hy itself, and wlm h arc convolved m a circle, to the more venerable imitation of eternal principles. ] low tin re lore, heiiu; sueli and so meat a (iod, will it he tin measure of motion, or hi short of lien*'ration, 1 as it appeared to some that it is, who neither perceived tin* power of it, nor its d* miurme 4 pr« >ence with all things 1 W hen also, they' say that it is rather the cans** of corruption, than of generation, and of oblivion than pre>or- vation, and of these according to accident, and not essentially, they very much resemble those that are asleep, and who are unable to collect hy a reasoning: pro- i ess w hat the benefits are eonft i red hy and through time on the soul and the body, on all heaven through the whole of itself, and on all generation. 7'heurgists likcxcise confirm a hat ttv have asserted, adicn they say, that time is a God, and deliver to us the discipline of it, by uhich u'c arc enabled to excite tl to become visible; and 'a lien also, thay ccU bratc il ns older and younger, and as a circularly revolt big and eternal God, not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally receiving it. They
1 l’or ;ifrn/ifyr-n lirrr, read )nrt\n*~n.
1 C)c o niuiUi-ii Ik rc in tlie «>ri"in;»l
1 Instead of ui ignwi in 11ns |ilace, it is olmoudy necessary to read yti-cffrwi.
* For roi* ttifHcvpymmt here, read rij»fr// 440 vpy««i/».
ii)*»
lMIOCLUS ON rm:
[book IV.
likewise add, that it intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which it convolves and restores to their pristine state all moving substances, by swifter or slower periods. And besides this they assert that it is infinite in power, l'or to circulate again and again, [without emQ is the pro¬ vince nj injinite power. Together with these things likewise, they say that it is oj a spiral form, as measuring according to one power, both things that arc moved in a right hue, and those that are nun id in a circle; just as a spiral hue uniformly [or according to one form j comprehends the right ami the circular line.
nook iv ]
of beings; the former being the one and unmultiplied comprehension of the intel¬ ligible unities, hut tin: latter being the boundary and demiurgic measure of the perpetuity, or of !lit* more or less permanency of the things which proceeil from intelligihles. If, therefore, the soul, after the same manner as intellect and the Gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and by an eiieriry always the same, understanding intransitively, it might, perhaps, have generated time, but it would not have Im* en in want of time to its perfection. But since it understands, or perceives intellectually, with transition, and apnea- tislalically, and one soul requires the whole of time, but another a certain part* of it, in order to the possession of intellectual anil genesiurgic lives; and if, in short, no cause is in want of its offspring to the |M*rfection of its* U ; if this lie the case, soul would thus Im* both jierfoet and imjierfeet, prior to constituting that which is secondary to itself. It would Im* perfect indeed, in order that it might generate; since nothing imperfect is generative of anoth**r tiling. And it would also be imjM*rfect, Incause it would never participate of that which c.iih-s it to Ik* perfect. And it is altogether absurd to say, that causes are in want ol the things which proceed front them. let this, therefore, be considered by you as the greatest argument, that tun* is not the progeny of soul, but that it is first partici¬ pated by soul.
Alter this, however, it is requisite to understand, that inanimate natures also participate of time, and that they do not then alone participate of it when they rise into existence, m the same maimer as they do, of form and habit; but even vvliiui they appear to Im* deprived of all life, they tlu 11 participate of time, and not in such a way as they are said to live, because they are cn-arraiigrd with wholes, and are ro-passive with the universe. lair they peculiarly and essentially partici¬ pate of a certain time, and this so far as they are inanimate, and are always m a perishing condition till their perfect corruption. I'or time is every w here present. And the architect indeed, is able to say for bow buitr a time a wall will endure, and the weaver can tell tlu extent of tin* duration of a shirt, or m short of a gar¬ ment. 1 In a similar iiianiu r aUo, every artist can say wliat will lx* the duration of bis own work; tlioii^b In* cannot speak so definitely as concerning the pro¬ ductions of nature. But the prophet speaks about tlu* duration of all*things, as being able to survey tin* temporal interval distributed to tilings from the universe. In addition to these things also, since the psychical and corporeal mutations, motions and rests, and in short all such mundane natures, as are opposed to
* For fivfur* litre, rra*i finpinv.
1 For mrdi|r«i here, it o imtnan to read toOijroi.
Tim. l*lat.
Vol. 11.
1‘KOCLUS ON Till-:
[OOOK IV.
each other, arc measured hy time, it is necessary that time should lie exempt from all these. For that which Ih-iii^ one anil the same, is participated hy many tilings, and these dissimilars, and always pre-suhsists hy itself, must he in an exempt manner participated hy them. And "till more hem:' in all things, it is every where impartihle, so that it is everv where one Ihiii^, impartihle according to minder, and jx i uhar to no one ol the tilings which are said to subsist accord¬ ing to it ; w Inch Aristotle also peri ci\ mi; lie show s that in partihle ' natures, there is somethin;; incorporeal and impartible, which is every where the same ; assum¬ ing * tills to l>e tin null' or an instant.
I ■’art her still, if time w i rt not an essence hut an accident, it would not thus exhibit a demiurgic power, * so as to make some things to he perpetually gene¬ rated, hut oilers of a longer or shorter duration, according as their nature is stronger, or weaker; and to distiilml* to all things an appropriate measure of duration aiuou^ beings. It however, it is a demiurgic essence, it will neither he the whole soul [of (lie universe] nor a part ol soul. For tin* conception of soul is dither* nt fi*1111 that ol linn , and « ach is the * ails*- ot dill* rent, and not 4 ot the same things. For soul imparts life, and moves all things, ileiicetlu world also, as it approaches to soul, is tilled with life, and parti* ipates of motion. I 5 ut tune w hich 1 excites demiurgic edi cts to their perfection, and to the measure of them hv wholes, and which is the supplier of a certain p**rp* luity, f ' will not lie subor¬ dinate to soul, since soul likewise parti* ipates of it ; and though not essentially, vet according to its transitive energies. For tin- soul *»t the ilniverse is saul to * n« rm/.e incessantly, and to hv*: wisely through the whole **t tune. It remains therefore that time is an essence, and is not secondary to soul. After all how¬ ever, it must he considered, that if etermly w as the oli'sprui" of intellect, or a certain intellectual power, it w mild In* reipiisile to sav that time is somethin*; of tins kind pertaining to soul. But it * t* rnity is ih«* cm nipt measure of the multi¬ tude ot int* IIi"ihles, and tin eompn hi-nsion ot the perpetuity and perleetion of all things, how is it possihh that tim* also should not have this ratio to soul, and the ps\ chical order ; dillirin- from tin m in the s.ou*- w ay, as all pro* ceding (lite r from abiding causes f JUr eternity exhibits a greater transcendency than lime,
■ Tin- wool [itfnarun it oiltilli >1 III I In uii"liul.
Imliail nt \u /14 ii licit , it it i('*|Ui>iic t«> lent
J 1 t»r tini 4 i j n/u» In it, nail iNiu/.ii.
* Oi it (iiintliil tit le in tin
! t lilii'uitc it (jiuiilt-il iii tint jtl.uc in I tic ttrigiual.
L lei n iiu litre, it it lint tv.irt lit nail u.t ttrijrii.
nnoK i\.]
T1 M/ELS Ol 1'LATO.
v illi respect to the tilings that nr* measure*! l»y it For the former comprehends exempt ly, both the essences :uiil the unities of in tell igihles ; I ml the latter dm s not measure lh< essences of th* first souls 1 asr.itli. r subsisting eo-nrdinatel\ with them, and being gem-rated together with them. As some i’l.ilonMs likewise s;iv, time does m*t nn asme the inti lh < tn.il energies nf the lir*-t miuU ; though 1*1.it<* <|< .trly says, that tlx '.mil of the universe leads a divine and wise life through the whole of time. Intelligihles also, an-more united to eternity than iiiundane nature* to time; and the union of them is so great, that some nf the more contemplative phi¬ losophers hav<* apprehended eternity to lie nothing else than the one and total intellect \vhirh comprehends all other intellects]. But no one of the more wise is willing to admit that time is the same with the things that are in tune, on ac¬ count of the "real separation and difference between them.
\\ hat then will time he, if it is neither something belonging to motion, nor a concomitant ol the psy chical energy, nor in short, the progeny of soul, nor as some innovating in divine concerns sav, who conceive time to 1 h.' the psychical circle of the <Iif/rrf'iit, hut rtiTnity th<‘ psychical circle of the smne? l'or 1 have heard that Theodoras philosophized things of this kind, lie however, who nidi avours to correct this opinion, will never admit that these parts <»f the soul are the same as eternity ami time; hut lie will grant that tin* circle of tin different verges to t< tuporal, lint the circle of the same, to eternal natures. Since tin refore, mt do not approve any one of these opinions, w hat will time he ? For it is not perhaps sullicient to sav, that it is the measim of mundane natures, nor tor-nu¬ merate the benefits of w hich it is the cause, lmt the peeuliarifv of it is to lx* ajv- prehended to the utmost of our power. Shall we therefore say, that the essence of it being most excellent, perfective of soul and present with all things, is an intellect not alone abiding, hut also moving; abiding indeed, according to the inward energy, by which it is trul\ eternal; lmt moved, according to the exter¬ nally proceeding energy, according to which it bound* all transition. For eternity possessing permanency, both according to its inward energy, and according to that which it exerts towards eternal natures, time adumbrates it, according to one of these, hut becomes separated from it according to the cither, in ronserpicucc of abiding and lieing moved. Hence it will he something at once intelligible and generated, and something at once partible and impartible. At the same time, however, we admit all these things in tin; psychical essence, and we are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend this middle nature, than by employing after a certain manner opposites in surveying it. A\ by therefore is it wonderful,
* |. e. of »uperiuuiHlaut touts.
Phoclus on Thk
[tOOK IV.