The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

of .o.o.l; proceeding into this world from the father. One indeed, and the first, is that which proceeds from the /.«ur of the • th elive cause. For it is the /). miur^us who now generates time; through his nvv„ u.ienvy.ng and prolific abundance desiring to till all things with tiiM, middle, and last goods. But tin second cause, is that wl.i, h iris, s from the aptitude of the receiv ing thing. For the communicator of good is then .h light, d. win n that whirl, receives .«, is aptly dispoM.l to its reception. And the third rat.*.-. that which proceeds from the symm ,n h and as ,t r, e c<>n>p» at,on and symphony of both p„u cr and apt dude 1 or on acrount of this, though the < mds always extend to all things good co-ordinate to their essences, v rt it is not alw ays received by all of us ; because we are not adapted to Us reception, and lrav, not always a subsistence commensurate to Us pow.r If however, we wish that divinity should rejoice u, us,* as he ,s naturally !h.p„M d to rejoice, and he delighted on our account, though he alvv ays possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, we must render ourselves adapted to the ■ ti. „ Of the good which is extended by him ; in order that thcg.lt ot d,vanity, mav not vv ill. respect to us he iiicllicacious, though In is not nnpeded l,y any thmg. These things therefore it .s the business of another d.s. i.ssioi, to survey more

fully. .

Nmv liowrvor, l.-t us l.ow .iwrso lire,.non mor.- Mm.lurlo Us para-

, 1 ,..,,, h It,.- linra.iim of tin,.-. JSnna. the paru.l.a-.n 1l.rroti.rr is pr.-

rn-trilv ,'I.TU ,1. if llio so.i.ihlo wnrhl ili.l r- < < •> "eoii.lary I" n» U is

,. vi ,|o'„l to i vory.. tin,I itwonhl ho in a loss .1. eroo assini.'nlo...II.-

„il,lo. \ml ,t ilkoois, IS ,11,1 ilillioull porooiio, III,.l llio .Iiituro which has Us

'moral. m mulati...,, if It "oro sopanitoil from timo. wmil.l !«• so l.ir from

.por,a t...il, that I. woul.l no. la- possil.lo for ,t to romai.i for a momoiu.

Ill nro, a oorlain |aTpoluily moos.uy ... Ilia, which is lo he ... a-till greater

• InUea.l of cro^au iu 1»„> place, ,1 » nectary to f-ail ceara V ,.

, lf | f w „|, rrimf l,o luiuluct .Humi.uUo.o, for iI«k arealvvavs cite.,d-d, after ll.e

„.a.r.br.aosr, a. lW.ioh.ias JMoil, . an »...ialilc a™ »lo,n.,.cr.

. 1 ,.., .r mi or .lie pad. .hid. hr |..,|n,nalli ■» ns, hr ... lo hr Jrh 5 h.rd. In.

<Kligtit indicalini: our paper reception of tlm K'“.it.

H*iOK I V j

TIM.l-IL'S «>1 PI, \ lo.

in i

degree assimilated to the intelligible. But to that which is perpetual indeed, yet has not the perpetuity at once present with it, in the same manner as the intelli¬ gible, the whole extension of time is necessary. Moreover, he who considers the nature of time, will more clearly know' how time not only contributes to the perpetuity of the whole world, and to the great parts of the world, hut also to the perfection and felicity of each of them, and comprehends all these at once; which in the course of the interpretation we shall endeavour to manifest, by investigating the plep.litudes of time.

“ The nature indeed of animal itself was eternal, and this it is impos¬ sible to adapt perfectly to that wliicn is generated. lienee lie formed the design of producing a certain moveable * image 1 of eternity ;* and in consequence of this, while he was adorning the universe, lie made this eternal image proceeding according to number, of eternity abiding in one, and which we denominate time.”

'That animal itself is the plenitude of the multitude of intelligible animals, and that it possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, is a thing frequently and fully asserted, and i-- not considered as at all dubious by the Platon it philosophers. But what eternity is, and the moveable time which imitates it, are tilings perfectly difficult to understand, and to explain sufficiently to others. At the same time however, if i> requisite to narrate the mole elegant opinions of the ancients about it, and to add, n we are able, anv thing which may contribute to the elucidation, and distinct consideration of the things to he discussed.

The multitude therefore, have a conception and co-sensation of time, in conse¬ quence of looking to the suhlun try and celestial motions, and are of opinion that time i> something pertaining to motion, such for instance as the inimlx r, or exten¬ sion ot motion, or something else of the like kind. But the more excellent ot these, proceeding to the consideration * of eternity, and perceiving that there is not simply motion, hut a perpetual and orderly motion in the universe, and which circulates with inv aruifile sameness,—conceived from hence, that this invariable sameness, was inherent in moveable natures, from a certain other cause, and imt

1 I or «<r,r.n here, it is requisite to read narrat.

’ lor oiirroi here, rout •ro,;r,;>.

* And for oiw read nso m

* Tor niwi'n likewise, it m iieeessarv to read mwim.

Instead of rfiranr in this |dare, it w requisite to read irifraor

IMfOC'LL-S ON Tilt

[book it.

i«-i

from themselves. This cause therefore, will cither lx.» immoveable, or moved. And if indeed, it is moved at a certain time only, how will it be the cause of that which always is invariably the same ? Hut if it is moved always, this perpetuity of its mo¬ tion must again he derived from something else, and either 1 tins will be the case ad infinitum, or there will l*e something immoveable, which is the cause of perpe¬ tual motion, to things which are always moved. And the energy ol this being immoveable, is no longer according to time, but is eternal. For the jveculiarity of tilings winch subsist accord mg to time, is to be always m generation, or becoming to It, but of eternal natures, to exist always. For common conception opines, that etc mity is denominated from (.listing always, just as it thinks that time derives its ap[M‘llation !rom dancing [jt agx rr ( v y'wn%»~\ be ing a measured motion, and which has its cxMt nee in generation. On tins account, it appears to me that the multi¬ tude assumed the fust conception ot time, but the wise ot eternity, hy tin* funner directing the ir attention to tin- nature which is always moved, and the latter to the nature* which isalwavs stable. It must now howeve r be* shown vv hat each of these i-, and m a manner most eouformahle to the doctrine ol IMato.

Aristotle inch e*d, admitting time* to lie the* numbe r of motion, asserts that it is c o, not according to that which numb* rs, but according to that whic h is numbered. Hence, he very properly inepiires what that is which muuls rs it, it time is that which is numlx reel. For the se are* relatives, and tin* one e xisting, the other also exists. He solves the itupiiry however weakly, by saying that it is a certain soul w'hich numbers time.* lmr it is lie e e-ssary, that prior to pe rpetual number, tlie re* should lie a perpetual nume rator, in order that lie* may always produce, that which is generated always existing. Admitting these lore time* to lie the* number of motion, lie also *,un that eternity is intelligible, deriving its app< lketion from exist¬ ing always, and possessing and comprehending the whole ot time. Hence also lie says, the existence and life of all things are suspended from this, of some things more obscurely, hut of others more clearly. It is necessary however at present, that we should particularly see what eternity and tune* are* according to Plato, anil that we should not admit the* image eif time to !r* time alone, nor eternity to be simply a certain intelligible (Jod, but in the first place show, in what order of the

* For ft tw urripvy in tin) place, it is necessary to read >) »*■' uxetpiy.

’ In defence of Vristotle however, il ruav be said, that when lit assert) that II i) a certain soul which numbers time, lie tines not speak of tune according to its hrsf subsistence, hut llie tune which is parti¬ cipated bv material natures, and of which, tlie multitude, as i’rotrlus observes. Lave a conce ption, dint co-seiisalion.

lllHIK |\.]

TIM/El S OF PLATO

Ift3

intelligible* it sulisiste. For this is t specially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

It is manifest then to every' one, that eternity is more venerable, primordial, and as it were more stable than animal itself, though animal itself is the most beautiful, and most perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato lias Indore said. For if the eternal is said to be, and is eternal as participating [of eternity.] but eternity is not said to participate of animal itself, nor to receoe its appellation from it, it is evident that the former is secondary, but the latter more simple and more primary. For eternity neither participates of animal itself, liecause it is not an animal; for neither is time a visible animal; nor is it any other animal. For it has been demonstrated that animal itself is niily-ljcgnttcn and eternal, because eternity is more excellent. For the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is more excellent than eternity. lint as we all say that the participant of intellect, and the animated, are posterior to intel¬ lect and soul, so likewise the eternal is secondary to eternity'. W hat then some one may say% will eternity l>c f if it is more venerable than animal itself, which is said to be the most beautiful of intrliigibles, -and iu every respect perfet t 1 May it not he said, that it is especially most beautiful, in consequence of receiv¬ ing the summit of beauty, on account of excessive participation, but that it does not receive the summit of the good ; for it is not said to be most excellent. So that it may be subordinate to that which is ihe best. To which may lie added, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all inlelligibles, but of intelligible animals. Hence eternity* is no animal, but if it is life, it is infinite lif*. In the next place, it is not necessary that what is in every respect perfect should be the first. For the perfect has all things, so that it has things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division \vill he super-perfect. Hence nothing prevents eternity from being superior to the animal which is the most Ireautiful of all intelligible animals, and is in every respect jtcrfect, if eternity is most excellent and super-perfect. Fartlu r si ill, animal itself lias not* an arrangement prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. On tins account therefore, l’lato says, “ F«r to that "a Inch ts the most bcautijul of intelligibles anil in even/ respect perfect .” But eternity is prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. For these are eternal; but eternal natures participate of eternity, which is not co¬ arranged with the multitude of them, and lias rather an arrangement contrary to them. For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as Itcing void of mul-

1 There u an omiMion in the onpnal iu llui place of o m«r. ’ O* m omitted here in the original.

lMtm ix’s on Tin-:

[book iv.

,i,Animal itself however, comprehends all such animals as are intelligible ; on hit'll account also, it ts in want of eternity, in order that it may parti* ipate through it, of union, containing power, and a firm and immutable life. lienee too. lie that it is eternal, yet does not add, that it has multitude in its, If, hut r^ieaks of it in tin- singular numher ; signifying that union is especially present „iti, ,t from eternity, so that the whole essence of intelligible animals shines forth .is one nature, on account ol eternity.

If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, eternity will not In- one certain