If however, it be requisite to refer all the composition of the soul, to the divine orders, for it has the images of all of them, the beginning of the reference, must be assumed from the former part of this dialogue, in which it is said, that the soul was fabricated, not as we say junior to the body, but both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient, as the mistress and ruler of it. For Tima us thence beginning to speak concerning it, gives to it a superior dignity with respect to the generation of the whole corporeal composition. It must be said, therefore, that its progression, so far as it rules, and i" the mistress of the body, must be referred to the principle of all things. Hut so far as it is allotted a triple and united hv pos¬ tals we must refer it to the summit* of intelligible.*; and as generated from essence, same and different, to the whole of the truly intelligible breadth ; of which essence and being possess the summit ; but eternity which isthe cause to all things of permanency in the same, the middle; and intelligible animal, which causes itself to l>e different in its progressions to intelligible animals, the end. For the w hole there, as the Parmenides teaches us consists of dissimilar parts. This triple whole therefore [the soul], w hich is a mixture of dissimilar elements, is a thing of this kind. Hut so far a* tin* soul is a self-begotten and intelligible num¬ ber, we must refer it to the summit of tbe intelligible and at tbe same time intel¬ lectual orders. For there the first niimlx r subsists in conjunction with difference. For as theologists say, wo must survey that first order, as hi jug 1 the cause of tin* series of things, [and of other co-ordinations]* which are divided according to numl»er. Hut there also, Parmenides gives subsistence to the whole of number, ami from thence unfolds all things into light. And so tar as the soul is a whole consisting of three elements, we must refer it to the intellectual wholeness, whit h connectedly contains wholes and parts. For the three middles arc derived from those connectedly containing Gods. One [i. e. the geometric middle] proceeding from the first of these Gods, w ho comprehends the rest, and collects all tilings ac¬ cording to one reason, into one world, and one union. But another [i. e. the hariuo-
* Tin* words within 1 lie brackets, are wanting in llie original, but arc supplied from tbe version of Tlimir.rus. Hence it is requisite to add in tbe original afier vwrpKoefuau, the words orroi tr ran tycoir-
fitOif.
* For ravTorrjrn here, 1 read neporijra: for the summit of intelligible*, which consists of bound, infi¬ nity, and that ich'uh u mixed, is the first triple and at llie same time unites! Iivpost-isis.
* For overwr here, it is requisite to read overnr.
* The words within the brackets are supplied from tbe version of Thorn te us; so that after tunas n the anginal, the words tat aXXwv rwriK^wr, must be added.
nic middle] proceeding from the second of these Gods, who imparts adifferent bond to different things, a greater bond to such as are greater, but a less to such as aro It ».* And another [i. e. the arithmetical middle] being derived from the third of these Gods, who imparts by illumination from himself, communion to natures of a third rank ; through whom things that are less in bulk, are more united, but such
jij-p irreater, are united m a loss degree. 1 his however, is the distinguishing property of the arithmetical middle. So far also, as the soul has an idea and configuration of such a kind, and employs a rectilinear progression, and circular comer-ion, for the reason we have- Ijcfure-meiitioned, we must refer it to the triad of intellectual figure. For the right, and the circular line, fir.-t subsist in that triad. Ib nee in the idea of the soul, lines were assumed, and circles in conjunc¬ tion with, and m parate from each other. Again, so far as the soul receives monadic and In hdomadic powers, we must refer it to the iutelle* tual hebdomad, lint as !lie medium 1 between intelligible- and sensible-, and as assimilating si-nsibles to intel- ligibles, we must refer it to the ruling [supermundane] s« ri*->. For this series assimilates secondary natures to unieal summits. And as energizing according to twofold energies, some of which pro\ideiitially attend to sensible-, hut others adhere to intelligibles, we must refer it to the liberated Gods, who tcuieb and do not ton* li the universe. These observations tin relbre, wInch we have briefly made, will afford assistance to those who wish to perils*- the writings of our preceptor, iu which the truly arcane conceptions of Plato concerning these things, art- unfolded.
I am astonished however at those IMuUmists, who think that tin* soul should he divided according to parts into the celestial souls, viz. into the one and the seven of these. F or where is it possible in incorporeal natures, that there should he a division of this kind, vvhit h abolishes the w hole ? For such a distribution into parts as this, is the peculiarity of partible masses. Ami I also wonder at those, who think that these souls are entirely supi*rcelestial, since Plato in what immediately follows, shows that in all In* has said, he s|leaks concerning one soul, and this mundane. Hence, I think it is better to assume this as a principle, that it is here necessary,
* For in flie harmonic middle, the greater terms hare a greater ratio to each oilier lliau the less. Thus in 2. 3. b. the ratio of b to 3 is greater than that of 3 to 2.
* Of tins union ttie arithmetical ninhlle is an linage; foi m tins, there is a greater ratio in the less, an «t a less ratio iu the greater terms. Thus in 5. 0. 7- 8. the ratio of 0 to 5, is greater than that of 8 to 7-
1 For fstouy here, read fjtoqy.
* The English reader will find these arcane conceptions of Plato concerning all these orders of Gods, Luutifollv unfolded ill mv li.iinlatiuii of Proclus on the Fheologv of Plato.
TIM XL'S OF PLATO.
I In' whole should remain in the divisions, and that the discussion is concerning mundane animations ; nnd having assumed this, to say that the one soul of the world is indivisible, and at the same time is divided according to these powers; first into the duad, secondly into the triad and tetrad, and thirdly into the hebdomad, l'or the division of it is made according to these numbers. And such is our opinion on (his subjei I.
Thendorus the philosopher however, of Asiue, lieing full of the doctrines of IVumenius, speculates the generation of the soul in a more novel manner, from h tters, and characters, and numbers. 1 Hut the divine lamblichus blames every theory of this kind, m his treatise in confutation of the followers of Amelins, and also of Nuinennis, whether he includes IVumenius among those who adopted this method, or whether he anv where met with writings of the disciples of Amelins, containing similar opinions; for I cannot say. The divine lamblichus therefore says in the first place that it is not proper to make the soul every numlrer, or the geometrical number, on account of the multitude of letters, l'or the words body ('me*'*) and non-being itself («.■»; ov) consist of an equal number of letters. Non- being therefore, will also lie every number. You may also find many other things, consisting of an equal number of letters, which are of a vile nature, and most con¬ trary to each other; all which it is not right to confound and mingle together. In the second place, he observes, that it is not safe to argue from characters, l’or these subsist by position, and the ancient was ditli rent from the present mode of forming them. Thus for instance the h tter Z, which lie makes the subject of discussion, had not the opposite linos entirely parallel, nor the middle line oblique, but at right angles, as is evident from the ancient letters. In the third place, he adils, that to analyze into the primary ratios of numbers, and to dwell on these, transfers the theory from some numliers to others, l’or the licptad is not the same which is in units, and tens, and hundreds. This however, existing in the name of the soul, why is it requisite to introduce the disquisition of primary ratios? Tor thu^ he may transfer all things to all numliers, by dividing, or compounding, or multiplying. In short, he accuses the whole of ihis theory as artificial, and con¬ taining nothing sane. I am also not ignorant of the arguments of Aristotle against the psyehogony of Plato, and the solutions of those arguments, by certain Platonists; but I have not deemed it requisite to mention them any farther here, as I have elsewhere made thorn the subject of discussion, l or the soul is not a
* Proelus goes nu epitome of this theory, hut as it would l>c very ihtiicult to render it intelligible to the English reader, and as in ihe opinion of lamblichus, the whole of it is artificial, and contains nothing sane, 1 have omitted lo trauvlalc it.
[book hi.
circle as magnitude, nor is it requisite to think that to confute this hypothesis, is to embrace the Platonic theory. Hence I have thought tit to omit the farther consi¬ deration of these particulars, as I know that I have published a treatise in answer to the oppositions of Aristotle to the Tiimeus, in which there is no small discussion of these particulars, and where it is shown that magnitude cannot rightly lie ascriln-d to the soul, according to Tiimeus, and demonstrating from thence, that the soul cannot hv magnitude which i- partible, iutellet tually perceive intelligible^ which an* impartible! as in ither is it possible for the impartible to lie adapted to the partible. Nor must it be said that the motions of the heavens [are the motions of the soul of the universe]; 1 but that according to the doctrine of the 'Pima us, the former subsist from the latter. Nor must it be admitted that it is impossible tr<- rpienlly to understand the same thing by the same power, but this nue-t neces¬ sarily Ire: the case in more transitive i 1 it« llections, since intelligibles an* bounded, and intellection subsists in a circle. Omitting tin n tore, the farther consideration of these things, which are more amply discussed in the above-mentioned I realise, h t us direct our atti ntion to the words of the philosoplu r, w hich appear to me to exhibit the doctrine * of things themselves.
“ \fter, therefore, the whole composition of the soul was generated, according to the intellect [or intention] of its composer, in the next place, he fabricated within the soul, the whole of a corporeal-formed nature."
The first head, as we have before observed, of the discussions concerning the soul, was about its hyparxis, the second, about its harmony, the third, about its figure, the fourth, about its powers, and the fifth, about its energies. In all the other heads therefore, tin* philosopher has most perfectly instructed us. Hut the last, was that concerning the ( energies)>f the soul, which lu: adds in wh.it is now said. Since how ever, there is a twofold form of the energy of the soul, 1 mean the gnostic and the motive, lie separately discusses each of these; and shows how the soul by moving itself, moves other things, and how by knowing its* !f, it knows the natures prior, and also those that are posterior to itself. Such there¬ fore i* the scope of the words lx fore us. Hut that he did not teach u*', in what has been already said, concerning the multitude of souU as those assert, who say, that his discussion about the essence of the soul, pertained to that soul which is without habitude [to body] ; but about its harmony, to the soul which is called by
* The words within the brackets sre supplied from the Ttrsion of Thcmaeus.
* Iuitccd of Taputuetiv here, read wapakooir.
TIM.rXS OF I’LATO.