This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of writing is robust, superb, and magnificent; but the Socratic character of diction is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the former. Hence (say they} Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however, who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Menexenus, appear to me not to have perceived the magnificence of the diction of Socrates in the Phiedrus. There are also those who say it is fit that the artificer of such-like encomiums, should be skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics. But Socrates having fought at Delos and Potidiwa, was not unskilled in all such-like particulars. Others avain assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, Just as he said with respect to other things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he says, that he did not know how to praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth fi. e. of the true or intelligible polity}. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the
book 1 TIMEUS OF PLATO. 53
descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abund- ance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is eflected through power which ts transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication ts assimilated: to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separ- ation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order, For Timaus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.
Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wondertul, since the same inbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the pastand presentage. Not that [ despise the poetic genus; but it is pertectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things ino which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more dithcult in words.”
This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, donbt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambi- tious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions, For who speaks more magnificently than Llomer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable
54 PROCLUsS ON THE {BooK 1.
of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But YT should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely- inspired, and the artificial, And having made this division, he refers the magni- ficent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated init. For if there is any artificial sublimity 1m some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a pane- gyrist, who exlubits in his pratse a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which 15 free from compulsion and pure; justas actions Cin bis Republic] have magnificence, not casually, bat adapted to the education and discipline of the men, That Socrates, however, does not reject’ the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artiticul, he manifests, PE think, when he says, “that he docs not despise the poetic genus.” The poctic genus, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet Uns simply ; but that whieh ts nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.
The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being ina certain respect dif- ficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, that which ts Sorcign to the education of any one, itis dificult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in werds.” Por it scems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act suphistically, by exlibiting virtue as far as words, bat in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Willit not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, viz.: To suppose the most excellent education is implied in the words, that which ts foreign to the education of any one; but to assume, in decds and in words, as equivalent to, conformably to deeds, and conformably to words ; and to imi- fate well, as having the same meaning with fo be τε εὐ imitated 2. And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, itis difficult mdeed according to deeds, but it is still more dullicult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing
Book 1. Tim.Eus of Plato. 55
proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, ifhe intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar io the speaker. For words are seen to difler according to the inward dispositions. For thas we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimili- tude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. — Since, also» to say of Aclilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not dificalt; but to narrate copiously what he said» when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much Dblamine Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to uifa/e the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can delineate their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions, So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live perform- ing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imi- tate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says itis, Bat Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.
56 — PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.
“ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, IT am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philoso- phers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the qua- lity and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and
» words.
With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are skilled in them. For skil! manifests an irrational occupation in’ mere words, unaccompanied with the Knowledge of the why. Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called wanderers. But as they led a disorderly and inerudite life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have a settled abode ; since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particutars, as ave ina family and a city, are Likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be titly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? Phey are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens ; but through the philosophic, their words, te consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they com- prehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should) be total and Intellectual, mn order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may
possess ironically such things as the heavens primarily contain.
“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”