We therefore admit, that all tin* is well said so far as pertains to the theory of things: for these particulars are prior to the world. Hence also in mundane natures, tin-re is the monad, afterwards the duad, and afterwards the heptad. I'or in tin universe there is one soul, which is that of the universe, lint alter this, there are two souls, which divide the heaven into the circulation of the same' .uid tin* ( in illation ol the different. And after those, there are seven souls, which distribute in an orderly manner the planetary spheres. We conceive it how¬ ever, to he more concordant with the words of Plato neither to understand what is now said, as pertaining to those super-mundane souls, nor to the multitude of mundane souls, hut as asserted of the soul itself of the universe. Plato therefore himself shortly alter, having spoken concerning all the divisions of the soul, says, “ lint when all the composition of the soul was produced coiifonnuhh/ to (he intention of its composing artificer , after this he fashioned within it the hole of a corporeal-formal nature. In which words he di nominates the soul one, and this as no other than the soul of the-universe. I'or it is this soul w hich comprehends the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. Hence the demiurgic divisions, and the two-fold lines and circles, must he assumed in this 1 soul; for in so doin^ we shall not he in want ol arirmm ills. Since therefore, it is the collector of all immoveable and niter-motive natures, of imparlihles and parlibles, of paradigms, and tlje last images, and of lriily-e\i>tini: beings, and such as are not truly beings, tin- nature '•fit is uiv properly two-fold, partly pertaining to more excellent, and partly to subordinate hem-.s. Ih cause however, these are entirely separated from each other, they require after a certain maimer two* media. Vnd m corporeal natures indeed, the two conjoining media an s< parated from each other; hut m incorpo¬ real natur. s it is one Informed essence, which hinds together tin* extremes ; one part ot vvliieh heini; conjoined to iutelhirihh-s, is intellectual, seienlilie, shining " ilh divine w isdom, ana^ome, and < om prebend in;; the causes of things; hut the other part hem”- pro\imate to partible natures, is effective of di lien nee, comes into contact with sensililes, recurs to the providential inspeetion of secondary natures, is artificial, and comprehends such other things as are allied to these. All the ratios iiowevt r, are in ea« h of these. I'or in this, the essence of the soul differs from the inlelh dual essence. I’or the latter indeed, is uniform, and anted -
* Tor uiTd' lierr, it is necessary to read ravriiv.
‘ Instead of »>r’ nvrni'f in tins jil.ur, il is rri|iiis:tc to read (T'nvnjf.
1 I', r trtif lirrc, read t v w.ir,
Tim. rial.
V(1L. II.
' LUOfc. III.
dently comprehends all forms inoiiadically ; but the former is dyadic, and con¬ tains the same reasons, dianoetically and doxastically; in one way indeed, in the circle of the same, hilt in another in the circle of the different. [And thus the soul imitates it* cause.] 1 For she is both a monad and a duad, as with reference to the monad [.Saturn], the father of the intellectual Gods. And the soul is a monad as with reference to t!ie mi!\er*e, hut a duad, with reference to intellect For in short division itself and multiplication derive their subsistence from this Goddess [Rhea]. The xixifir principle therefore, is the cause of progression, multitude, and multiplication. Hence some philosophers, assimilating to the Go,Is things which are derixed from them, think fit to arrange intellects accord¬ ing to the masculine, but souls according to the feminine genus o! the Gods. For intellect is indix isihle, and of the form of the odd numb* r; but soul is dix isihle and biformed And the former i- analogous to paternal, but the latter to prolific causes. And the one is allied to bound, but the other to infinity. If likew ise, I should lie ashed lioxx the soul is one, and hoxx it is Informed, I should say, that it is one indeefl, as self-motive' for this is common to all psychical life, and to the parts it contains; but that it is biformed according to two-told lixes, viz. the life wInch is conxerted to first natures, and the life which proxidentially attends to secondarv natures. I should also say, that according to the essen¬ tial it ha* one life : for >i If motion is the es-ence of the soul. Rut according to same and different, I should distinguish its txvo-lold lixes.
Why lioxx ex er, <lid the Deiniurgus first constitute the soul rectilinear! y, but aflerxvarils circularlv, and after \x hat manner is a right line adapted to the essenr e of the soul 1 To this wi' reply, that it is requisite to conceive the sold as analo¬ gous to a right line. For as a right line proceeds xx it In mt curvature, and defi- niti Iv from this to that point; tor there is only one right line bet xx ecu txvo points ; and as it is infinite in its oxvu nature, so likewise the soul is generated an infinite poxxir. Intellect al*o, like an indix i*;ble point, i* the leader of the soul, compre¬ hending it indixisibly, and antecedently containing in an impartible manner the whole of its essence. For the impartible is allied to intellect; but that xxhich is primarily partible to soul. Rut a point and a line are things of this kind. Hence, a right line is xerx properly ascribed to the soul, and afterwards a circle, xxhich xxe say, an* simple lines. Rut a point is ascribed to intellect. For from thence
1 Tilt words wiilnn t lie hraikrls jic wauling in I tie original; t»ul il appears lo nit lli.it lh«y ought to \>r iii'irlol, though they were likewise wanting in Iti«* M's. of'1 homa-us. In the original therefore after the words u.VXui K *»■ ry Ourtp/w, I couceixe lliere is an omission ol »ui rwrwi V fitfwrai nje tairni ainur Rut tile foutal cause of the sou! is Illrea.
1 IM.TA S OF PLATO.
.is iVuin a certain adytum. the reason of (lie soul presents itself to the view, unfold¬ ing the impartibility of intellect, and announcing its occult and inefl’ahle union. Intellect itself however, i- tini 1 1 y established in itself, understanding all things w ith a tranquil energy ; being a point and a centre as with reference to the soul. For if the soul i> a circle, intellect is the centre, or’ the power of the eir- « It*. lint if the soul is a right line, intellect is a point, comprehending without interval that which has interval, imparlibly that which is partible, and rentrically * the eireular lorin. Intellect itself hovvever, is a circle as with reference to the nature of tin i foot/, ahoiil whit It * it on all sides converges, through a desire of the one, and of coni u t with it.
i’arllier still, after another manner also we may say, that a line is adapt* d to tin' soul. For intellect indeed, though some one should give to it motion, yet it has this energy intransitive. For it surveys at once the whole of the intelligible, having an eternal life, and energizing about the same things, m the same nature, ami according to the same, lint soul possesses a transitive energy. For at clitlo- rent tunes, it applies it*-* 1 to dillcreut forms. And this is true even of the soul ot the universe. For, as Plato sa\s in the Ph.rdrus, it is the p«‘* r.liaritv of soul to energize through time. lint every transitive motion is a line. F’or it has xcficnn• and :, /iit/ur, and tin* rectilinear, and one tiling tor the beginning, and aiiolln i- l*»r tht* end. No that in this respect we refer a line to (he p-vchical life. Again, the inmiov* able cause is motive *>l self-motive natures; for these pro\i- m ti< 1\ parli* ipale ot it ; but tin* self-mov ing muse is motive of aller-motive natures. Since iberelore, the sold prov ides for allcr-mnlive natures, being essmtiallv prior to tie m, and as living from itself, Irausci nils ali things (hit hav** an adventi¬ tious hl«*. eoiilonnahly to this, it also has tin* linear form m its providential ener¬ gies ; being motive, and constitutive nl alt* i-niolive natures ; just as a Ime is the dist.mee ol *»ue tiling Irom aiiolln r, and au < gr* >>ion <*r departure from itself. In what is said therefore, about the mixture of (he soul, and a|s () in what is said con¬ cerning numbers and middl'-s, Pinto uulolds the being itself of tlit* soul, and shows liovv it is one au*l many, what progressions n has, ami what regressions both to superior natiin s, and to itself; how it produces and converts things pos¬ terior to itself; and how it fills with ratios, and binds together the whole world. But m what he says concerning tin* right line and circles, he delivers to us the vital and intellectual peculiarity of the soul, and indicates how it participates of
' For •) licrr, a lire* w.v*\ to r*\i*l >«.
1 I lisle v«l of n-.Xin.n in tins |il.icr,il i-. oliwoutlv *icccs>-rtry to rc.ul turpi tut.
1 (1 \oyni litre aj>|it-.in lo In: wi|*crllti*«i>, av is alsorij* rw not in the nest line. For llic original is, rrpt r/r o \oyvt vntrn\‘ On trvrtvu roOy rov noi, cai rrjt -on not , tat rij* wpot ro tr mrrafjiji.
1'HOCLl'S ON THE
[hook ii r
tlw* lift* in intellect, and how it is converted to itself, so far as it is self-vital and self-moved. For the ri^ht line manifests the progression oftlie psychical life from more excellent natures; hut the inflexion into a circle indicates intellectual cir¬ culation. For the soul is allotted this power, and also that which is productive of the life in itself, from its father. Since however, the psychical life is tw ofold, the one heiii£ diunoetic, hut the other doxa>lic, two lines present themselves, and are l>ent into two circles.