propriety. For the monadic alone pertains to intellect, on which account also intellect is impartible. lint the dyadic pertains to hodv, whence in the genera¬ tion of the corporeal-formed nature, Plato hejjan from the dnad, fire and earth. «md arr.m^i d tvvo oilier genera ol element's b< tween these. 1 he soul, however, oein; a medium Is-tween intellect and body, is a monad and at the same time a duad. Hut tIn* cause' ot this is, that in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and infinity ; just as ml. Meet indeed, is allied to bound, but body rather pertains to infinity, on account of its subject matter, and divisibility ad infinitum, ^viid if after tins manner, some n fer the impartible and the partible to tbe monad •iiid i ml i finite duad, t hey ‘•jirak con to nimbi v to tilings tin-in selves * but if as making the soul to Im> number, in no respect difieriii" from monadic nuinliers, they are '* r ) bir Iroin asserting that wlm h happens to tin* essence of the soul. The soul, then-fine, is ;i monad and at the same lime a duad, adumbrating hy the monadic, intelleetu.il bound, but by the dyadic, infinity; or by tin* former, Inan^ the linage, indeed, ol the impartible, but by the latter bi ini; the paradigm of partible natures.
In addition to these things also, it is requisite to survev, lion a two-fold work, of the D* miiiriius is here delivered. I o*r he divides the soul into jiarts, hanno- lii/es the di\ided parts, and renders them concordant with each other. But in <... < 11 hit th. so things, he em r.ri/es at one and the same tune Dionysiaeallv [i. e. Barehical \ ] and Apollouiacally. I or to divide, and produce vv holes into parts, and to preside o\er tlie distribution <>| lorms, is Dionysiaral; but to perfift all things harmoniealIy, is Apolloni.tral. As the Deiniur^us, therefore, comprt bends in hiiiLsell the cause ot both these (>ods f hr both divides and harmonizes the soul. Lor the hebdomad is a number common to botli those divinities, since theolotjists also say that Bacchus was div ulrd into seven parts :
Into sci€-n parts tlie Titans cut the bov.
And they reier the hrptad to A|»ollo, as containing ail symphonies. For the duple diapason first subsists in tin* inonad, duad, and tetratl, of which numbers the hebdomad consist-,. Hence they call the (iod Ilebdoma'retes, or horn on the seventh day, aiui assert that this dav is sacred to Inin;
l or on tins day baton , bore * llic bind Ulm wi art a •M.UIcn sword.
Just as the si\th tlav is sacred to Diana. This number, indeed, in the same manner as the triad, is imparted to the soul from superior causes; the latter from intelligible, hut flu former from intellectual natures. And it is also imparted from »liese very divinities [Apollo and Bacchus], in order that by a division into
tor ai£ior here, it is obviously necessary to read atrtor t<.
1 or yjtvoauy a ytipara iierr, read x/>vira«opa y<u aro.
l'KOCLUS ON THE
seven parts, the soul may have a signature of the Dionysiacal series, anti of the fabulous laceration • of Bacchus. l'or it is necesfurv that it slioultl participate of the Dionysiacal intellect; anti as Orpheus says, that (rearing the Coil on its head, it slioultl Is* dmdetl conlbrinalily to him. But it possesses harmony in those parts, as a symbol of the Apolloniacal order. I'or in the lacerations of Bacchus, it is Apollo who collects and unites tin; distributed parts of Bacchus, according to the w ill of the father [JupiterJ. In these mimlreis also, the three middles are com¬ prehended.* These therefore being tlu< i , adumbrate not only in the sold but every where, the three daughters of Themis. And the geometric middle, indeed, is the image of Kimoima. 1 * * * * 6 7 Hence Plato in the Law s s lys, that she adorns polities, and disposes tin m in an orderly man in r, and he liken ise cell hrali s her as the judg¬ ment of Jupiter, adorning the universe, and comprehending tlit true political science. But tin* harmonic middli is an image ol Dice or Justice, distributing a greater ratio to greater, hut a less to lesser terms. This lmwewr is the work ofjiistice. And the ai ithiiu tn al middle is an image ol Peaee. * For it is this, as It Is also said in the Laws, which imparts to alt things tin iipiat aieoiiluig to quantity, and makes peoph at peaee with people. 1 or the solid analogy fi. e. the triplicate proportion] prior to these, is sacred to tin ir mother '1 hemis, who com¬ prehends the powers of all of them. * And thus much universally concerning tin ■sc three limldh s.
Tin se tlirei middles ’ lunvi ver, may In- said in a w ay adapted to what has Keen before observed, to be the sources of union and connexion to the soul, or in other words, to l*e unions, analogies, and Immls. lienee also limans denominates them bonds. I’or prior to this, he h id said, that the geoim trie middle is the most beautiful ol bonds, and that the other middles are contained in this.* But every bond is a eerlain union. It therefore tin middles are bonds, amt bonds are the unions of the tilings that are hound, that which follow s is e\idenl. Hence thes« pervade through all the essence of the soul, 1 and render it one from many
1 fur r III lilt* |tl.it r, l«l<l iteiifiii} ^,111..
1 I i*. ill llir iiuiiiIm 11 I. .’ 1. I. li. Ilir lirliiliiiii.nl, n» I’iih In* ulrnm - ', »'ili»i»lnii; «*f 1. « Jlii'l I I nr
I. .V unit J. an in arilliiurlit al |iri>|M>rlinii. '1 hr inimhcr* J. uml (i. uml alto 1. uiiil ti. me hi hul- nniuic.il |ir<i|>nrln>ii. Ami llit iiiunher* 1. 2 .1 ami (i. arc m gtouu Itical |>io|uirlu>ii.
1 Instead i>f (vri'iui here, it h in cnuri to luil l.nu/nai
* For triplicate, coiim.-Us nf geometrical |>r<>{>>>r(i<>0, au<l geomclric.il colilam* in ilt< If, n> v*r line brforr •Imwii, ihe arillum lu al, uml I lie li.miuiiiic.il |>r<>|>orlmn ; uml llicrcfmc lri|>liculc, or solid ana¬ logy, comprehend* in itM-lf llir three middle*.
1 Mffforijrri I* omitted III the original.
6 For O' Tovrun lit rf, it is ub\ touslv nftmarv to r«*ad o rovry.
7 The words y*\, f /* uc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to b* inserted.
Hook 111]
TIM ILLS <>i PLATO
wholes, as they are allotted a pow< r of binding together tilings of a various nature. A'J however they are three, the geometric inuhile hinds every thing that is essential in souls, For esseiire is one reason, proceeding through all things, and connect¬ ing first, middle, and last natures, just as in the geometric middle, one and the same ratio, pervades pi rtcctly through the tlirei: terms [of whit h the proportion consists]. Hut the harmonic middle connects all the divided sameness of souls, imparting to the extremes a communion of reasons, and a kindred conjunction. And sameness, indeed, is seen in a greater decree in more total, hut in a less decree in more partial natures. And the arithmetical middle l>indstlieall-v ariousdiversitvof the progression ofthe soul, and is less inherent in things which are greater, hut more in such as are less, according to order. Fur difference has dominion in more partial, just as same¬ ness has in more total and more excellent natures. And these two middles have something hy which they communicate with each other, in the same manner as sameness and difference. As essence also is the monad ofthe latter, so the geo¬ metrical middle is the monad ofthe former. The geometric middle, therefore, is the union ot the essences in all the A 1 terms ; the harmonic of the erjually numerous samenesses; and the arithmetical, of the differences.' Hence all these extend through all tin* terms, or how could a certain whole he produced from them, unless they were as much as possible united to each other ? Kssontiallv indeed, hy the geometric middle, hut in another and another wa\ hy the remaining two. On this account also the arithmetical and harmonic middles become the consum¬ mation ofthe geometric middle, in the same manner as sameness and difference, contribute to the perfection of essence. For because the arithmetical and har¬ monic middles subsist oppositely with reference to each other, the geometric middle connects and, as it were, weaves* together their dissention. For the harmonic middle indeed, distributes as we have said, greater ratios to greater terms, and less ratios to less terms; since it evinces that things which arc essen¬ tially greater and more total, are also more comprehensive in power than such as are of an inferior nature. Hut vice versa, the arithmetical middle, distributes less ratios to greater terms, 1ml greater ratios to less terms. For difference prevails more in inferior natures, just as sameness on the contrary, lias greater authority in superior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms ; imparting by illumination union to first, middle, and last natures, through the presence of essence to all tilings.
The Demiurgus therefore imparts three connective unions to the soul, which Plato denominates middles, as binding together the middle order of wholes.
* It i* litre necessary l« tlie wools t] rwr trrpori |rwr.
* For here, it is necessary lo read rvt
And of these, the geometric middle collects the multitude of essences, and causes essential progressions to lie one : for one ratio is the image of union. But the harmonic middle, hinds total samenesses, and the hyparxes of them into one communion. And the arithmetical middle, conjoins first, middle, and last dif¬ ferences. For, in short, diil'erenre is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the Parmenides. These three, however, \i/.. essence, sameness, and dillerenee, are in each part of the soul, and it is requisite to conjoin all of them to each other through a medium and colligative reasons.
In the next place, w e >..) that the soul is a plenitude of reasons, she being more simple than seiisihh-s, hut more composite than intelligihles. Hence imnrus assumes seven ratios m the soul, viz. the ratios of equality, multiplicity, suhumlti- plicity, the sup* rparticular and superjiartient ratios, and the opposites of these, the siihsiijHTpartic.ilar, anil subs.qierpartient, hut not the ratios which are eom- pounded from these. For these are adapted to corpor. a! reasons, since they are composito and partible. The reasons in the soul, however, proceed indeed into multitude and partihility, vet together with multitude, they exhibit simplicity, and the uniform in conjunction w ith a distribution into parts. Hence tin y are not allotted an hypostasis in the monad, and the impartible, in the same manner as intellect. For intellect is alone monadic ami impartible. Nor does the mul¬ titude of them proceed into composite reasons. And multiple ratio indeed is in oneway only partible, viz. according to the proluiitu 1 or greater term : for the hyJ>olo"Os, or less term, is without division, and is not prevented from being unity. But the siiperparticular, is divisible in a twofold respect, viz. according to the prologos and hypologos; hut is impartible according to dillerenee.* And the biqverpartient is partible, both according to the prologos and hypologos, and ac¬ cording to dilh reiice. 1 So that the first of these, is div isihle in one way only, the second hilariously, and the third trifarioiisly. But equality is impartible. Tlie sold therefore constitutes the universe by these ratios ; the cnrporeal-formed nature indeed, by that which is tnl iriously partible; the nature oi superhetes by
* Thus for instance, 3 .! to 4 is a multiple ratio, which ill its lowest terms, is that of S to 1 . But J it div isihle, ami 1 accurately speaking is nut. Broclus, therefore, in what he now says, speaks of multiple ratio when reduce*! lo its lowest terms.
1 Thus llie superparlicular ratio of 0 lo 1, o in Hs lowest lerms the rate * f 3 lo , and bolh 3 and J are divisible, dut this latio according to the differ*nee of the terms, is indivisible; for this difler-
tiKC h 1.
t hus for instance, the su|vrrparlieul ratio 3 to 5, which is superhiparticnl, being in Us lowest terms, for this isthe case with all superpartient ratio*, is evidently partible, both according to the pto- logot and hypvlogoi ; and it is al»o partible according to the difference of the terms. For tins dif¬ ference is
TIM XUS Ol PLATO.
that which is hilariously partible ; every linear nature, hy that which is partible in one way only ; anti hy the impartible the impartihility which comprehends all things. For there is something impartihle in partible natures. These things, therefore, are truly asserted.