eminent degree a symmetry of all the elements; so. that the fountain of this is primarily with the Demiurgus. And it seems that there is one concurrence with each constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic health ; but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being, which is still preserved, or is in a perishing condition; which is preserved, indeed, in the natures that are connected by indissolable bonds, but is in a perishing condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble natures, as being finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And here indeed (1. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of divinity about the universe, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was vitiated in a former period, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which is of a renovating nature, [ence also theologists refer one kind of health to E:scula- pius, this being all the medicine of things preternatural, whether it perpetually or sometimes only represses a preternatural subsistence. But they generate another prior to Esculapius, which is consubsistent with the fabrication of things, and which they produce from Persuasion and Love. Uence, as Plato says, the universe is from intellect: and necessity, intellect’ persuading necessity; but necessity being converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which is best. For it is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the conversion of necessity to intellect. lence, it is manifest that. the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that) which is Esculapian, and that whichis Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular,
But the constituted body, is a composite, and alter-motive. That which is selfmotive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things, The universe, however, so far as itis a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as things ofan eflicacions nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers; the former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent con- gelation, But the word unscasonably manifests the privation of symmetry, and the ‘inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions
* For τὸν τὸν here, read τὸν you.
440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 111.
from chance. For it appeared to those who leave something external to the universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding and falling on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that the world is in short both hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of this kind, though the natures which surround it should be hot and cold, it would suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would suffer by the things which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are hot and others cold, it would suffer by these; but if of others, which have strong and vigorous powers, it would suffer from them, For whether these surrounding natures should happen to be contrary to the things of which the world consists, because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay ; or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures that are in it. As he speaks, therefore, of every composite, he very properly makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there 3a certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Tlenece, because it is known, he mentions these. Since, however, every composite does not con- sist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally, ‘ and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers,” though they should not be heats and colds. For it is necessary that every physical body should have a physical power, through which it may be able to act according to nature, If, therefore, any body should surround the world, whether similar or dissimilar to certain things contained in it; if dissimilar, indecd, it would disturb the world; but itis necessary that what is impassive should not be disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something which is situated ia a certain place; and if similar, In consequence of being mingled with what is similar to it, it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful Lond. Such therefore is the explanation of the particulars of the text.
Let us, however, survey itself by itself, how there is nothing external to the uni- verse. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many kinds of matter, and many worlds?) May we not say, that he constituted matter, and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on this account, he very properly produces but one matter ; and that the multitude of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other, but that matter is without difference and without quality? Por though we should
Book Iil.) Tim.Eus of Plato. 441
orant that there are many kinds of matter in this universe, yet we must say that there is one matter which proceeds from on high through diminution, as far as to the last dregs of things, which last sediment also is truly formless, the summit of matter having a great alliance to forms. For all things according to their summit are most allied to the natures prior tothem. So that there is one, and vet not one matter, which proceeds through all things, itself subsiding into itself. Onaccount of this matter, therefore, the Demiurgus produced one world having itselfa diminution with reference to itself.’ | Every thing likewise which makes by its very existence, being one in itself, makes one image of itself, and one whole form; and especially when it remains immoveable. For being moved, it is pos- sible for it to make other and other images of itself. Farther still it may be said, that to divide production into multitude, is no lonzer the effect of power, but of imbecili- ty. But to comprehend multitude in unity, and to connect thewhole number of things through the monad, is the province of admirable abundance. Vf, therefore, total pow- éris in the Demiurgus, if he is an immoveable cause, if he fabricates by his very being, and if he generates that which is similar to himself, he generates the world one, Whole, and perfect. What then, it may be said, is not the Demiurgus able to
govern many and infinite worlds? We reply, that multitude and the infinite (in quan-
tty} are not the prerogatives of power, but that it pertains to power to congregate things that are divided, and to give bound to infinites. For this assimilates things to the good, 0 which also the Demiurgus extends all his productions. "This, therefore, is demon- strated through many other arguments.
That Plato however, in an admirable manner informs us, that nothing is left external to the universe, from which any thing else of the like kind could be ge- nerated, and that each of the things that are monadic alone consists of the simple | natures of which it is composed, and there are not other? things external to it of a similar kind, from which any other such nature could be produced, we may learn by observing that he says, an all-various inequality exists in the seeds of bodies. And also, that on account of this inequality, the differences of fire, and ofeach of the elements, are incomprehensible. Hence, all fire is not ’ similar to all fire, though visibility is common to all. On this account likewise, there is a certain fire which burns, and this is all-various from the smallness and magni-
{ For aura εἰς eavrny here, it seems necessary to read αὐτὸν εἰς eavroy.
* Instead of καὶ μὴ εἰναι exros avrov, adda rovros ὁμοία, it is necessary to al και μὴ εἰναι eKTos
“avrov ἄλλα κ. ds
ἡ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.
Tim. Plat. Vou. I. aK
442 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ rit;
tude of the elements of which it consists. And the same thing is true of all the elements. Each of the monadic natures therefore, consists of all such things, as are contained in it alone, but in no other thing whatever. Hence it is not ex- ternally mingled with them nor is connascent with them. But you may also as- sume this from these sublunary bodies. For not every one is nourished by every one, but different bodies by ditlerent things, because all of them are not similar to the elements of which they consist. But each body becomes greater through those things by which itis able to be nourished, the things that enter into it re- ceiving the places of those that depart from it. On this account, therefore, cor- ruptible natures perish, because there are external to them things of a kind similar to those of which they consist, and which are contraries some to one thing, and others to another. Each of these also, being added to their appro- priate natures, introduce corruption to composites, by dissolving the symmetry which is in them. In things that are corruptible therefore, the reason or product- ive principle, especially effects a difference, since itis very different from that of simple natures. But in things that are indissoluble, the difference, and tbe reasons of the composition cf them, pertain to the same things. Hence, they are indissoluble, and in short monadic, alone existing from elements alone, ac- cording to one reason, and one symmetry. These things, therefore, should be examined more fully. Por we shall find that they subsistin a beautiful manner,’ if we look to things, and do not restin words alone, as is the case with many who meddle with the theory of these particulars. Let us, however, proceed to what
ux next said by Plato.
“ Through this cause, therefore, and this reasoning, he fabricated the world one whole, perfect from containing in itself all wholes, and free
from old age and disease.”
Cause indeed, uniformly comprehends every thing which proceeds from it, but reasoning comprehends its productions ina divided manner, as we have before observed. So that the universe as one whole is comprehended by its cause, and is generated according to cause ; but as consisting of all wholes, it is generated by a reasoning process.’ And itis generated one indeed, by the demiurgic deity,
MInstead of evpyooper yap ov καλως ἐχόντα, it js obviously necessary to read ἐυρησομεν yap καλως
€yorvra. * A reasoning process in the Demiurgus signifies, as has been before observed, a distributed or divid-
ed cause of things.
Book 111. Tim.Zus of Plato. 443
and according to divine union; but a whole according to the wholeness which is connective of intellectuals." For this producing totally renders the universe a whole. And it isa whole containing in itself all wholes, according to the divided causes of forms. For the monad possesses with itself the whole number [of which it is the cause.] The universe also is perfect, as being always converted to its principles, and imitating the demiurgic conversion. But it is free from old age and disease, as having a flourishing, vigorous, and ever vigilant life, and as par- ticipating of admirable powers. For from the causes which renovate the world a pure and unwearicd life is imparted to it, and from the inflexible * Gods, unde- filed power. And through the former indeed the world is free from old age, always becoming new ; but through the latter, it is free from disease, being puritied from every thing preternatural. The Demiurgus, however, comprehends the cause of both these.
“Βαϊ he gave to it a figure adapted and ailied to its nature. For to the animal which was to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure will be adapted, which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence he fashioned it as with a wheel of a spheriform shape, every where (or fromall the parts} equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities; this being the most perfect of all figures, and the most simi- lar to itself. For he conceived that the similar is infinitely more beauti- ful than the dissimilar.”