But if difference itself is not the nature of the different, but a power generative of beings, it will be collective of being and the one. For every where power is allotted an hyparxis of this kind. For through power the otie participates of being, and being of the one. Power therefore was the cause, not of division, but of communion, of contact without separation, and of the habitude of the one to being, and of being to the one. Hence it is necessary that it should neither be arranged according to intelligible power, nor according to the intellectual differ- ence of beings ; but that being the middle of both, it should subsist analogous to intelligible power, but should generate in the extremities of intellectuals the portion of the different. What else therefore is it than the feminine nature of the Gods? Hence also it imitates intelligible power, and is prolific of many unities, and of many beings. And how could it otherwise separate number from itself, and the forms and powers of number, unless it was the cause of the divine progressions in a feminine manner. Multitude therefore is paternally in intelligibles, but maternally in intellectuals. Hence, in the former indeed, it subsists inouadically, but in the latter according to number. Very properly therefore, in the second genera of the Cods also, union is derived from the male, but separation from the female divinities. And bound indeed proceeds from the males, but infinity from the females. For the male is analogous to bound, but the female to infinity. The female, however, differs from infinite power, so far as power indeed, is united to the father, and is in him ; but the female is divided from the paternal cause. For power is not only in the female divinities, but is also prior to them, since the intelligible powers are in the male divinities, according to Timaeus, who says that the power of the demiurgus is the cause of the generation
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CHAP. XXXI.
of perpetual natures. For [the demiurgus says to the junior Gods] 44 imitating my power, produce and generate animals." Power therefore, is prior to the male and the female, and is in both, and posterior to both. For it pervades through all beings, and every being participates of power, as the Elean guest says. For power is every where. But the female participates in a greater degree of its peculiarity, and the male of union according to bound. That the first number therefore, which presents itself to the view from intelligibles, is of a feminine nature, is through these things evident
CHAPTER XXXI.
It remains then, that we should speak concerning the triadic division of it, following Parmenides. These three things therefore, have appeared to us from the beginning, according to the separation of the one from being, viz. the one, difference, and being ; difference not being tha same either with the one or being. For though the one and being were in intelligibles, yet difference first subsists here. Since however power above [i. e. in intelligibles] was collective, but here is the separator of the extremes, there are not only three monads, but also three duads, viz. the one in conjunction with difference, difference in conjunction with being, and the one in conjunction with being. For difference also is the cause of a separation of this kind, not preserving the union of the one being with genuine purity. There arc therefore three monads, and three duads. But these likewise may become three triads, when we begin, at one time from the one, at another time from being, and at another from difference. Hence this triad subsists monadically, and triadically. But this is the same thing as to assert that difference and the first feminine nature generates in itself, monads, duads, and triads. For the divided
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assumption, generates for us different monads; but the conjoined assumption, duads'and triads, some indeed being vanquished by the one, others by difference, and others by being. And thus far the first deity presents itself to the view, being prolific of the first numbers; according to the one indeed, of unical numbers, but according to difference of generative, and according to l>eing, of essential numbers.
Since however, from this deity which is intelligible, that which is posterior to it proceeds, it is evidently necessary that the monad, duad, and triad, should severally have prolific power. These powers therefore; Parmenides calls once, twice, thrice. For each of these is a power which is the cause of the above-mentioned essences that produce either separately, or connectedly. For there with respect to the generations of them, some of them are entirely peculiar, but others are common to secondary natures. The progeny therefore of these are, the oddly-odd, the evenly-even and the evenly-odd.' And of these, the oddly-odd indeed, as we have before observed, is collective into union of the divine progressions. But the evenly-even is generative of wholes, and proceeds as for as to the last of things. The evenly-odd however, is mixed, having its subsistence from both the even and the odd. Hence we must establish the first as analogous to bound, but the second as analogous to power, and the third as analogous to being. And you may see, how indeed in the first order all things had a primary subsistence, viz. monad, duad, triad; but how in this order, all things arc secondarily and subordi- nate^. And the mixture which is the triad, subsisted there indeed in one way, but here the evenly-odd subsists in another way. For there the extremes were odd, because they were intelligible; but here the even is more abundant, and the intelligible summit only is odd. For the middle of the triad is analogous to power. And there indeed, is the monad, which has all the forms of odd numbers according to cause, and the duad is there, which is occultly all the forms of even numbers, and also the triad, which is number primarily. But here both the odd and the even number now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place ir*
« t» «{rMff|irra is omitted in the original.
Chap. Xxxi. of Plato. 293
an unmingled, and in another in a mingled manner. All tilings there- fore, are here prolifically, but there, paternally and intelligibly. But that monad docs not proceed from intelligiblcs, but subsists in them in unprocceding union. Hence, after these, and from these, we may survey the whole of number subsisting according to a third progression. "For these things," says Parmenides, " preexisting, no number will be absent." Every number therefore, is generated through these in the third monad, and both the one and being become many, difference separating each of them. And every part indeed of being participates of the one; but every unity is carried as in a vehicle in a certain portion of being. Each of these however, is multiplied, intellectually separated, divided into minute parts, and proceeds to infinity. For as in intelligibles, we attribute infinite multitude to the third triad, so here, in this triad we assign infinite number to the third part of the triad. For in short every where, the infinite is the extremity, as proceeding in an all-perfect manner, and comprehending indeed all secondary natures, but being itself participated by none of them. In the first monad therefore, there were powers, but intelligibly. In the second, there were progressions and generations, but both intelligibly and intellectually. And in the third, there was all-powerful number, unfolding the whole of itself into light; and which also Parmenides denominates infinite. It is likewise especially manifest that it is not proper to transfer this infinity to quantity. For how can there be an infinite number, since infinity is hostile to the nature of number? And how are the parts of the one equal to the minute parts of being? For in infinites there is not the equal. But this indeed has been thought worthy of attention by those who were prior to us*
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The division therefore into three, having been demonstrated by us, we shall briefly observe, that the one appears to be many according to this order, the one itself proceeding into a multitude of unities, and being in a similar manner becoming generated in conjunction with the one. For those three monads are the intelligible comprehensions of all orders, and they at once preside over all the progressions from intelligibles, produce all of them in an exempt manner, and collect them to the intelligible causes. Since however, Plotinus admits that number is prior to animal itself, and says that the first being produces from itself number, and that this is established as a medium between the one being, and animal itself, but is the basis and place of beings, it is worth while to speak likewise concisely about this. For if he says that animal itself has intelligible and occult number, as comprehended in the monad, he speaks rightly, and accords with Plato. But if he says that animal itself comprehends number, now separated, or which has a multiform subsistence, and is the progeny of difference, intelligible multitude is not a thing of this kind. For there indeed, the one. is being, and being is the one. Hence animal itself is according to all things perfect. But in number, the one is separated from being, and being from the one, and each of the parts is no longer an intelligible whole, as an animal itself. For that is a whole of wholes; and every where the one was with being in the parts of it, and animal itself was only-begotten. But number proceeded after the two- fold coordinations, I mean the monad and duad, the odd and the even number. How therefore, can we place in animal itself the first number? If however, some one should say that number exists there, it i8 according to cause and intelligibly. But it is intellectually separated by diflerence. And farther still, in addition to these things, if animal itself is surveyed by some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude
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CHAP. XXXII.
of forms, and the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, it will thus have intellectual number, as being arranged near the intellectual end. But if he should call intelligible animal number, in this case there will be separation and difference in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole of things, according to supreme union. For all section and division originate from the intellectual Gods; since here difference proceeds, adorning things in conjunction with the one and being. How therefore, does the division of the unities into minute parts, or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can the multitude of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the tetrad was there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind being adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one being is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is con- joined with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since however, it comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timoeus denominates it the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four first- effective causes. For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the production of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad subsist unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.
Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with sepa- ration. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them.' Hence, the first multitudes proceed indeed from the one, but they are unical, without separation, and without number, imitating the one principle of the whole of things. Very properly therefore, does Parmenitles constitute multitude in intelli- gibles, according to the end [of the intelligible order]; but number in intellectuals accordiug to the beginning [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.] And these are conjoined with each other. Parmcnidcs also pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause of intellectual numbers. And Timneus shows that animal itself is only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of
• Instead of «««-<tXw y«j t« wgwrtrru rm t*pi«rafmwv, np> <£i«r w /w{fi|», it is necessary to read ■xxrrxxw yttf ra wjgutj<tt« ran vf fi/wwv, tw sfOu^wrajMWv, iltar rj^. fu>ff ir.
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296 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, wc have abundant!/ shown.