the intellectual triad. Thus therefore, the place also which is above the heaven, is allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the celes- tial circulation, and is intelligible as in the first intellectuals. ' Hence also it subsists analogous to the first triad of intelligibles. That triatl however, was simply intelligible. For the intelligible which is in intelli- gibles, at once exists prior to all second and third intelligibles. But the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible; for it is the summit of intel- lectuals, and not of intelligibles. Hence Plato calls the first triad of in- telligibles the one being ; but he denominates the supercelestial place, truly-existing essence. Tor the former indeed, antecedes all beings in an admirable simplicity, and in the occult unity of being. For that being is the intelligible itself, and is not in one respect intelligible, but in another intellectual, nor is it that which is passive to [viz. participates of] being ; but it is the seat, and the most ancient monad of being. This order how- ever, [vis. the supercelestial place] falls short of the union of that triad* and participates of being, but is not simply being. Hence also Plato calls it essence, and essence which truly is, as receiving this intelligible and essential according to the essence of that which is primarily being. And the first triad indeed of intelligibles was paternal ; for it subsists accord- ing to divine union and bound, and is the occult, and highest boundary of . all intelligibles. But the supercelestial place is maternal, subsisting ac- cording to infinity, and the power of infinity. For this order is feminine and prolific, and produces all things by intelligible powers. Hence also, Plato calls it a place, as being the receptacle of the paternal causes, and bringing forth, and producing the generative powers of the Gods into the hypostasis of secondary natures. For having denominated matter also a place, he calls it the mother and nurse of the reasons [i. c. of the produc- tive principles], which proceed into it from being, and the paternal cause.
According to this analogy, therefore, Plato thus denominates the super- celestial place, as feminine, and as being the cause of those things ma- ternally, of which the intelligible father is the cause paternally. Matter
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however receives forms alone ; but the mother and nurse of the Gods, not only receives, but also constitutes and generates secondary natures, together with the father. Nor does this generative deity produce from herself into an external place, her progeny, and separate them from Ler own com- prehension, in the same manner as the natures which generate here, deliver their offspring into light external to themselves; but she generates, comprehends and establishes all things in herself. Hence also she is the place of them, as being a seat which on all sides contains them, and as by her prolific, and primarily efficient powers, preoccupying and con- taining in herself, all the progressions, multitude and variety of secondary natures. For all beings subsist in ihe Gods, and are comprehended and saved by them. For where can they recede from tlie Gods, and from the comprehension which is in them? .And how, if they depart from them, con they remain even for the smallest portion of time? In a particular manner however the powers which are generative of divine natures, are said to comprehend their progeny, so far as they are the proximate causes of them, and constitute their essence with a more abundant division, and a more particular providence. For paternal causes produce secondary natures uniformly, exemptly, and without coordination, and comprehend, but unically their own progeny. And in simplicity indeed, they preoccu- py the variety of them ; but in union their multitude. It is evident therefore, from what has been said, that the supercelestial place is intel- ligible, and after what manner it is intelligible. In addition to these things also it is evident, how it is feminine ; for place is adapted to the generative Gods through the above-mentioned causes. And the meadow is the fountain of a vivific nature, as will be shortly demonstrated. Socrates likewise assumes all the divine natures that are in this place, to be of this hind, [viz. to be of the feminine genus] I mean science herself, justice her- self, temperance herself, truth herself, and Adrastia ; which may especi- ally be considered as a certain indication, that Plato particularly attri- butes the feminine to this order, and not only other theologists.
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What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place ce- lebrates this deity negatively, analogous to the one t And what are (ha negations ? For he denominates it, without colour, without figure, and without contact. And he takes away from it these three hyparxes, colour, figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order being the summit of the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable, according to its peculi- arity, and is [only] to be known through intelligible impressions. For being the summit of intellectuals, it conjoins itself with intelligibles. For how could intellectuals be conjoined with intelligibles, unless they ante- cedently constituted an intelligible transcendency of themselves ? But what connexion and communion could be surveyed of the whole orders of things, unless the extremities of such as are first possessed a certain similitude to the beginnings of such as are second ? For on account of this similitude, these are connascent with each other, and all things sub-' sist according to one scries. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was intellectual, so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an in- telligible hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible ; but the one is intelligible simply ; and the other is not intelligible without the addi- tion of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with each other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of things, so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in it is extended in- telligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive of the same things, because it is intellectual, and intelligible good presides in the intellectual genus. All things therefore, are from both, exeinptly indeed, from the intellectual of intelligibles, but coordinately, from the intelligible of in- tellectuals. And both indeed, rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are alone, as Plato says, known by intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impres- sions, iience also he calls the attempt boldness which endeavours to unfold the arcana concerning them, and to explain by words their un- known union.
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Chap. Xi. of Plato. 24-7
From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of intel- lectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it conjoint itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their unical, ineffable, and paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an unknown manner prior to intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible by the natures posterior to it; but it is known by those prior to it, being super-expanded into a continued union with them.' It likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly ; but this does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge. For intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the unknown union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and unknown power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato mystically unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is highest, and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God. As therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God through negations, after the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform and unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since Socrates in the Phtedrus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place, arranging it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the ascent of souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timasus, Plato contends that the one demiurgus through whom every demiurgic genus of Gods subsists is ineffable and unknown; and every where that which is highest has this transcendency with respect to secondary natures. For it imi- tates the cause which is at once unically exempt from all beings. We celebrate this cause however, through negations alone, as existing prior to all things; but we unfold the summits which proceed analogous to it, affirmatively and at the same time negatively. As participating indeed, the natures prior to themselves, we celebrate them affirmatively. For Plato calls the supercelestial place essence which truly is, the plain of truth, the meadow, and the intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and he docs not only call it without colour, without figure, and without
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oontadt, thus mingling affirmations with negations. For this order is a medium between the intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine orders, containing the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectual!/, according to a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits the plenitudes of intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise derates all things at once, according to one common union, as fa r as to the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far as to matter. Being therefore established between the unical and the multiplied Gods, it « unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown manner in which it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively through its partici- pation of the first natures. For the first demiurgus is called in the Timsus fabricator and father, and good, and all such names, so far as he participates of preexistent causes; but so far as he is the monad of all fabrication, Plato leaves him unknown and ineffable, exempt from all the fabricators of things. For he says, " it is difficult to discover him, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Thus therefore Plato unfolds the supercelestial place, affirmatively indeed, as being filled from the first causes, at one time indeed calling it essence* which truly is, at another the plain of truth, and at another, something else of this kind; but' so far as it transcends the intellectual Gods, and •o far as -it is supreme and unical, he celebrates it negatively, in the same manner as the principle which is exempt from all things.
It follows therefore, in the next place, that we should consider what the negations are, and from what orders they are generated. In the Parmenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all the
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divine orders, because the me is die cause of all of them. And every thing divine- according to the hypavxis of itself participates of the first principle ; and the one in consequence of transcending these is in a much greater degfee exempt from the natures posterior to these. For from these all things proceed; since they receive partibly the peculiarities of these. This however iB evident from (he otter hypotheses* in which Che same conclusions are again1 eircalated, at one time being connected together negatively, and *t anotlier affirmatively. For what is* there wlrichr could be able to subsist, unless it was- antecedently comprehended according Vo cause in wholes ? But in the Pined r us, the things which are denied of the intelligible summit of air intellectuals are the natures whieb am proximately established after this summit, vis. the sacred genera; the connective, tike perfective, and the' paternal of what are" properly called' intellectuals For this summit being exempt front these, it also, transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of the Gods is to Me one, that the three orders posterior to this* summit, arettr it- Plato therefore denominates the cctestia* order which connectedly con- tains wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, colour ; because likewise the apparent beauty of this sensible heaven is resplendent' with; all various colours, and with light. Hence he calls that heaven intel- lectual colour, and light For the light proceeding from the good is [in the orders] above [the heaven] unknown and occult, abiding in- the adyta of the Gods ; but it shines forth in this order, and from being unapparent becomes manifest. Hence it is assimilated to colour the offspring of light.