and partial intelligible*, and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the one with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible is impar- ticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all tilings from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, exist- ing itself by itself; and at-tbe same time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the co-ordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these the we becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude. Hence 1 do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea. For this form b partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider it as the hypai xis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufficiency and divine power, ac- cording to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater degree, therefore, are the intelligible Gods, because they are united to- the good, wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very pro- perly, therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union; sub- sisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uni- formly and unically ; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and be- ing uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fa-
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222 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
thers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in. telligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence, and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in them- selves all ' things according to supreme union.
• Instead of rm xaf nwwiv, it it requisite to read varra xoJf tvtunv, and then the end of this book will be co mplete, and not defective is the Latin translatorPortus imagined it was.
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Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as ac- cording to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intel- lectually perceived ; but others are intellectual only; — this being the case, beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligi- ble, we will in the 6rst place determine what pertains to them in common, from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total monads which arc entirely beyond the Gods that arc divided accord- ing to parts, viz. essence, life arid intellect. And these prior to the par- tial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts the end of this triad to the beginning. -And all these are indeed intelli- gibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellec-
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224 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
tually in intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of con- version, though intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to progression, and essence according to permanency ; — this being the case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods being essentialized according to life should conjoin imparticipable intel- lect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should uniformly connect the various progressions of secondary, but unfold and expand the stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes. For imparticipable life is a thing of this kind, circumscribing that which is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being, but participated by intellect But tins is the same thing as to assert that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills intellect from itself. For being is the intel- ligible, but life is intelligence. And being indeed is characterized ac- cording to a divine hyparxis; but Kfe according to power ; and intellect according to intelligible intellect. For as being is to byparxis, so is intel- lect to being. . And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so n life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated from the one and byparxis but constitutes in conjunction with the one the nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being. As also the one itself which exists prior to being, imparts to being from itself a second unity, so likewise life being allotted aa hypostasis prior to intellect, generates in- tellectual life. For true being and the intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, is illu- minated by Gods wlio are allotted a union secondary to the occult sub- sistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause the separation of intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary na- ture of intelligibles, subsides, through the medium of these Gods* into
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multitude and separation, and the inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and carried in the divisions of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual ; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles, but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible Gods intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the intellectual Gods another : and we denominate the Gods that subsist according to life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intellect the power of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of being intellectually perceived, but we give them this appellation, as deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in com- mon, connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as they also are allotted a peculiarity collective of wholes in the divine orders.
It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium, and that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both monadic and triad ic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed to the highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads ; but with reference to the divided essence of triads, they are monads, unfolding into light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles, therefore, in their triadic progression, do not depart from a unical hyparxis, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods subsist triadically, exhibiting in themselves the separation of the monads, and through divine difference, proceeding into multitude, and a variety of powers and essences. For the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of second-
* For <am» it is neceisary to read w*m,
Proc. Vol. I.
ary natures, but are divided into more numbers, and such as are more distant from the monad. They likewise relinquish the union which is the cause of primarily efficient natures, and variety is assumed by them in exchange for the occult hyparxis of those primary essences. According to this reasoning, therefore, the intelligible and intellectual separation is greater than the separation which is only intelligible. And of these again, the partial orders are allotted a much greater division, so as to un- fold to us a multitude of Gods which cannot be comprehended in the numbers within the decad. Their peculiarities also are indescribable, and inexplicable by our conceptions, and are manifest only to the Gods them- selves, and to the causes of them. Such, therefore, are the intelligible and intellectual Gods, and such is the peculiarity which they are allotted, a peculiarity connective of extremes, and which unfolds into light prece- daneous, but converts secondary natures. For they intellectually per- ceive the Gods prior to them, but are objects of intellection to the Gods posterior to them. Hence also Timasus establishes all-perfect animal to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, because there are intelligibles pos- terior to it, which it surpasses in beauty, as being superior to them, and because it is the boundary of the first intelligibles, the natures posterior to it subsisting intellectually. According to this reasoning, therefore, the first intellectual Gods are also intelligible ; and we do not, deriving these things from a foreign source, ascribe them to Plato, but they are as- serted by us in consequence of receiving auxiliaries from him. This, however, will be more manifest through what follows.
In the next place, therefore, we shall discuss the manner in which the Gods who illuminate the breadth of imparticipable life proceed from the intelligible Gods. Since then the intelligible Gods establish in themselves
uniformly things multiplied, occultly such as are divided, and according to a certain admirable transcendency of simplicity, the various genera of beings, — hence the first intellectual Gods,1 unfolding their indistinct union, and the unknown nature of their hypostasis, and being filled through intelligible power and essential life with the prolific abun- dance of wholes, are allotted a kingdom which ranks as the second after them. And they always indeed produce, perfect, and connect them- selves, but receive from the intelligible Gods an occult generation ; from intelligible power indeed, receiving a peculiarity generative of all things ; but from intelligible life which preexists according to cause in the intelli- gible, receiving the nature which is spread under them. For life is pri- marily indeed in intelligibles ; but secondarily in intelligibles and intel- lectuals ; and in a third degree in intellectuals; existing indeed according to cause in the first, but according to essence in the second, and according to participation in the last of these. The first intellectual, therefore, pro- ceed from the intelligible Gods, multiplying indeed their union, and their unical powers, unfolding their occult hyparxis, and through prolific, con- nective, and perfective causes assimilating themselves to the essential, en- tire, and all-perfect transcendencies of intelligibles. For in intelligibles there were three primarily effective powers ; one indeed constituting the essence of wholes ; another measuring things which are multiplied ; and another being productive of the forms of all generated natures.