Socrates therefore, in the Philebus, affords us such like auxiliaries to the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however, not only to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the theology of Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore, what is written in the Timaeus, and shall follow our leader [Syrianus^ who has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion, in the Timaeus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of alt intelligible ani- mals, that it is all-perfect, that it is the most beautiful of intelligible*, that it is only-begotten, and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He likewise denominates it animal itself, as being the intelligible paradigm of every am mal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is ne*. cessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and the most beau- tiful of intelligibles, should be established m the intelligible orders. For though there is intelligible animal m the demiurgus, yet it is rather intel- lectual than intelligible, and is not the most beautiful of all intelligibles, but is second to them in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in the intelligible Gods. In the demiurgus also, there are not only four forms of the things contained in the world, but there is all the multitude of forms. For in him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But animal itself is totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad. The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among be- ings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which in- telligible animal is effective and at the same time generative, of these the demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided manner, in conjunction with
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the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal itself is exempt from the de- mi urgus, and is, asTimseus every where denominates it, intelligible.
Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being,1 is all-perfect. For the former is beyond all separation ; but the latter generates indeed, and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings. If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all- perfect multitude ? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the third triad of intelligibles, as wa9 a little before demonstrated, but animal itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible ani- mals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be established accord- ing to this order. For either there will not be an intelligible paradigm, (and in this case, how will sensibles be images of intelligibles? or how will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things >) or tf there is, it is the third in intelligibles. For the natures which are prior to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect ; since they are exempt from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not only-begotten. For they proceed together with others ; the male indeed, with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those that are of a generative characteristic Nor are they the roost beautiful of intelligibles ; for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all- perfect, and at the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings therefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal itself is eternal, as Timeeus himself says. For says he, "the nature of animal is eternal." And again, in another place he asserts, " that the paradigm is through all eternity being." If therefore it is eternal, it par- ticipates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eter- nity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whole power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately
' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life. Proc. Vol. I. $ A
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186 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged proximately after them.
Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which, time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately partici- pates of time (for time was generated together with the uiyverse) it is certainly necessary that animal itself should primarily participate of eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the first paradigm. For eternity indeed measures the existence of animal itself : but animal itself is mea- sured and filled with perpetuity from it. To which may bemadded, that we assert eternity to be the cause of immortality to all things. Hence eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is pri- marily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily inunortal. The daemo- niacal Aristotle also rightly- calls eternity immortal and divine, and that from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If how- ever it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to partici- pation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, pos- sessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of per- petuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapt- ed to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with life. Hence Socrates in the Phredo," after many and beautiful demon- strations of the psychical immortality, says, " God therefore, my dear Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal." Hence, in- telligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily pos- sess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But
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Chap. Xvi. of Plato. 187
this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will be established in the middle of the intelligible order.
Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of these thiee things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or ac- cording to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of this kind, much more must this be the case with intelligible essence and that which is primarily being. For they are nothing eke than essence only. But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being therefore, as we have said, is at one and tlie same time exempt from motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timeeus abides in one. Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency of eternity. Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that which is primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.' For neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And in short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where esta- blished above that which participates. But the eternal participates of eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time. Eternity therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being ; so that it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as ani- mal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that which is always being. For as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellection, and measures the essences, powers and energies of all things.
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Stock, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of in- teliigibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first of intclligibles, and how is it denominated by Timaeus? He says there- lore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds according to number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity, but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say that it is the imparticipable one, how is it possible that any thing can abide in that which is exempt from all things; and which neither admits the habitude nor communion Of secondary natures with itself? For every thing which abides in any thing, is in a certain respect on all sides comprehended by that in which we say it abides. It is however perfectly impossible that the first one should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings. But if any one should suppose that it is the one of eternity, in which Timaeus says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary however, that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior to, is better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures. If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is infe- rior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to Timaeus, it is established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the whole
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Chap. Xviii. of Plato. Iqq
of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their principle.
Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our view, according to the doctrine of Timaeus, viz. animal itself, eternity, and the oue. And through this one, and the firm establishment in it, eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through eternity, animal itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a per- petual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having pro- ceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity is tlu ever in conjunction with being. But the duad in eternity participates of the intelligible monad, which Timams on this account denominates one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence of its being especially characterized according to bound, denominating it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, con- necting the names ; because this triad is defined according to intelligible jiower. And lie denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring the appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first triad therefore is the union ofull the intelligibles, being in a certain respect coordinated with them. For the union is different from this which is ex- empt from intelligibles and im participate. It is also the supplier of stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eter- nity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence, with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the
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