But again in the Phaedrus, Plato celebrates the supcrcclcstial place, the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake of amatory mania : the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes place, and the passage to these from hence. But every where, as I may say, the leading end is either physical or political, while the conceptions about divine natures take place, either for the sake of invention or per- fection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and supernatural* and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is.precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is violent and not sppntaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an ad- ventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the objections which may be urged against our design.
• For fuAtam, k U aetmrj to read, ra nhnm*.
Oh the Theology
UOOK I.
I, hoveteb, to an objection of this kind, shall make a just and per- spicuous reply. I say then, that Plato every where discourses about the Gods agreeably to ancient rumour, and to the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles of the dogmas ; and thence, as from a watch. tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But some- times he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of beauty pervading from thence through all things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory order.
But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the all-per- fect, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the com pleat number of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed in- order from the first cause, and evince their mutual connexion and de- pendence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, connate with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unica), occult and simple form of hyparxis ; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distri- buted into many parts, and are exuberant in number, but inferior in power to such as are of a higher order ; and such as are middle, accord- ing to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their.proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms of the theologic science, appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is no- thing else than the. celebraled; generation of the Gods and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes. The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before men- tioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods,
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CHAP. VIII.
and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is ne- cessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogue*, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timacus, they are interpreters, Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us ; and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides ; just as the* Timams is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent, to' contain the whole science about nature.
I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a two- fold contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato ; and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable than these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellec- tual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings. For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present discourse.
These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner. But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore
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12 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis* treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple and indivisible. Against both these therefore, must be contend, who entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before men* tioned. The contest however against these is not equal. But those who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those, who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do upt, unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are in- deed, as Homer says, is every respect venerable and skilful menj but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we must doubt against them,' following in this our leader to the most holy and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what ap- pears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides \ for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole the- ology of Plato.
, Ijr the first place then, let us consider those, who draw down the design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato. It is therefore evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to himself to deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he curso- rily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion, and permanency, &c. ; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to discover the nature of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise, as to a great contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy undertaking to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates him- self to the Ibycean horse, and presents us with every argument to prove that this method is a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in
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Chap. Ix. Op Plato. S3
mere words. How therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty arguments those conceptions ' about which the great Parmenides, evin- cing that they require much serious discussion, composed this discourse ? How likewise is it reasonable to suppose that an aged man would busy himself with mere verbal contests, and that he who loved to speculate the truth of things, would bestow so much study on this method,— he who considered every thing else, as having no real existence, and who ascended to the high watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who ad- mits this must suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this dia- logue, by thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from the most intellectual visions of the soul.
But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what ***rmenidei ^ onuses, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered on thb discussiOw- Wp., it potthen about being according to his doc- trine, and the unity of all beiugsTtj WlUtliwwiondjnp; himself, his design was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to conSP^ipPMfc tude of beings into one undivided union ? If, therefore, this is the one being, or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly established above the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd to confound dogmas about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? Tor indeed, such a form of discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor does the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonise with dialectic exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only, but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts us to make our investigations, ueitber about things perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as are more known.
It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those who rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge to an intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious, various, and unstable ; or that he- should speculate true being with this doxastie
■ For nurrcXoi, it if uecxttuj to read rr<0»A«f.
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ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
wisdom, and inane discussion. For a varioiw fnrm ~f i , ,
not harmonise' with th*r *,hi,h " • ?^ rf knofW8« docs
., ,a\ Umt whlch *« simple, nor the multiform with t)„ un.fonn, nor the doxastic with the intelligible lth
But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such » mnA ^ course i, perfectly foreign from the discussion of discourses about all beings and deliver, the order of *ZT\u
Does it not therefore appear, *a Plato nZ £ Z ant hypothesis to Parme^es, if it ^ 8aTd th^ L^"^ * dUcorf- exercise through opposite arguments, and tha^ tLTkl of T* ^ employed in this exercise, he excites the- whole of ^ evil IT"
attributes hypotheses to each of the pWIosonhenLaL**^ bar tenets. Thus to TW»* _ jg}LL^flVnio their pecu- Sf^T-atp^diMtf ^^^^p^^P^ffffT^TiTthp. doctrine about nature ; to Republic; to the Elean guest, that about being ; and to the priestess Diotiraa, that respecting love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogues confines itself to those arguments which are adapted to the writings of the principal person of the dialogue. But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his poems, and in his diligent investiga- tion of true being, but in the Platonic scene, he will be the leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion, therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude of imitation, though he himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the sons of the Gods a love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of the passions. How, therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and empty arguments to the leader of the truth of beings ?
But if it be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we should make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will cite if you please what is written in the Thcaetetus and Sophista ; for from these dialogues what we assert will be apparent In the Tbesetetus then Socrates being excited by a young man to a confutation of those who assert that being is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion of this kind
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entertained by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns the cause. " I blush," says he, " for Parmeoides, who is one of these, more than for all the rest ; for I, when very young, was conversant with him when ■he was very elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profun- dity perfectly generous. 1 am afraid therefore, lest we do not under- stand what, has been asserted, and much more am I fearful that we fall short of the meaning of Parmenides." With great propriety therefore do we assert, that the proposed discussion does not regard a logical exer- cise, and make this the end of the whole, but that it pertains to the science of the first principles of things. For how could Socrates using a power of this kind, and neglecting the knowledge of things, testify that the discourse of Parmenides possessed a depth perfectly generous P And what venerableness can there be in adopting a method which proceeds doxastically through opposite reasons, and in undertaking such an inven- tion of arguments ?