But let providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a subsist¬ ence for itself alone. There will not follow, the un- envying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assi¬ duous. There will follow and not follow, the unsclicitous, and the undisturbed. For in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energize, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secon¬ dary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things ; for this in a certain respect is possible and not possible. For if it should be said, that through a transcendency exempt from
all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hin¬ ders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures ; but yet, considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their nature, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner. There will not follow, an allot¬ ment with respect to one thing, a distribution according to desert, and a subsistence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good. For so far as they are beings, they must necessarily be good ; and yet, providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence they possess good. But to other things with respect to providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being uncoordinated with respect to it. There will not follow', the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow' and not follow, the being ig¬ norant of it. For it is necessary they should know' that it is not, if it is not ; and it is also necessary they should not know it ; for there is nothing comnion to them with respect to providence?
In the next place, let it be proposed to consider the
consequences of admitting or denying the perpetual ex¬
istence of soul.
If then soul always is, the consequences to itself with respect to itself, are, the self-motive, the self-vital, and the self-sub sistent. But the things which do not follow to itself with respect to itself, are, the destruction of itself, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itself. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the impartible and the partible, (for in a certain respect it is partible, and in a certain respect impartible), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being. For so far as it communi¬ cates with intellect, it is eternal ; but so far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.
Again, if soul is, the consequences to itself with respect to other things, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is present with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. That which does not follow, is to move externally. For it is the property of animated bodies to be moved inwardly ; and to be the cause of rest and immutability to bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are to be present with bodies, and yet to be present Sepa¬ rate from them. For soul is present with them by its providential energies, but is exempt from them by its essence, because this is incorporeal. And this is the first hex ad.
\ , . L . τ " . r
The second hexad is as follows : If soul is, the conse-
queue® to other things, i. e. bodies, with respect to them¬ selves, is sympathy ; for according to a vivific cause, bodies sympathize with each other. But that which does not follow, is the non-sensitive. For in consequence of there being such a thing as soul, all things must necessa¬ rily be sensitive ; some things peculiarly so, and others as parts of the whole. The consequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with respect to themselves are, that in a certain respect they move themselves, through being animated, and in a certain respect do not move themselves ; for there are many modes of selFmotion.
Again, if soul is, the consequences to bodies with respect to soul, are, to be moved internally and vivified by soul, to be preserved and connected through it, and to be entirely suspended from it. The consequences which do not follow are, to be dissipated by soul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life ; for bodies receive from soul, life and connection. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of soul. For so far as soul is present with bodies, so far they may be said to participate of soul ; but so far as it is separate from them, so far they do not participate of soul. And this forms the second hexad.
The third hexad is as follows : If soul is not, the con¬ sequences to itself with respect to itself are, the non-vital,
the unessential, and the non-intellectual ; for not having any subsistence, it has neither essence, * nor life, nor intellect. The consequences which do not follow are, the ability to preserve itself, to give subsistence to, and be motive of itself, with every thing else of this kind. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a subsistence, it is in a certain respect unknown and irrational with respect to itself, as neither reasoning nor having any knowledge of itself ; but in another respect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is considered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.
.Again, if soul is not, the consequences which follow to itself with respect to bodies are, to be unprolific of them, to be unmingled with, and to employ no providential energies about them. The consequences which do not follow are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not communicate with them. For this in a certain respect is true, and not true, if that which is not soul is considered as having in->
* i. e. Not being soul, it has not the essence of soul; but this does not prevent it from being something else. For the hypo¬ thesis is, if soul is not, which is equivalent to th§ assertion that if a thing is not soul, it is something else.
deed a being, but unconnected with soul. For thus it is different from bodies, since these are perpetually connect¬ ed with soul : and again, it is not different from bodies, so far as it has no subsistence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.
In the fourth place then, if soul is not, the consequen¬ ces to bodies with respect to themselves are, the immove¬ able, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of sympathy with each other. The consequences which do not follow are, a sensible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themselves. That which follows and does not follow is, to be passive to each other. For in one respect they would be passive, and in another not ; since they would be alone corporeally and not vitally passive.
Again, if soul is not, the consequences to other things with respect to it are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by soul. The consequences which do not follow are, to be vivified and connected by souh The con¬ sequences which follow and do not follow are, to be assimilated and not assimilated to soul. For so far a§ soul having no subsistence, neither will bodies subsist, so far they will be assimilated to soul ; for they will suffer the same with it; but so far as it is impossible for that which is not to be similar to any thing, so far bodies
will have no similitude to soul. And this forms the fourth and last hexad.
Hence we conclude, that soul is the cause of life,
sympathy and motion to bodies ; and in short, of their
being and preservation. For soul subsisting, these are
at the same time introduced ; but not subsisting, they are
at the same time taken away.
P. 191. Note. Hence there is something even beyond the one*-*—' The most sublime of the arcane dogmas of the Platonic Theology is this, that the ineffable principle of things is some thing even beyond the one , as is demonstrated by Proclus in his second book On the Theology of Plato, and particularly by Datnascius in bis MS. treatise περί αρχών, On Principles. See my translation of the former of these works, and of an extract from the latter in the Additional Notes at the end of the third Volume of my Plato, and in my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle. From this extract, the following observations are selected. “ The one is not the one as that which is smallest, but it is the one as all things. For by its own simplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so the one is many prior to the many »
All things, therefore, are from the one , and with reference to the one , as we are accustomed to say. If then accord¬ ing to a more usual manner of speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation all things , we must admit that the united , and in a still greater degree the one , are the principles of these. But if we consider these two as all things, and assume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and co-ordina¬ tion with them, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to consider in any way as all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that the one, though it is all things which have in any respect a subsistence, yet is one prior to all things , and is more one than all things ; since it is one by itself, but all things as the cause of all, and according to a co-ordination with all things ; — if this should be said, the one will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For, by being the one it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle pf all things should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it should be exempt from the most simple allness r and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of the one. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the prin¬ ciple which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither,
therefore, must it be called principle nor cause, nor that which is first nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, or recalled into memory. We may also add, that the one is the summit of the many, as the cause of the things proceeding from it : and that we form a conception of the one according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most vene¬ rable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all concep- \