1 i. e. As things perfectly indivisible.
VIII. What, then, is this nature, which is said
to be one, continued, and void of quality ? And,
indeed, that it is not a body if void of quality, is
evident ; 1 for if it were, it would have quality.
1 Though from the arguments adduced here by Plotinus, it appears to be impossible that the first matter should be body void of quality, yet I think there will not be any absurdity in admitting with Simplicius, that body is twofold, one kind as subsisting according to form and productive power, and de¬ fined by certain intervals ; but another as characterized by intensions and remissions, and an indefiniteness of an incorpo¬ real, impartible, and intelligible nature; this not being form¬ ally defined by three intervals, but entirely remitted and dissi¬ pated, and on all sides flowing from being into non-being. “ Such an interval as this, we must perhaps,” (says Simplicius) %t admit matter to be, and not corporeal form, which now measures and bounds the infinite and indefinite nature of such an interval as this, and which stops it in its flight from being* Matter, however, is that by which material things differ from such as are immaterial. But they differ by bulk, interval, division, and things of this kind, and not by things which are defined according to measure, but by things void of measure and indefinite, and which are capable of being bounded by formal measures. The Pythagoreans appear to have been the first of the Greeks that had this suspicion concerning matter ; but after them Plato, as Moderatus also informs us. For he, conformably to the Pythagoreans, evinced that the first one is above being, and all essence ; but he says, that forms are the second one, which is true being and the intelligible ; and that the third one, which is psychical, or belonging to soul, parti¬ cipates of the one , and of forms. He adds, that the last nature
But we say that it is the matter of all sensibles,
and that it is not the matter of some, but the form
of others ; as clay is matter to the potter, but is
not simply matter. We do not, therefore, speak of
it in this way, but with reference to ail things ; and
this being the case, we must not attribute to the
from this, and which is the nature of sensibles, does not parti¬ cipate them, but is adorned according to a representation of them, matter which is in them being the shadow of the non- being, which is primarily in quantity, or rather depending on and proceeding from it. According to this reasoning, there¬ fore, matter is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to non-being.
Those things, indeed, which are the properties of sensibks are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into generation, viz, into matter; for matter is always truly the last sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life, which they symbolically deno¬ minate water, matter, being as it were a certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state or condition of subsistence ; just as the impartible, the immate¬ rial, true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an intelligible nature ; all forms, indeed, subsisting both here and there, but here materially, and there immaterially ; viz. there impartibly and truly, but here partibly awd shadowy. Hence, every form is here distributed according to material interval.” See more on this subject in the notes to Book I. of my translation of Aristotle's Physics.
nature of it any thing which is perceived among
sensibles. Hence, besides not granting to it other
qualities, such as colour, heat and cold, we must
ascribe to it neither levity or gravity, neither den-
sity or rarity, or figure ; and therefore, neither
must we ascribe to it magnitude. For magnitude
itself is one thing, and to be great another. And
figure itself is one thing, and that which is figured
another. It is necessary, however, that it should
not be a composite; but simple, and one certain
thing in its own nature. For thus it will be desti¬
tute of all things. And he who imparts morphe to
it, will impart morphe as something different from
matter. He will also profer, as it were, magnitude
and all things from the things which exist ; for
otherwise, he would be subservient to the magni¬
tude of matter, and his production would not pos¬
sess the quantity which he wished it should, but
that which matter is capable of receiving. To
assert, however, that the will of the artificer con¬
curs with the magnitude of matter, is fictitious.
But if the maker is prior to matter, in this case-
matter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it
to be, and will with facility be brought to all things,
and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it has
magnitude, it is also necessary that it should have
figure, so that it will be still more difficult to be
fashioned by the artificer. Form, therefore, enters
matter, bringing all things with it. But every form
possesses magnitude, and the quantity which it
contains is accompanied with reason [i. e. with a
productive principle] and subsists under this.
Hence, in every genus of things, quantity is defined
together with form. For there is one magnitude
of a man, and another of a bird. And it would be
absurd to suppose, that the introduction of quantity
to the matter of a certain bird, is any thing else
than adding to it its proper quality. Nor must it
be said that quality is a productive principle, but
that quantity is not form, since it is both measure
and number.
IX. How then can any thing w hich ranks among
beings be apprehended, which has no magnitude ?
Perhaps every thing which is not the same with a
certain quantity. For being and a certain quantity
are not the same ; since there are many other
things besides a definite quantity. And, in short,
it must be admitted that every incorporeal nature
is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal ;
since quantity itself is not a quantum, [or a certain
quantity] but that is a quantum which participates
of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that
quantity is form. As, therefore, a certain white
thing is produced by the presence of whiteness ;
but that which produces a white colour in an
animal, and other various colours, is not a various
colour, but a various productive principle ; thus
also, that which produces a definite quantity, is not
a definite quantity, but a quantum itself, or quan¬
tity itself, or a productive principle. Does quan¬
tity, therefore, acceding, evolve matter into magni*
tude ? By no means. For it was not contracted
into a small space ; but it imparts magnitude
which prior to this was not, in the same manner as
it imparts quality which had not a prior existence*
X. What, therefore, is that which is void of
magnitude in matter ? What, also, do you conceive
that to be which is in a certain way void of quality ?
And what is the intellection and the perception of
it by the reasoning power ? Shall we say it is inde¬
finiteness ? For if the similar is perceived by the
similar, the indefinitaalso will be apprehended by
the indefinite. Reason, therefore, will become
bounded about the indefinite ; but the intuition of
it will be indefinite. If, however, every thing is
known by reason and intelligence, but here, reason
indeed says what it is requisite to say about it, and
wishing to become intelligence, is not intelligence,
but, as it were, a privation of intellect, — if this be
the case, the phantasm of matter will rather be
spurious, and not genuine, being composed of an
imagination which is not true, and another kind of
reason. And perhaps Plato, looking to this, says,
[in the Timasus] that matter is apprehended by a
spurious reasoning. What, therefore, is the inde¬
finiteness of the soul ? Is it an all-perfect ignorance,
such as the absence [of knowledge ?] Or does the
indefinite consist in a certain negation 1 in conjunc¬
tion with a certain affirmation ; and is it like dark¬
ness to the eye, obscurity being the matter of every
invisible colour? Thus, therefore, the soul also,
taking away whatever in sensibles resembles light,
and not being able to bound what remains, is simi¬
lar to the eye placed in darkness, and then becomes
1 In the original η εν καταψασα. tivl , but it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read, -η er αποφασει σνν KaTatyaaet nyi . This emendation the sense also requires and is adopted in the above translation.
in a certain respect the same with that which, as it
were, it sees. Does it therefore see ? Perhaps it
sees matter as something deformed, and as void of
colour, and void of light ; and besides this, as not
having magnitude, since if it had, it would be in-
vested with form. When, therefore, the soul un¬
derstands nothing, is she not affected in the same
manner as when she sees matter ? By no means.
For when she understands nothing, she says no-
thing, or rather, she suffers nothing. But when
she beholds matter, she suffers such a passion as
when she receives the resemblance of that which is
formless ; since also when she understands things
that have figure and magnitude, she understands
them as composites. For she understands them as
things diversified, and in short as possessing quali¬
ties. Hence, she understands the whole, and at
the same time both, and her intellection or sensa¬
tion of the inherent properties is clear and manifest
But her perception of a formless subject is ob¬
scure ; for it is not form. When, therefore, in the
whole and composite, she receives the subject to¬
gether with its inherent properties, and analyze®
and separates them, then she understands obscurely
that which reason leaves, darkly that which is dark.
and sees intellectually, not understanding. And
since matter itself does not remain formless, but in
[sensible] things is invested with form, the soul
-also immediately impresses it with the form of
things, being pained with the indefinite, as if afraid
of being placed out of the order of beings, and not
enduring to stop any longer at nonentity.
XT. But why is it requisite there should be
something else besides magnitude and all qualities,
to the composition of bodies ? Or is it not neces-
sary there should be that which is the recipient of
all things ? It will not therefore be bulk. For if
it were bulk, it would also be magnitude. But if
it is without magnitude, it will not have a place
where it may receive [all other things.] For being
void of magnitude, what advantage would it derive
from place, if it neither contributes to form and
quality, nor to interval and magnitude ? the two
latter of which appear to be derived to bodies from
matter, wherever it may be. In short, as actions
and productions, times and motions, though they
have no substratum of matter in them, yet rank
among beings ; thus, also, neither is it necessary
that the first bodies should have a matter [which is
without magnitude], but that, each of them should
be wholly that which it is, being more various by
the mixture with things that have their composition
from many forms. So that this matter which is
without magnitude, is a vain name. In the first
place, therefore, it is not necessary that whatever
receives any thing should have bulk, if magnitude
is not now present with it ; since soul, likewise,
which receives all things, has all things at once·
But if it happened to have magnitude, it would
possess every thing that it contains, in magnitude.
Matter, however, on this account, receives the
things which it receives, in interval, because it is
the recipient of interval ; just as animals and plants,
while they are extended with magnitude, receive at
the same time the production of quality ; and
quantity being contracted, quality also is contracted.
If, however, because a certain magnitude pre-exists
in things of this kind, as a subject to the formator,
some one should also require this in matter, he will
not conceive rightly. For in the formation of
these, not matter simply considered, is employed,
but matter of a certain kind. But it is necessary
that matter simply considered, should possess mag¬
nitude from something else. Hence, it is not
Plot. D
necessary that the recipient of form should be bulk,
but that at the same time it becomes bulk, it should
receive another quality ; and that it should have
indeed the phantasm of bulk, because, as being the
first matter, it is an aptitude to the reception of it.
It is, however, a void bulk ; and hence some assert
that matter and a vacuum are the same. For the
soul having nothing which it can bound, when it
associates with matter, diffuses itself into the inde¬
finite, neither circumscribing it, nor being able to
arrive at any fixed point [of survey ;] since other¬
wise it would define it. Hence, neither is it to be
separately called great, nor again small ; but it
must be denominated both small and great. And
thus it is bulk, and thus is without magnitude, be¬
cause it is the matter of bulk. Being also con¬
tracted from the great to the small, and extended
from the small to the great, it runs as it were
through bulk. The indefiniteness of it, likewise, is
a bulk of this kind, being the receptacle of magni¬
tude in itself ; but in imagination in the way before
explained. For with respect to such other things
without magnitude as are forms, each of them is
definite ; so that they bring with them no coficep-
tion whatever of bulk. But matter being indefinite,
and never at rest 1 with itself, and being borne
along to every form, in every direction, and easily
led every where, becomes multitudinous by its
generation and transition to all things. And after