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The Enneads — Plotinus (trans. Stephen MacKenna, 1917–1930)

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The passage held in the archive
This is the life of the gods and of godlike and blessed men, a liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, a flight of the alone to the Alone.Enneads VI.9.11, trans. Stephen MacKenna

Well, in hearing magnitude is known incidentally ; but how ? Touch conveys a direct impression of a visible object ; what gives us the same direct impression of an object of hearing ?

The magnitude of a sound is known not by actual quantity but by degree of impact, by intensity — and this in no indirect knowledge ; the ear appreciates a certain degree of force, exactly as the palate perceives by no indirect knowledge, a certain degree of sweetness. But the true magnitude of a sound is its extension ; this the hearing may define to itself incidentally by deduction from the degree of intensity but not to the point of precision. The intensity is merely the definite effect at a particular spot ; the magnitude is a matter of totality, the sum of space occupied.

Still (it will be objected) the colours seen from a distance are faint ; but they are not small as the masses are.

True ; but there is the common fact of diminution. There is colour with its diminution, faintness ; there is magnitude with its diminution, smallness ; and magnitude follows colour diminishing stage by stage with it.

But, the phenomenon is more easily explained by the example of things of wide variety. Take mountains dotted with houses, woods and other land-marks ; the observation of each detail gives us the means of calculating, by the single objects noted, the total extent covered : but, where no such detail of form reaches us, our vision, which deals with detail, has not the means towards the knowledge of the whole by measurement of any one clearly discerned magnitude. This applies even to objects of vision close at hand : where there is variety and the eye sweeps over all at one glance so that the forms are not all caught, the total appears the less in proportion to the detail which has escaped the eye ; observe each single point and then you can estimate the volume precisely. Again, magnitudes of one colour and unbroken form trick the sense of quantity ; the vision can no longer estimate by the particular ; it slips away, not finding the stand-by of the difference between part and part.

It was the detail that prevented a near object deceiving our sense of magnitude : in the case of the distant object, because the eye does not pass stage by stage through the stretch of intervening space so as to note its forms, therefore it cannot report the magnitude of that space.

The explanation by lesser angle of vision has been elsewhere dis- missed ; one point, however, we may urge here.

Those attributing the reduced appearance to the lesser angle occupied allow by their very theory that the imoccupied portion of the eye still sees something beyond or something quite apart from the object of vision, if only air-space.

Now consider some very large object of vision, that mountain for example. No part of the eye is unoccupied ; the mountain adequately fills it so that it can take in nothing beyond, for the mountain as seen either corresponds exactly to the eye-space or stretches away out of range to right and to left. How does the explanation by lesser angle of vision hold good in this case, where the object still appears smaller, far, than it is and yet occupies the eye entire ?

Ii. 9.1]

t f

Or look up to the sky and no hesitation can remain. Of course we cannot take in the entire hemisphere at one glance ; the eye directed to it could not cover so vast an expanse. But suppose the possibility : the entire eye, then, embraces the hemisphere entire ; but the expanse of the heavens is far greater than it appears ; how can its appearing far less than it is be explained by a lessening of the angle of vision ?

Against Those that Affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and

THE Kosmos Itself to be Evil : [Generally Quoted as

“Against the Gnostics”]

We have seen elsewhere that the Good, the Principle, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal— for the secondary can never be simplex — that it contains nothing : that it is an integral Unity.

Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One. Just as the goodness of The Good is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential.

Therefore ; —

When we speak of The One and when we speak of The Good we must recognise an Identical Nature ; we must affirm that they are the same — not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that (un- knowable) Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find.

Even in calling it The First we mean no more than to express that it is the most absolutely simplex : it is the Self-Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent ; it is “ the Self-Contained ” because everything contained in something alien must also exist by that alien.

Deriving then, from nothing alien, entering into nothing alien, in no way a made-up thing, there can be nothing above it.

We need not, then, go seeking any other Principles ; this — the One and the Good — is our First, next to it follows the Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinker, and upon this follows Soul. Such is the order in nature. The Intellectual Realm allows no more than these and no fewer.

Those who hold to fewer Principles must hold the identity of either Intellectual-Principle and Soul or of Intellectual-Principle and The First ; but we have abundantly shown that these are distinct.

It remains for us to consider whether there are more than these Three.

Now what other (Divine) Kinds could there be ? No Principles of the universe could be found at once simpler and more transcendent than this whose existence we have affirmed and described.

They will scarcely urge upon us the doubling of the Principle in Act by a Principle in Potentiality. It is absurd to seek such a plurahty by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality in the case of im- material beings whose existence is in Act — even in lower forms no such division can be made — and we cannot conceive a duality in the Intellec- tual-Principle, one phase in some vague calm, another all astir. Under what form can we think of repose in the Intellectual Principle as con- trasted with its movement or utterance ? What would the quiescence of the one phase be as against the energy of the other ?

No : the Intellectual-Principle is continuously itself, unchangeably constituted in stable Act. With movement — towards it or within it — we are in the realm of the Soul’s operation : such act is a Reason-Principle emanating from it and entering into Soul, thus made an Intellectual Soul, but in no sense creating an intermediate Principle to stand between the two.

Nor are we warranted in affirming a plurality of Intellectual Prin- ciples on the ground that there is one that knows and thinks and another knowing that it knows and thinks. For whatever distinction be possible in the Divine between its Intellectual Act and its Consciousness of that Act, still all must be one projection not imaware of its own operation : it would be absurd to imagine any such unconsciousness in the Authentic Intelligence ; the knowing principle must be one and the selfsame with that which knows of the knowing.

Ii. 9. 2]

The contrary supposition would give us two beings, one that merely knows, and another — a separate being — that knows of the act of knowing.

If we are answered that the distinction is merely a process of our thought, then, at once, the theory of a plurality in the Divine Hypostasis is abandoned : further, the question is opened whether our thought can entertain a knowing principle so narrowed to its knowing as not to know that it knows — a limitation which would be charged as imbecility even in ourselves, who if but of very ordinary moral force are always master of our emotions and mental processes.

No : The Divine Mind in its mentation thinks itself ; the object of the thought is nothing external : Thinker and Thought are one ; there- fore in its thinking and knowing it possesses itself, observes itself and sees itself not as something unconscious but as knowing : in this Primal Knowing it must include, as one and the same Act, the knowledge of the knowing ; and even the logical distinction mentioned above cannot be made in the case of the Divine ; the very eternity of its self-thinking precludes any such separation between that intellective act and the consciousness of the act.

The absurdity becomes still more blatant if we introduce yet a further distinction — after that which affirms the knowledge of the know- ing, a third distinction affirming the knowing of the knowledge of the knowing : yet there is no reason against carrying on the division for ever and ever.

To increase the Primals by making the Supreme Mind engender the Reason-Principle, and this again engender in the Soul a distinct power to act as mediator between Soul and the Supreme Mind, this is to deny intellection to the Soul, which would no longer derive its Reason from the Intellectual-Principle but from an intermediate : the Soul then would possess not the Reason-Principle but an image of it : the Soul could not know the Intellectual-Principle ; it could have no intellection.

Therefore we must affirm no more than these three Primals : we are not to introduce superfluous distinctions which their nature rejects.

We are to proclaim one Intellectual-Principle unchangeably the same, in no way subject to decline, acting in imitation, as true as its nature allows, of the Father.

And as to our own Soul we are to hold that it stands, in part, always in the presence of The Divine Beings, while in part it is con- cerned with the things of this sphere and in part occupies a middle ground. It is one nature in graded powers ; and sometimes the Soul in its entirety is borne along by the loftiest in itself and in the Authentic Existent ; sometimes, the less noble part is dragged down and drags the mid-soul with it, though the law is that the Soul may never succumb entire.

The Soul’s disaster falls upon it when it ceases to dwell in the perfect Beauty — the appropriate dwelhng-place of that Soul which is no part and of which we too are no part — thence to pour forth into the frame of the All whatsoever the All can hold of good and beauty. There that Soul rests, free from all solicitude, not ruling by plan or policy, not redressing, but establishing order by the marvellous efficacy of its con- templation of the things above it.

For the measure of its absorption in that vision is the measure of its grace and power, and what it draws from this contemplation it com- municates to the lower sphere, illuminated and illuminating always.

Ever illuminated, receiving light unfailing, the All-Soul imparts it to the entire series of later Being which by this light is sustained and fostered and endowed with the fullest measure of life that each can absorb. It may be compared with a central fire warming every receptive body within range.

Our fire, however, is a thing of limited scope : given powers that have no limitation and are never cut off from the Authentic Existences, how imagine anything existing and yet failing to receive from them ?

It is of the essence of things that each gives of its being to another : without this communication. The Good would not be Good, nor the Intellectual- Principle an Intellective Principle, nor would Soul itself be what it is : the law is, “ some life after the Primal Life, a second where

Ii 9-4] “Against the Gnostics” 219

there is a first ; all linked in one unbroken chain ; all eternal ; divergent types being engendered only in the sense of being secondary.”

In other words, things commonly described as generated have never known a beginning : all has been and will be. Nor can anything dis- appear unless where a later form is possible : without such a future there can be no dissolution.

If we are told that there is always Matter as a possible term, we ask why then should not Matter itself come to nothingness. If we are told it may, then we ask why it should ever have been generated. If the answer comes that it had its necessary place as the ultimate of the series, we return that the necessity still holds.