Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks. — Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Baud- dha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts con- stituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhi^valana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously2. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelli- gent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account ; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active3. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i. e. the alayavi^ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not dif- ferent from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins ; or non-permanent ;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms 4.

1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshamkatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.

2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.

3 In consequence of which no release could take place.

4 The Brahmavidyabhara/za explains the last clause— from ksha- mkatva^ fa — somewhat differently: Api ka. paramawunam api kshamkatvabhyupagam&n melanazra na sambhavati, paramawunaw melana#z parama/mkriyadhinam, tatha kz. svakriyaw prati parama- numm kara/zatvat kriyapurvaksharce paramazmbhir bhavyam, kriyst

D d 2

404 VED ANT A-StJ TR AS.

(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than
before.) — For all these reasons the formation of aggregates
cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there
would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which
presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates
may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing
in the relation of mutual causality ; we say ' No/
because they merely are the efficient causes of the
origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality1 of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol- lowing members : Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like2. All these terms con-

jrayataya kriyaksha?ze*pi tesham avasthanam apekshitam evam melanakshane*pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa prav/7'ttir upapadyate, tatM ka sthiraparama^usadhyd melanarupa pmvrzttiA kathazrc tesham ksha^ikatve bhavet. — Ananda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.

1 The kdra^atvdt of *Sankara explains the pratyayatvat of the Sutra ; karyaw praty ayate ^anakatvena gaM/$ati.

2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series. — The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyabhara^a : Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sa^skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c, and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge (vi^Tzana) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^dnasya vn'ttilabha^) springing up in the embryo. — Name and form is the rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo. — The

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 1 9. 405

stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water- wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre- gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown — when examining the Vaii-eshika doctrine — that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in

abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. — Touch (sparja) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part. — Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. — Desire (trzsh/za) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. — Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. — Birth is the passing out from the uterus.— Species (g&ti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs. — Decay (gzri). — Death (mara/zam) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumursha). — Grief (joka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith. — Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac- count.— Pain (du/^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. — Durmanas is mental affliction. — The ' and the like ' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

406 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

which the adrzsh/a abides1 ; how much less then are aggre- gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the adrzsh/a). — Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate. — But how — we ask — can they be the cause of that without which — as their abode — they themselves are not capable of exist- ence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions ; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man ; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system. — Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is. according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else ; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself

1 Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain : A.rraya\n*ayibhuteshv iti bhoktr/vijesha^am adr/sh/a^rayeshv ity artha^. — The Brahma- vidyabhara^a says : Nityeshv ajraya^rayibhuteshv a^ushv abhyupa- gamyamaneshu bhoktrzshu ka, satsv ity anvaya^. Ajraystarayibhu- teshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha^. — And with regard to the subsequent ajrayairayifunyeshu : asraylsrayitvaju- nyeshu, ayaw bhava^, sthireshu parama^ushu yadanvaye parama- nunam sa;;2ghatapatti^ yadvyatireke k& na tad upakarakam upakar- ya^ paramaTzava/fc yena tatkrz'to bhoga^ prarthyate sa tatra karteti grahituw jakyate, kshamkeshu tu paramawushu anvayavyatireka- grahasyanekaksha^asadhyasyasawbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayituw ^akya^. — Ananda Giri remarks on the latter : Adrt- sh/ajrayakartrzrahityam aha\srayeti. Another reading appears to be a,raya\yraya,ranyeshu.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 20. 407

only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy- ment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency. — There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c, but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between
Nescience, &c), because on the origination of the
subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can- not be made to account for the existence of aggregates ; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence. — Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. — That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contra- dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness). — Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its

1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatirikta^ ka^it kshawo nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidy&bh.

408 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

causal energy. — That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im- possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon- ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency. — Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect ; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases \ — Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a things own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word ' thing ' and the words ' origination ' and ' cessation ' are interchangeable (which is not the case). — Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms ' origination ' and ' cessa- tion ' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing. — In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned. — Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse. — That too cannot be, we reply ; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under- stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception ; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself. — Hence