Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana ? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like ; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron ; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position ; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances. — The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release. — Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered *. — The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Miyd and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas).

8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active)
because the relation of principal (and subordinate
matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible. — The condition of the pradhana

1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.

Ii Adhyava, 2 Pad a, 9. 375

consists in the three gu;zas, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu?zas cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential character- istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/zas, the production of the great principle and the other effects — which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/zas — is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the
objections remain in force) on account of the (pra-
dh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But — the Sankhya resumes — we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/zas to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the character- istics of the gu/zas from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the gu/zas are admitted to be of an unsteady nature ; hence the gu/zas themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c, remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sankhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman. — Moreover, if the gu/zas were capable of entering into the relation of mutual in- equality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two

376 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

things would happen ; they would either not be in the con- dition of inequality on account of the absence of an opera- tive cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it ; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before 1.

10. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is ob- jectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the S&nkhyas, moreover, is full of contra- dictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, some- times eleven2. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great prin- ciple, in other places again that they proceed from self- consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only 3. That their doctrine, more- over, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Smriti, based on vSruti, is well known. — For these reasons also the Sankhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge. — The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable ; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering4 are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established dis- tinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For

1 Anantaro dosho mahad&dik&ryotpadayoga^. An. Gi.

2 In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.

3 Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, ahankara, and manas.

4 Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places. — The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, Io. 377

those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of every- thing and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For — to adduce a parallel case — a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &C.1, we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light. — That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experi- ence. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2 are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essen- tially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light ; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

1 In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential ; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.

2 ' Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.

3 7^ VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially- separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case ; for the two ideas (and terms), ' object of desire' and ' desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate. — The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion ; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the de- siring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvan- tage ; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, ' object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term ' causes of suffering/ while by the term ' sufferer ' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im- possible.— But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning — we, the Vedantins, reply — is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf- ferer cannot exist (in the Self). — Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub- ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the

Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, Io. 379

1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.

* In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.

3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.

4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.

5 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jarikate sattveti. An. Gi.

380 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase ' as it were V For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is ' a serpent as it were ' (' like a serpent '), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.5 You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit that, then my (the Ved&ntic) doctrine also is free from objections 2.