The word 'but' discards the objection. — We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections. — That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, ' on account of sacred texts/ For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from its effects. This appears from the passages indicating the difference of cause and effect (' That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person ; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven5 (Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 6); further, from the passages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the passage, ' then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place ; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of Brah- man, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be admitted. — Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman to be without parts ; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authori-
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 2j. 35 I
tative — not the senses, and so on — must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruc- tion is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c. ; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Pura^a says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes1.' Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But — our opponent will say — even the holy texts can- not make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions ' at the atiratra he is to take the sho^a^in- cup,' and ' at the atiratra he is not to take the sho^a^in-cup ') any contradiction which may present itself to the under- standing is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man ; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.
1 Prakn'tibhya iti, pratyakshadr/sh/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat parazrc vilaksha^am a^dryadyupade^agamyaw tad a&ntyam ity artha^. An. Gi.
352 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one ; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts. — Nor have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change ; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world ; that being an in- struction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural passage beginning ' He can only be described by No, no' (which passage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words ' O kanaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). — Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods \ &c).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine
that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self,
without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches
us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self
1 This is the way in which *Sankara divides the Sutra ; An. Gi. remarks to 'loke*pi, &c. : atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&tnu ka, hiti vya^ash/e/
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 29. 353
of a dreaming person, ' There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (Brt. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in- terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.
29. And because the objection (raised against
our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view
likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities — viz. the pradMna — is the cause of an effect — viz. the world — which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned. — But — it might be pleaded in favour of the Sankhyas — they do not maintain their pradhana to be with- out parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gunas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three gu;zas as its parts. — We reply that such a partiteness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts 1. And each guna. by itself assisted merely by the two other gu/zas constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature2. — So that the objection lies against the Sankhya
1 So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else — against the assumption — consist of parts.
2 The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu«as in combination only to undergo modification ; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.
[34] A a
354 VED ANTA-SUTR AS.
view likewise. — Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists of parts. — If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on. — Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts. — Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom1. If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com- bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec- tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers. — How then — it may be asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers ? — He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, c because that is seen.' For various scriptural pas- sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, ( He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is
1 As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration ; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.
Ii Adhyaya, I Pad a, 31. 355
never surprised ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4) ; ' He who desires what is true and imagines what is true ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; s He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail ') (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 9) ; ' By the command of that Im- perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 9) ; and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of
powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we
reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted. — Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action1; so, for instance, in the passage, * It is without eyesy without ears, without speech, without mind ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ' No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers ?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural passage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears,' Sve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman,