Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, ac- cording to 5ankara, because the world is unreal ; according to Ramanu^a, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brah- man in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although des- titute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, ^) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman — omniscience and so on — are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.
Pada II.
The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philo- sophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view. — The first adhikara;za (1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sankhyas, is unable to create and dispose. — The second adhikara^a (11-17) refutes the
INTRODUCTION.
Vaueshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrzsh/a. — The third and fourth adhika- ra^as are directed against various schools of Bauddha phi- losophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvav&dins, or bahy&rthavadins, who main- tain the reality of an external as well as an internal world ; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^anavddins, according to whom ideas are the only reality. — The last Sutra of this adhikara^a is treated by R&m&nu^a as a separate adhikara^a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing what- ever is real. — Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc- trine of the Gainas ; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo- sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikara/za of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/zz&aratras. But 6ankara and Ramanu^a totally disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to ; according to the latter it is approved of. — Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated Sankarsha^a, i.e. the ^iva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity ; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarsha^a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas. — The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally trans- lated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.' — This means, according to Safikara, ' Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarsha^a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).' —
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According to Raminu^a, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows : ' Or, rather there is non- contradiction of that (i. e. the Pa^aratra doctrine) on ac- count of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman)/ Which means : Since San- karsha^a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa^aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted. — The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one ; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'v&' and of the 'tat,' implied in Rdmanu^a's comment, are more natural than those resulting from ^ankara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which — in spite of objec- tions— has to be viewed as the true one.
PAda III.
The third p&da discusses the question whether the dif- ferent forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co- eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.
The first seven adhikara^as treat of the five elementary substances. — Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect. — Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether ; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11 ; 13) that fire springs from air, water from tire, earth from water. — Adhik. Ill (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.
Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one
element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to
Brahman acting in it.
Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the
elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of
their emission.
Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which
INTRODUCTION. Kli
the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary sub- stances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted to- gether with the elements of which they consist.
The remainder of the p&da is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the £*iva. — Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as ' Devadatta is born,' * De- vadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.
Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, accord- ing to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation. — This Sutra is of course com- mented on in a very different manner by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^a on the other. According to the former, the ^*iva is in reality identical — and as such co- eternal — with Brahman ; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that con- nexion is moreover illusory. — According to R&manu^a, the ^-iva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prak&ra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements ; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience ; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (viklra), contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (san-
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ko£a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru- pdnyathabhava), and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.
Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is ' gn&? This means, according to .Safikara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai^eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge ; not intelligent, but intelligence. — Ramanu^*a, on the other hand, explains ' gna.' by 'gn&tri,9 i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo- sophers who — like the Scinkhyas and the Vedantins of 6ankara's school — maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure ^aitanya. — The wording of the Sutra cer- tainly seems to favour Ramanu^a's interpretation ; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of .Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term gna. of which the most obvious interpretation is gnatrt, not ^anam.
Adhik. XIII (19-33) treats the question whether the individual soul is a;m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni- present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy&pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views. — In .Sankara's opinion the Sutras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the ^*iva is ami, while Sutra 29 formu- lates the siddhanta, viz. that the ^iva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as ami in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ — which itself is ami — constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sawsara. — According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi- kara/za gives utterance to the siddh&nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the