We read in the Br/hadara/zyaka, in the Maitreyi-brah- ma/za the following passage, ' Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, &c. &c. ; verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyt ! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 6).— Here the doubt arises whether that which is repre- sented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest Self. — But whence the doubt ?— Because, we reply, the Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to the individual soul ; and because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to the highest Self.
The purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i. e. the
I Adhyaya, 4 Pada, 1 9. 275
individual) Self is meant ; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same individual Self? — A subsequent passage also (viz. * Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge5), which describes how the great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause finally, ' How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be inter- preted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.
To this we make the following reply. — The passage makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has heard from Ya^avalkya that there is no hope of immor- tality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the words, ' What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal ? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Ya^avalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Smrz'ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the highest Self. — The statement further that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inad- missible, on account of the explanation given of that state- ment in a subsequent passage, viz. ' Whosoever looks for the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is aban- doned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that who-
2 76 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
ever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous view ; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, * This everything is the Self/ gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self ; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on. — By explaining further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and works (' There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rig- veda,' &c.) Ya^/zavalkya again shows that it is the highest Self. — To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge. — From all this it follows that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.
We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin
that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the
object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter,
denoted as something dear.
20. (The circumstance of the soul being repre-
sented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfil-
ment of the promissory statement ; so Asmarathya
thinks.
The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which is denoted as something dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages, ' When the Self is known all this is known,' ' All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial
I Adhyaya, 4 Pada, 21. 2*Jj
statement aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made. — This is the opinion of the teacher A^marathya *.
21. (The initial statement identifies the individual
soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it
will depart (from the body) is such (i. e. one with the
highest Self) ; thus Au^ulomi thinks.
The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Au^/ulomi. — Thus Scrip- ture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' {Kh. Up. VIII, ii, 3).— In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, ' As
1 The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows : As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire ; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also — which are effects of Brahman — are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence ; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some- how non-different. — The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Ajmarathya is bhedabhedav&da.
2 78 vedanta-s6tras.
the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison \
22. (The initial statement is made) because (the
highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual
soul) ; so Klrakrztsna thinks.
Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Klrakrz'tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/za- passage, ' Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms/ and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, is, y)2.
1 Bhamati : The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self ; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa^aratrikas : ' Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada.
2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii.
I Adhyaya, 4 Pada, 2 2. 279
And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa- rate creation of the individual soul ; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. — In the opinion of the teacher Karakr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Aj'marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, ' On account of the fulfilment of the promise ' — which de- clares a certain mutual dependence — that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul 1. The opinion of Au^ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition2. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by KcUa- krztsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ' That art thou ') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kaiakr/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist- ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.
The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's argu- ments, viz. that the BrzhadaraTzyaka passage represents as
1 And not the relation of absolute identity.
2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.
2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.