Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

To this we make the following reply. — Although the Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being represented as described.' That means : such as the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 fT.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brah- man is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares 2 that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term ' Self (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin-

1 Option being possible only in the case of things to be accom- plished, i.e. actions.

2 According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself its Self (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created air (II, 6).

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ning with the gross body ; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again — in the passage, ' May I be many, may I grow forth ' — it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non- different from the created effects. And — in the passage, 'He created all this whatever there is' — it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance, ' Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be man)', may I grow forth. It sent forth fire 3 (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1 ; 3), and ' In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 ; 2.) The Vedanta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony through- out.— On the other hand, there are found conflicting state- ments concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i. e. Brahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree — for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization; — and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those con- flicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of state- ments regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way ; nor have we the right to assume such a thing ; because we conclude from the intro- ductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages

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setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares ; compare Kh. Up. VI, 8, 4, ' As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True/ We, moreover, understand that by- means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Kh. Up. VI, i, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, ' If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things ; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever' (Gaudap. Ka. Ill, 15). — On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, ' He who knows Brahman obtains the highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' He who knows the Self overcomes grief ' {Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him passes over death' (vSVe. Up. Ill, 8). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, ' That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non- transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as ' Non-being this was in the beginning ' contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages
treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the
Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The passage ' Non-being indeed was this in the beginning ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upani- shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is (' He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.

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He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing ') ; it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c, represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, ' He wished, may I be many;' is declared to have originated the entire creation ; and is finally referred to in the clause, ' Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, ' On this there is also this jloka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,5 &c. If here the term ' Non-being ' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken ; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term ' Being ' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term ' Non-being ' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage ' Non-being this was in the beginning' {Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, { It became being ;' whence it is evident that the ' Non- being ' of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non- existence. And in the passage, ' Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1), the reference to the opinion of ' others ' does not mean that the doctrine referred to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda ; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence ; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is. — The following passage again, ' Now this was then undeveloped/ &c. (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of

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the world took place without a ruler ; as we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, ' He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails/ &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence (' when seeing, eye by name ; when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind by name '), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also. — We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, ' Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms y (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). The in- transitive expression ' It developed itself (vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done). — Or else we may look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily implied agent ; as is the case in such phrases as ' the village is being approached ' (where we necessarily have to supply ' by Devadatta or somebody else ').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the * work ') denotes the world.

In the Kaushitaki-brahma^a, in the dialogue of Balaki and A^ata^atru, we read, ' O Balaki, he who is the maker of

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those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.