Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 38 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part II (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word * Self with reference to the Giva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O -SVetaketu 5 (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c). Here the clause 'It is the Self designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word ' Self,' and the concluding clause, ' that art thou, O 5vetaketu,' declares the intelligent *Svetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense — while the employment of the word 'Self furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat — the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura- tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under- stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word ' Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense1. Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The word c Self,5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another ; ' as, for instance, a king applies the word ' Self ' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, ' Bha- drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word ' Self may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as ' the Self of the elements,' ' the Self of the senses,5 are made use of, and as the one word ' light ' (^yotis) denotes a certain

1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word ' thinking ' in any of the three pas- sages.

I Adhyaya, I Pada, 7. 55

sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then
does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking
(ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a
figurative sense ?

To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies :

7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the
term ' Self) because release is taught of him who
takes his stand on that (the Sat).

The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term * Self' because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % fT., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, i That is the Self/ and where the subsequent clause, * That art thou, O vSVetaketu,' declares the intelligent vSVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub- sequent to the two quoted (viz. ' a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge ; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term ' Sat,' and did comprehend — by means of the phrase ' That art thou ' — persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ' Thou art non -intelligent ; ' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know- ledge. But to assume that the faultless ,rastra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the ^stra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non -intelligent Self as the real Self, he would — comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail1 — cling to the view of that being the Self,

1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village ; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him.

56 vedAnta-s6tras.

and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the jastra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ' that is the Self, that art thou, G iSvetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Kk. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ' that art thou ' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, ' I am the hymn ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ' Self is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self can — in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self — be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per- ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e.Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible ; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ' Self ' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word '^yotis ' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ' Self ' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative

Cp. above, p. 30.

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8. 57

attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also ; whence such phrases as 'the Self of the elements/ 'the Self of the senses/ And even if we assume that the word ' Self ' primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determina- tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with Svetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word ' Self here to be something intelli- gent. The word '^yotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate example ; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of 'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding Sfitra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word c Self having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sfttra is to be explained as con- taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by
the word ' Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove
by an additional reason.

8. And (the pradh&na cannot be denoted by the
word 'Self') because there is no statement of its
having to be set aside.

If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term * Being ' (Sat), and if the passage ' That is the Self, that art thou, O *Svetaketu,' referred to the pradhana ; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the

58 vedanta-s6tras.

true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered) ; for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhatf at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying ' that is Arundhati,' although it is really not so ; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/^aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).

The word ' and ' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapaz^aka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term ' Sat ' denoted the pradhana, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoy ers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term ' Sat/ — For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason.

I Adhyaya, I Pada, 9. 59

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).