The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering that sense which their] author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly follows vSankara's inter- pretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees with the views held by Badar&ya/za has been discussed above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a translation of vSankara's commentary with an independent version of the Sutras which it ex- plains. Similar considerations have determined the method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads re- ferred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by 5ankara. There also the views of the commentator have to be followed closely ; otherwise much of the comment would appear de- void of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor Max Miiller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render intelligible vSankara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from
extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes
given are based, most of them, on the rikas composed
by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is
unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.
My best thanks are due to Vandits Rama Misra vS&strin
and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College,
whom I have consulted on several difficult passages.
Greater still are my obligations to Vandit Ke^ava vSastrin,
of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to
read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and
whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.
Vedanta-Sutras
With
Sankara Bhashya
^ANKARA'S INTRODUCTION.
FIRST ADHYAYA. FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the August Vasudeva!
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of the ' Thou ' (the Non-Ego2) and the ' Ego/ and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to superimpose 3 upon the subject — whose Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego — the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural4 procedure —
1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (£it) ; the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense-organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i. e. the external material world.
2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the ' thou ' (yushmat), not the notion of the ' this ' or ' that ' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan- guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person (' It is 1/ ' I am he who,' &c. ; ete vayam, ime vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.
3 Adhyasa, literally ' superimposition ' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.
4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless ; for the modes of speech
VEDANTA-stfTRAS.
which has its cause in wrong knowledge — not to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal1, to make use of expressions such as 'That am 1/ ' That is mine2.' — But what have we to understand by the term ' superimposition ? ' — The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing 3.
Some indeed define the term ' superimposition ' as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing 4. Others, again, define superimposition as the error
and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.
1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.
2 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c, belong to my Self.'
3 Literally ' in some other place/ The clause ' in the form of remembrance ' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva- datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in M&hishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre- viously observed again presents itself to our senses ; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.
4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super- imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother- of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The dtmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.
1 This is the definition of the akhyativMns.
2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.
3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam- praka\ya, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne- science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: '&datmaiva svayampraka\ro*pi buddhyadivi- shayavi^ura^at kathazra&d asmatpratyayavishayo*ha#zkanispadaw giva iti ka. ^antur iti £a kshetra^a iti Mkhyayate.'
4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it
6 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs ; for non- discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi- nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge (neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition 1. The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre- supposition on which there base all the practical distinc- tions— those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda — between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions), or with final release2. — But how can the means of right
may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani- fested either by itself or by anything else. — It is known or mani- fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatv&d ekantenavishaya- tv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam api kau£id atmano nesh/am ity a^ahkyaha pratyagatmeti.
1 Tatraivaw sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/ze sati. Bha. Tas- minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud- dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi- na^tmanl va kmena* ^anayadidoshewa >£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.
2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^anaka^^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c, and scrip- tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience1? — Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per- sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per- ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3. Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de- pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superim position described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away ; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also — who possess a higher intelligence — run away when
1 It being of course the function of the means of right know- ledge to determine Truth and Reality.
2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.
8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.
4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.
8 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.