Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 40. 437
may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Ved&ntin ; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord. — For all these reasons the SMkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.
39. And on account of the impossibility of ruler- ship (on the part of the Lord).
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an un- tenable hypothesis, for the following reason also. — Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted ; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of percep- tion, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.
40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by
the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we
deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.
This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused
438 vedanta-sCtras.
by the pradh&na. If the analogy between the pradh&na and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.
Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i. e. a body ; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum ; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation). — This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigra- tory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.
41. And (there would follow from that doctrine)
either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on
the Lord's part).
The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.— They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and like- wise that the pradMna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doc- trine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration ; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at sometime cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradh&na, souls, and Lord is
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 42. 439
defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one \ From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gra- dually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa^sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his om- niscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void. — Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord. — But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to aban- don a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.
For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative
philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative
cause of the world, appears unacceptable.
42. On account of the impossibility of the ori-
gination (of the individual soul from the highest
Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be
accepted).
We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those
who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only
the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now
1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.
440 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause. — But, it may- be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recog- nised principle that Smrzti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative ; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated ? — It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy ; another part of the system, how- ever, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.
The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat) Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as V&sudeva, Sankarsha^a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest Self, Sankarsha^a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (ahankara). Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects. — The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (i^ya), recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.
Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/za, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways ; for various scriptural passages, such as ' He is one- fold, he is threefold' (Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra- tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach,
II ADHYAYA, 2 pAdA, 44. 44!
&c. ; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Smrzti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sahkarsha^a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva, i. e. the highest Self, there should originate Sahkarsha^a, i. e. the individual soul ; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imper- fections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause. — That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.
43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.
The Bh&gavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sankarsha/za, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the ahankara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.
44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of
knowledge, &c. (V&sudeva, &c. be taken as Lords),
yet there is non-exclusion of that (i. e. the objection
raised in Siitra 42).
Let us then — the Bhagavatas may say — understand by Sankarsha/za, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c, but rather Lords, i. e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.
44 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.
All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub-
stratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imper-
fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does
not apply.
Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the ' non-exclusion of that/ i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established. — Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self? — If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasu- deva.— Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes ? — In that case the objection urged in Sutra 4a remains valid. For Sankarsha/za cannot be produced from V&sudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause — as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect) — and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pa^aratra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinc- tions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.
45. And on account of contradictions.
Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the
Bhagavata system, with reference to the assumption of
qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and