would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only. — Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought ; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con- scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation. — - For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.
The system of the Vainlrikas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, ' On account of the mani- festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once,
4 1 6 VED ANT A-SU TR AS.
as then no specification would be required *. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (' Entity does) not (spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring from non-entity, the as- sumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c. — a thing certainly not actually observed. — If, again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions — just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on — we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non- existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely. — Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence ; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor2 does any one
1 If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is' capable. — Cp. on this point the Sarvadamfla- sa/rcgraha.
2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 2j. 417
think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like ; but every- body knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only. — The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is false ; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c, are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the sub- sequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition). — Hence as we see on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non- entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from non-existence has to be rejected. — We finally point out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the atoms ; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly perplex the mind of every one ?
27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be
an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-
active people also.
If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since ' non-existence ' is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field ; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay ; and the weaver too [34] e e
4 1 8 vedAnta-sOtras.
lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.
28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot
be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of
them).
There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c, we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vign&na) exist. — The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.
According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con- stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our
1 According to the vigTzanav&din the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is power is m&na, knowledge ; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramatr/, knowing subject.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 28. 419
doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1. — In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2,
Moreover, the cognitions — which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness — undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit- ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con- scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things. —
1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non- different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.
2 Avayavavayavirupo vahyo*rtho n&sti ken ma, bhud ^tivyaktya- dirupas tu syad ity a\yankyaha evam iti. GatyMin&m vyaktyadinam Mtyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhsivad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^* gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha^.
e e 2
420 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas. — If we be asked how, in the absence of ex- ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments : we both (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im- pressions, without any external object ; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions. — Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.