Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sawyoga, apart from the things which it con- nects. If it should be maintained that sawyoga and sama- vaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is con- sidered in himself or in his relations to others ; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma^a, learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and demoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence/ which however do not prove
1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sawyoga ; and that contradicts a fundamental Vaiye- shika principle.
2 This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.
39^ VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
themselves to be separate entities. — Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception. — Nor, again 1, does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif- ferent ways.
Further2, conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts ; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the VaLreshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established ; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things — whether contradictory to reason or not — should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the VaLreshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
1 A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.
2 It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sawyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, I 7. 399
Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa/^lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether ; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish1.
Let it then be said (the Vafoeshika, resumes) that the samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode — which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance — is not possible. — That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence ; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established ; and only when the latter relation is esta- blished, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause2.— Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten- sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space3, whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent ; conclusions contrary to the VaLreshika doctrine of the indi- visibility and permanency of the atoms. — If the VaLreshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist- ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible)
1 Ekasambandhyakarsha/ze yatra sambandhyantarakarshawaw tatra samlesha^, sa tu savayavdna^z ^atukash/Mdinazra dnsh/o na tu niravayavai^ savayavanam, ato dvyamikasya savayavasya niravayavena parama^una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh.
2 In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.
3 For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.
400 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
atoms ; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. Earth — which is, in comparison with a binary com- pound, the grossest thing of all — undergoes decomposition ; so do the substances following next which belong to the same class as earth ; so does the binary compound ; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i. e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaueshika might pos- sibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts1, we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in con- sequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while ; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origi- nation of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.
It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.
1 8. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates
with its two causes, (there takes place) non-estab-
lishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the
1 And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 1 8. 4oi
VaLreshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above.
That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-
nihilistic1). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches
universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being
taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvastitvavadin) ; the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vi^anavadin) ; and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (un- real; Nihilists, junyavadin 2). — We first controvert those
1 Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.
2 The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the £ahkarabhashya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the SarvadanuraasazBgraha.— -The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas ; the Idealists are the YogaMras ; the Sautran- tikas and the Vaibhashikas together constitute the class of the Realists. — I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brah- mavidyabhara^a. — Buddhasya hi madhyamika-yoga/Sara-sautran- tika-vaibhashikasam^ftakir ^atvara^ sishyak. Tatra buddhena prathamazrc yan prati sarva»z sunyam ity upadish/aw te madhya- mik&s te hi guru«a yathokta/^ tathaiva jraddhaya gnhitavanta iti krz'tva napakrzsh/a>$ punaj £a taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusa- re/zakshepasyakn'tatvan notkrzsh/abuddhaya iti madhyamika^. Anyais tu .nshyair guru#a sarvasunyatva upadish/e ^Mnatiriktasya sarvasya junyatvam astu nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai^ pari- bhashitopeta^ tad upari £a £7zanasya tu .ranyatvaw na sa/rcbhavati tathatve ^agadandhyaprasahgat sunyasiddher apy asawbhavai £eti buddhamate a/$aratvena paribhashita akshepo*pi krz'ta iti yoga- £ara^, vi^anamatrastitvavadina^. Tadanantaram anyai^ jishyaiA
[34] d d
402 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental (£aitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on ; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms ; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile. — The inward world consists of the five so-called ' groups' (skan- dha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vi^anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedand- skandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sam^Tzaskandha), and the group of impressions (sa^skaraskandha) x ; which
pratitisiddhasya kathaw .mnyatvaztf vaktuw jakyam ato ^anavad vahy&rtho*pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so*stu, parazrc tu so *numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathahgikrz'tyaivatf* jishyamatim anusn'tya kiyatparyantazra sutratf* bhavishyatiti tai^ przsh/am atas te sautrantika^. Anye punar yady aya#z gha/a iti pratitibalad vahyo*rtha upeyate tarhi tasyd eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa kathazrc paroksho*to vahyo*rtho na pratyaksha iti bMsM viruddh- ety akshipann atas te vaibhashika^.
1 The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c. ; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as £aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as ^aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses. — The vi^anaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavi^anapravaha^), according to all commentators ; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidydbharawa, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpakazrc nirvikalpakaw £a pravrz'ttivi^/za- nasam^/zitam). — The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c. —The samgTzaskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur ajva ityadi^abdasam^alpitapratyaya^, An. Gi. ; gaur a^va ityevaw n&mavirish/asavikalpaka# pratyaya^, Go. An. ; s&mgna, ya^adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo v&, dvitiyapakshe vi^anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahya^, Brahmavidyabh.). The sazrcskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c, dharma and adharma. — Compare also the Bhamati. — The vi^anaskandha is £itta, the other skandhas £aitta.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 1 8. 403
taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist- ence \