To all this we — the Vedantins — make the following reply. — We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed ; it does indeed belong to them ; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire ; as mere fire, i. e. fire without wood, &c, does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent ; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed
1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per- ception.— Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya anumanad ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya £etanasya na pravrz'ttyajrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity apekshayazrc tatprakaraw sMayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw pra#a- dimattvam. An. Gi.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 3. 369
to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible. — But — an objection will be raised — your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov- ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence. — A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron ; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all -knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe. — If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place ; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience. — Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause ; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.
3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like
milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion
is due to intelligence).
Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following instances. — As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind ; so the pradhana also, although non- intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.
This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again ; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c, we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ' He who dwells in [34] B b
3 yO VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 4 ; and, ' By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c, Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle l cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide. — Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence — for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances — or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases. — If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 34 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause ; a con- clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.
4. And because (the pradhana), on account of
there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela-
tion ; (it cannot be active.)
The three gu/zas of the Sahkhyas when in a state of equi- poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to — nor restrains from — action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord,
1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence. — Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva^ sadhyavati pakshe pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalaksha«am, anupanyaso na vyabhi^arabhumir ity artha^. An. Gi.
It Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 5. 37 1
on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account
of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con-
nected with the power of illusion (maya).
5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies
itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into
milk) ; for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in
the female animal).
Let this be (the Saiikhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk ; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instru- mental cause ; we reply, ' Because no such cause is ob- served.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely ; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.
To this we make the following reply. — The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you ; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How ? ' Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause ; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only1. The fact, however, is that men aho are able, by
1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's
B b 2
372 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
applying a means in their power, to produce milk from
grass and herbs ; for when they wish to procure a more
abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully
and thus obtain more milk from her. — For these reasons
the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be
proved from the instance of grass and the like.
6. Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted
in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob-
jections) on account of the absence of a purpose
(on the part of the pradhana).
Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the San- khya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ' on account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse- quently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different pos- sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy- ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) * ? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release2. — If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the
body ; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha.
1 Anadheyatuayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihdrarupatwayajunyas- yety artha^. An. Gi.
2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims — ex hypothesi — only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.
Ii Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 7. 373
state of release ; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &C.1 — If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)2, there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con- sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire. — If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place3. — It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.
7. And if you say (that the soul may move the
pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one)
or as the magnet (moves the iron) ; thus also (the
difficulty is not overcome).
Well then — the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances — let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move ; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana. — Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old
1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.
2 TYz'tiye *pi katipaya,rabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/$ syad iti manvano dvitiyaw pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.
8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu/^edat ; the BM- mati's reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz'kraktyanu/^edat.
; 74 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.