1 The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24.
Aa2
356 VEDANTA-StjTR AS.
although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world),
on account of (beings engaging in any action) having
a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world. — The intelligent highest Self cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ' on account of actions having a purpose/ — We know from ordinary ex- perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act after due consideration only, and does not engage even in an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose of his own ; much less so in important business. There is also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common experience, ' Verily everything is not dear that you may love everything ; but that you may love the Self therefore every- thing is dear ' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con- tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand, you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity also. — Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel- gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the highest Self also created this world without any motive. — That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture. — Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being is untenable.
33, But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word 'but' discards the objection raised. — We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 34. 357
reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any- extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature \ without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 2. — Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos- sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says. ■ — Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person ; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea- tion on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip- tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality ; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of
1 The nature (svabMva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman.
2 This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha.
An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva nivn'tter api dar^anad fovarasyapi mayamayyaw lilayaw tatha- bhave vinapi sawyag^anaw sa/rcsarasamu^ittir iti tatraha na ketu Anirva/fcya khalv avidyst parasye^varasya £a svabhavo lileti £o£yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavay&m anupapattir avataratity artha^.
353 VEDANTA-S^JTR AS.
his regarding (merit and demerit) ; for so (Scripture) declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly- planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world. — The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy ; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly ; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Svuti and Smrzti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, ' because he is bound by regards.' If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame ; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Par^anya, the Giver of rain. For as Par^anya is the com- mon cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c, while the differences between these classes of beings
Ii Adhyaya, I Pad a, 35. 359
are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty. — And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that ; compare, for instance, the two following passages, ' For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed ; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed ' (Kaush. Up. Ill, 8)1; and, 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (Br/. Up. Ill, 2, 13). Smriti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to de- pend on the different quality of the works of living beings ; so, for instance, ' I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha. Gi. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's
having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible
on account of the non-distinction (of merit and
demerit, previous to the first creation) ; we refute
the objection on the ground of (the world) being
without a beginning.
But — an objection is raised — the passage, ' Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and conse- quently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of
1 From this passage we must not — the commentators say — infer injustice on the part of the Lord ; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Par^anya does).
360 vedAnta-s{jtras.
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to reli- gious merit after distinction had once arisen ; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free from inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmi- gratory world is without beginning. — The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning ; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation. — To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.
36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recom- mends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence ; and further, as then there would exist no deter- mining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred, and other afflicting passions *. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed ; so that — on the doc-
1 Ragadveshamoha ragadayas te £a purushaw dukMdibhlfc klwyantiti klcds tesha/ra vasana^ karmapravrzttyanugu#as t&bhir dkshiptaw dharm&dilaksha#aw karma tadapekshavidya\ An. Gi.
II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 37. 361
trine of the world having a beginning — we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains. — Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in *Sruti and Smrzti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, ' Let me enter with this living Self (^iva)/ &c {Kk. Up. VI, 3, a). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, 'the living Self — a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the pra/zas — shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the pr&^as would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those pra^as ? Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the pra/zas ; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation. — Moreover, we have the mantra, ' As the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon' (Ri. Sa^h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Smrz'ti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ' (Bha. Gi. XV, 3). And the Purd«a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).