The1 refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en- joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause. — How so? — ' On account of the scriptural word " origin " and others.' The word 'origin' is used in connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the knowledge of one thing everything is known ; viz. Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4, 'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect ; the thing made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely ; thus,' &c. — The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay2, there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual effects distinguished by names) they are untrue ; in so far
1 Pari^amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/rc samadhaya vivar- tavadam a\n*itya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.
2 Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato vi£-#atam iti sambandha^.
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 1 4. 32 I
as they are clay they are true. — This parallel instance is given with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase ' having its origin in speech ' to the case illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. — Later on again the text, after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no existence apart from them, ' Thus has vanished the specific nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Kk. Up. VI, 4, 1). — Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the ' and others' of the Sutra. Such texts are, ' In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that ' (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; < This everything, all is that Self (Brz. Up. II, 4, 6) ; ' Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 3, 11) ; 'The Self is all this ' (Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ' There is in it no diversity ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25).— On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares). We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty steppe — for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from the surface of the desert1) — ; so this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman. — But — it might be objected — Brah- man has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers
1 Dr/sh/eti kada&d dr*sh/a#z punar nash/am anityam iti yavat. — Dr*sh/agraha«asu&ta/tf pratitikale*pi sattarahityazrc tatraiva hetvan- taram aha svarupeweti. An. Gi.
322 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and mani- foldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches ; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam ; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity ac- cording to the Veda — which depend on the karmakkuda — may be established in connexion with the element of mani- foldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the in- stance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ' as clay they are true ' asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase ' having its origin in speech ' declares the unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage again, ' That is the Self; thou art that, O >SVetaketu ! ' teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the em- bodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world — which is based on the individual soul — having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in
Ii Adhyaya, I Pad a, 1 4. 323
addition to the element of unity. — Scriptural passages also (such as, ' When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states ; for the passage * Thou art that ' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true- minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false- minded * ? Another scriptural passage (' from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' Brt. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction. — Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknow- ledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true ?
Other objections are started. — If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c, become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects ; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts em- bodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their pur- port if the distinction on which their validity depends
1 In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the ' false-minded ' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.
324 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the
distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is
not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how
can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the
Self, which forms an item of that doctrine ?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen ; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue ; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without sus- pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one. — But how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta- texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1. — This objection, we reply, is with- out force (because as a matter of fact wre do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)
1 Le. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes,