reasons as detailed under I, i and ff. — has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world? — Our objection, the pur- vapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought ; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by them- selves the sense of vSYuti, they naturally rely on Smrztis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of 5ruti with their assistance ; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Smr/tis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Smr/ti declares to have been rzshi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following 6ruti-passage, ' It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the nshi, kapila *, whom he wishes to look on while he is born ' (.SVe. Up. V, 2), Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Smrztis.
This objection we dispose of by the remark, * It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other Smr/tis.' — If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain Smrztis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Smrztis which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter SnWti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, * That which is subtle and not to be known ; ' the text then goes on, ' That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks * From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu^as, O best of Brahma/zas.' And in another place it is said that {the Unevolved is
1 On the meaning of l kapila ' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff. — As will be seen later on, Ankara, in this bhashya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some reshi.
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, I. 293
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brah- ma^a.' — Thus we read also in the Pura;za, ' Hear thence this short statement : The ancient Naraya^a is all this ; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in the BhagavadgitS. also (VII, 6), ' I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world.5 And Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, * From him spring all bodies ; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Smrzti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Smrzti, we reply to him on the ground of Smrzti only ; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been shown already that the 5ruti-texts aim at con- veying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Smrztis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Smrztis which follow vSruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded ; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), ' Where there is contradiction (between vSruti and Smrzti) (Smrzti) is to be disregarded ; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Smrzti is to be recognised) as there is infer- ence (of Smrzti being founded on vSruti).' — Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without 5ruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such per- ception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unob- structed power of cognition. For the possession of super- natural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction * ; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda)
1 I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.
294 VEDANTA- SUTRAS.
which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) after- wards only. Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Smr/tis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to 5ruti. — As to men destitute of the power of inde- pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Smrzti ; for if men's inclinations were so alto- gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Smrztis, and the distinction founded on some of them following Sruti and others not. — The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture ; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's know- ledge.) On the other hand, we have a ^ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu *, viz. ' Whatever Manu said is medicine ' (Taitt. Sa#zh. II, 2, io, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything (' he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-
1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there.
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 2. 295
luminousness,' 1. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrzti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Maha- bharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one ; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, ' There are many persons, O King, according to the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers ; ' that opinion is contro- verted ' just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ' He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ' When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (ts. Up. 7) ; and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour ; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection. — An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the
296 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sankhya system).
The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrtti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Smrz'ti ; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience — no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense — Smr/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Smrz'ti which is concerned with the effects (i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say. — We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine. — The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sankhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4ff.
3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted.
This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu- mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sankhya-smrzti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered as refuted ; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the ' great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views. — But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments ; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.) — We reply that here an ad-
Ii Adhyaya, I Pada, 3. 297
1 In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (nidi- dhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.
2 The ash/akas (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and sis'ira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that Smr/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on *Sruti.
3 But why — it will be asked — do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sarikhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Smmis conflicting with the Vedanta views ?
298 VED ANTA-S#TR AS.