pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the po- tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten- tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti- ality is of the nature of Nescience ; it is rightly denoted by the term ' undeveloped ; ' it has the highest Lord for its substratum ; it is of the nature of an illusion ; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character1. This undeveloped principle is some- times denoted by the term cika^a, ether ; so, for instance, in the passage, ' In that Imperishable then, O Gargt, the ether is woven like warp and woof (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of as M&ya, illusion ; so, for instance (Sve. Up. IV, 10), ' Know then Prakr/ti is M£y&, and the great Lord he who is affected with M&ya.' For May& is properly called un- developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not. — The statement of the Kanaka that ' the Undeveloped is beyond the Great
1 Nanu na bi^ajaktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety &ha avidyeti. Ke&t tu prati^ivam avidya^aktibhedam ikkh&nti tan na avyaktavyakn'tadirabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve^pi sva^aktya vi&trakaryakaratv&d ity aha avyakteti. Na ^a tasya ^iva-rrayatvaffz ^ivajabdava^yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta^Ma- bdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity alia parame^vareti. Maya- vidyayor bhedad favarasya maya\rrayatva/rc ^lvanam avidya^rayateti vadanta/rc pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino may& paratantra tathaishapity arthafc. Pratitau tasyar Man&peksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.
244 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
one ' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira^yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience, is attri- buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al- though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term ' the Undeveloped ' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left. — - Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation1. — There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived ; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, I, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot ; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects. — But how — we ask those interpreters— is it possible that the word ' Undeveloped ' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the
^ 1 Sutradvayasya vr/ttikrz'dvyakhyanam uttMpayati. Go. An, A&iryade,riyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.
I Adhyaya, \ Pada, 4. 245
passage under discussion)? — If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest ; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin- ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath- someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction — as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it — but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men- tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person. — We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kanaka passage does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because
246 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.
The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradh&na as some- thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some- where they teach that the pradh&na is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers. — Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge ; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man. — For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradh&na. — Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak
(of the pradh&na as an object of knowledge) we deny
that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant,
on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana — which had been referred to as the Undeveloped — as an object of knowledge. ' He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death ' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 1 5). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na,
I Adhyaya, 4 Pada, 6. 247
which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con- clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre- sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol- lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road ; ' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ' The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know ; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ' A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sarikhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta,
6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).
To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avallt-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired
2 48 vedanta-s£tr as.
about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con- tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, i, 13), ' Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it to me, who am full of faith.5 The question as to the indi- vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third of my boons.5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.5 — The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many ; ' in the passage met with con- siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge ; 5 and in the passage (I, 2, 18), ' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.