The word ( not ' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c, belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 33), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ' He who dwells in the Self/ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ' Self ' denotes the individual soul ; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge ; ' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ' internal ruler.' — But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him? — Why— we ask in return — should that be impossible? — Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ' There is no other seer but he,' &c, which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis- cussion.— May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler? — No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)
We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection. — The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre- sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the
I Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 21. 1 35
Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ' Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, * But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.
21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi-
bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the
declaration of attributes.
Scripture says, ' The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im- perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5 ; 6). — Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.
We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in- stances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.5 — But, it
136 vedAnta-s^tras.
may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature. — No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the case of man also. — While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhina, no attribute of a contrary nature being men- tioned.— But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1,9), c He who knows all and perceives all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana ? — To this the purvapakshin replies : The passage, ' The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen/ &c, points, by means of the term ' the Indestructible/ to the source of all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This same * Indestructible ' is again mentioned later on in the passage, ' It is higher than the high Imperishable/ Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradh&na denoted by the term ' the Imperishable ' is the source of all beings. — If, however, the word * source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative cause, we may by ' the source of the beings ' understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.
To this we make the following reply. — That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing else. — Whereupon is this conclusion founded ? — On the statement of attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving/ clearly states an
I Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 21. I 37
attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all beings — which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' — not to the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, which — in the clause, ' From the Indestructible every- thing here arises '—is designated as the material cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1,9), ' From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of dis- cussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed. — We further maintain that also the passage, ' Higher than the high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circum- stance that the passage, 'He truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person/ (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility and the like — which formed the subject of the preceding chapter — will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next Sutra. — Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the Rig-veda. and so on, and then the text continues, ' The higher knowledge
1 3 8 VED ANTA-S<JTRAS.
is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Lord, the know- ledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss ; and nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the know- ledge of the pradhana. — Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be ac- knowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds only. — Further, the reference to the knowledge of every- thing being implied in the knowledge of one thing — which is contained in the passage (I, i, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known ? ' — is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which com- prises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of enjoyment. — The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief subject — which it does in the passage (I, i, 1), 'He told the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharvan ' — and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the com- prehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the term ' knowledge of Brahman ' would become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the AVg-veda, and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the lower know- ledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 3, 7), ' But frail
I Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 22. 1 39
indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.' After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12), ' Let a Brahma^a after he has examined all these worlds which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'— The remark that, because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be material. — For all these reasons the source of all beings, which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.
22. The two others (i. e. the individual soul and
the pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) be-
cause there are stated distinctive attributes and
difference.