Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead — some saying he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul ; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), ' That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus

I Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, Ii. Ii9

been stated, a caviller starts the following objection : neither of the stated views can be maintained. — Why ? — On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main- tained ; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as ' the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attri- bute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent — a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as ' the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as ' entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume

1 20 VEDANTA-S$TRAS.

that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their good deeds ' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works ; according to the scriptural passage, ' It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con- clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of. To this we make the following reply : — In the passage under discussion the individual soul (vi^anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant ; when, for instance, the order is given, ' Look out for a second (i. e. a fellow) for this bull,5 people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood ; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul. — But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave ? — Well, we reply, jruti as well as smrz'ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), ' The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss ; ' Taitt. Up. II, 1, ' He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;' and, ' Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni- present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light

I Adhyaya, 2 Pada, 12. 121

and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade ; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two ' entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self. — Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ' Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot/ which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), ' He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/zu,' repre- sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur- ther, the clause, f Those who know Brahman call them,' &c, which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant ; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from

12 2 vedanta-s6tras.

the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in- telligence, implied in the words, ' The other looks on without eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. { Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (antra), bewildered ; but when he sees the other Lord (Ira) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away/

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, ' Two birds inseparable/ &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Paingi-rahasya Brahma^a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva ; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul {gna) ; so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi- vidual soul, and the word kshetra^a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetra^a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paingi-rahasya,) ' The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams ; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^na ; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul/ Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying ; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sawsara and is of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence ; as is evident from the clause, ' The other looks on without eating/ That agrees, moreover, with jruti and smrz'ti passages, such as, ' That art thou,' and ' Know me also to be the individual soul ' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, * These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm ; to him indeed

I Adhyaya, 2 Pad a, 1 3. I 23

who knows this no impurity attaches V — But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit ? ' — The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end2 the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul ; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy ; not the former, because it is non-intelligent ; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree- ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (' For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,' &c; Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical assump- tion of agents, and so on — comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream — holds good in the sphere of Nescience only ; while the pas- sage, ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another ? ' declares that all that practically postulated exist- ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on
account of the agreement (of the attributes of that
person with the nature of Brahman).