and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti. And this a priori impression — which, although no doubt significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive — is confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of Sutras which .Sarikara connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by 6ankara and Ramanu^a has been stated above in the con- spectus of contents ; the points which render the interpre- tation given by Ramanu^a more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first place, the circumstance — relevant although not decisive in itself — that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that the text of Sutra 13, 'spashfo hy ekesham/ is more appropriately understood, with Rama- nu^-a, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in the preceding Sutra, than — with ^Sankara — as embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case we should expect not ' hi ' but ' tu '). And, in the third place, the ' eke/ i.e. 'some/ referred to in Sutra 13 would, on vSahkara's interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sutra had referred, viz. the followers of the Ka^va-^akha (the two Vedic passages referred to in 12 and 13 being Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2, 11, according to the Ka^va recension); while it is the standing practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the designation ' eke,' members of Vedic ^akhas, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding Sutras. With this practice Ramanu^a's interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees ; for, according to him, the ' eke ' are the Ma- dhyandinas, whose reading in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. c tasmat,' clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the Ka^vas denotes the j-arira, i.e. the ^iva. I think it is not saying too much that .Sankara's explana- tion, according to which the * eke ' would denote the very same Ka^vas to whom the preceding Sutra had referred- — so that the Ka?zvas would be distinguished from themselves as it were — is altogether impossible.
The result of this closer consideration of the first set of
XC VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
Sutras, alleged by vSahkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust 6ankara's assertion that another set also — IV, 4, 1-7 — has to be detached from the general topic of the fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7) obliges vSankara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities which clearly cannot belong to them ; so that he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary state- ment that those qualities belong to them ' vyavaharape- kshaya/ while yet the purport of the whole adhikara^a is said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no vyavahara exists ! Very truly vSankara's com- mentator here remarks, 'atra ke£in muhyanti skhanda- ^inmatra^anan muktasya^anabhavat kuta a^Tzanika- dharmayoga^,' and the way in which thereupon he himself attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.
In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyaya with another passage> which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of vSankara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or — according to Ramanu^a — the worshippers of which Brah- man repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanu^a treats the views of Badari and (Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of Badaraya^a — which is stated last — as the siddhanta. vSankara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/za's view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/za (a proceeding which, although not
Introduction. Xc1
plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegiti- mate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhanta, while Caimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purva- paksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras to conclude the dis- cussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that vSarikara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if .Sankara's system itself is already accepted.
The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Ramanu^a as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Sankara's sense.
If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the dis- tinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately connected with this investiga- tion— in fact, one with it from a certain point of view — is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or l^vara. That Ramanu^a denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above ; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-
XC11 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves.
Placing myself at the point of view of a vSankara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i. e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define? — That Brah- man, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta ; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact which 5ankara calls the highest. — But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Mayd or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as sa£-£id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory ^lokas of the Pa#£ada.ri dilating on the samvid svayam- prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P. D. I, 7). ' That from which the world proceeds ' can by a 5ankara be accepted only as a definition of l^vara, of Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should con- clude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brah^ man as one only, as the all-enfolding being which some- times emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its
Introduction. Xc111
various manifestations— -a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Ramanu^as — the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.
We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Badaraya^a defines Brah- man, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mayd, is con- firmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being throughout far from direct in their enun- ciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sutrakara against the Sankhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by them- selves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga- tion. The sixth Sutra of the p&da mentioned replies to the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that c it is thus seen/ i. e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence ; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung. — Now, an argu- mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true vSankara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with the prakr/ti of the Sankhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-
XC1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS.